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PROLOGUE
The quest for regional integration has been a centerpiece of the development 
strategy of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. In the past three 
decades, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have become the instrument of 
choice. However, while this “new regionalism” was successful in overcoming the 
limitations of previous inward-looking integration initiatives, the proliferation 
of PTAs resulted in a regulatory architecture that does not necessarily provide 
firms with the nimbleness required to compete in the global economy of the 21st 
century.
With this challenge as its backdrop, this report provides a comprehensive review 
of the trade integration policies undertaken in LAC in the past quarter-century. 
It begins with an in-depth characterization of the current state of PTAs across 
the region, measuring current results against original objectives. This is followed 
by an econometric impact evaluation of the agreements that is based not only on 
an unprecedented granular analysis of intraregional trade flows, but also on an 
assessment of their effectiveness as springboards for greater insertion into the 
global economy. Taking stock of this wealth of analytical evidence, it outlines an 
agenda for closing the gap between expectations and results.
The contribution of this research to the vast literature on LAC integration is 
twofold. The empirical analysis focuses for the first time on the results since the 
turn of the millennium, when LAC’s regionalism has been tested by the prolif-
eration of PTAs around the world and major transformations in the drivers of 
global interdependence. On the other hand, rather than focusing on the multi-
ple political and economic facets of regional integration, it zeroes in on the trade 
dimension to put forward a policy proposal that aims to address the current 
balkanization of the regional trading system step-by-step. More to the point, it 
provides an estimation of the gains to be expected from a fully-fledged regional 
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free trade area, and from a more gradual convergence approach based on the 
cumulation of the rules of origin among existing agreements.
Supporting LAC countries in the pursuit of deeper integration lies at the heart of 
the institutional strategy of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The 
central tenet is that by simultaneously addressing deficiencies in the policy and 
regulatory frameworks—the integration software—and in physical cross-border 
infrastructure—the integration hardware—the IDB can focus on its compara-
tive advantages, while tailoring interventions to the needs of individual member 
countries and subregions.
The outlined policy road map to address existing inefficiencies contributes to 
this mandate. Given the current uncertain global trade environment, the report 
argues that it is in the region’s best interest to go beyond the current mosaic of 
small agreements and to move gradually towards a unified regional market. By 
connecting these dots, policymakers across the region have an opportunity to 
upgrade their integration software and thereby to fulfill the long-professed aspi-
ration of improving lives through regional integration.
Antoni Estevadeordal 
Sector Manager
Integration and Trade Sector
Vice Presidency for Sectors and Knowledge
IDB
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IN BRIEF
Connecting the Dots
As governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from 
across the entire political spectrum continue to profess their commitment to 
regional integration, what can be said of their experiment with the “new region-
alism” in the last quarter of a century? Has it met expectations? Do these policies 
still make sense in a much-changed world economy? What should the agenda 
ahead be?
• Looking first into the rearview mirror, one can see a nuanced picture. The 
open regionalism of the early 1990s clearly overcame the paralysis of the 
postwar period, which was rooted in a sharp conflict between countries’ 
protectionist leanings and their aspirations toward integration. The quan-
titative exercises in this study show unequivocally that subregional prefer-
ential trade agreements (PTAs) were powerful tools for promoting regional 
integration: they boosted intraregional trade by 64% on average, despite a 
mixed record of implementation.
• However, the results also show that these PTAs were very ineffective in 
meeting what was their main economic motivation: to boost competitive-
ness abroad. The new regionalism’s shift to more pragmatic, subregional set-
ups was a mixed blessing. It simplified and expedited negotiations, but it 
opened the door to fragmentation and a mosaic of small PTAs, setting strict 
limits to trade and productivity gains.
• LAC’s small, subregional PTAs, whose members share similar comparative 
advantages, are poorly equipped to generate large enough scale and special-
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ization gains to move the global competitiveness needle. This is especially 
true at a time when the emergence of mega-economies and mega-agree-
ments are transforming the world economy.
• If LAC governments want to hold on to their regional integration objectives 
and give them a stronger economic backbone, they have little choice but to 
converge to a regionwide free trade agreement (LAC-FTA). Unlike during 
previous initiatives, the region has now a favorable policy environment and 
a strong head-start: nearly 90% of intraregional trade is already duty-free.
• Governments can pick different routes to convergence, depending on 
their political circumstances. They could take a more cautious, step-by-
step approach, beginning by extending the cumulation of rules of origin 
among existing agreements and then filling in gaps in these relationships. 
Alternatively, they could plot a nonstop course to a LAC-FTA.
• Given the region’s experiences with customs unions, supranational insti-
tutions, and complex disciplines, the recommendations point to a “plain 
vanilla” free trade zone, based on intergovernmental architecture and with 
a focus on goods and services. In the spirit of a “living agreement,” other 
issues such as intellectual property, labor, or the environment may be con-
sidered once the foundations for this regional free trade agreement (LAC-
FTA) for goods and services is firmly in place.
• The agreement should also include a broad chapter on trade facilitation, 
covering not just customs-related measures but also mechanisms capable 
of minimizing transportation and transaction costs, such as technical stan-
dards, phytosanitary measures, and logistics. While efforts to rationalize and 
promote the harmonization of these measures do not necessarily depend on 
a formal trade agreement, this platform represents a major opportunity to 
facilitate coordination and enforce the commitments already contained in 
a series of subregional initiatives relating to both infrastructure and trade 
facilitation.
• There is no need for all the region’s governments to be involved at the early 
stages of the negotiation. All is needed is a critical mass of countries with 
enough gravitational pull and in this regard Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 
are in a unique position to make things happen and eventually bring to-
gether the region’s largest subregional blocs—the Pacific Alliance (PA) and 
MERCOSUR—whose combined US$4.3-trillion market accounts for 81% 
of LAC’s GDP.
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• Estimates of the immediate, localized impact of a LAC-FTA point to av-
erage gains of 9% for interregional trade in the intermediate goods used 
in the region’s exports, which would be an important boost for LAC’s un-
derdeveloped value chains. Likewise, an average 3.5% increase is expected 
for intraregional trade as whole (an additional US$11.3 billion, based on 
2017 flows), with significant variance across subregions and sectors (rang-
ing from 1% in mining in the Andean countries to 8% in manufacturing in 
Mexico and 21% in agriculture in Central America).
• Even if these gains are taken at face value—and they are admittedly partial, 
lower-bound estimates—they cannot be dismissed as irrelevant, particular-
ly in a context where intraregional trade has fallen by 26% between 2012 
and 2017. Estimates that seek to capture economy-wide effects tell a similar 
story of modest yet palpable gains that are particularly useful for illustrat-
ing the insurance policy dimension of potential convergence. If frictions in 
global trade increase—a probability which seems to be increasing by the 
hour—a regionwide FTA would mitigate negative impacts on LAC exports 
by as much as 40%.
• These estimates also send an important message in terms of the advantages 
of taking an aggressive approach to convergence rather than a cautious one. 
If the gains of moving all the way toward a LAC-FTA are palpable but limit-
ed, a slow, step-by-step approach could render these gains irrelevant despite 
the eventual political advantages of such strategy, particularly given the pace 
of the transformations sweeping the world economy. If governments in the 
region are really committed to strengthening both the political and the eco-
nomic cases for integration, time, unfortunately, is not on their side.

INTRODUCTION
As governments across the region and across the entire political spectrum con-
tinue to profess their commitment to deeper regional integration, what can be 
said of the experiment with the “new regionalism” that Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) has been engaged in for more than a quarter of a century? Has 
it met expectations? Do these policies still make sense in a much-changed world 
economy? What should the agenda ahead be?
LAC has a long history of trial and error, and successes and failures, in pursu-
ing regional integration. The first formal attempts came in the 1960s with the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free 
Trade Area (LAFTA, South America plus Mexico), which then evolved into the 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).1 Other initiatives followed, such 
as the Andean Community (CAN) and the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA), which later became the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Most 
of these early initiatives, however, bore few economic or institutional fruits.
The quest for integration was reignited in the early 1990s, when the aftermath 
of the debt crisis and the ensuing market-oriented reforms gave rise to a “new 
regionalism”—a group of deeper, more comprehensive, and more open inte-
gration initiatives that led to the consolidation of five subregional trade blocs: 
CAN, the CACM, CARICOM, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), 
and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).
A quarter of a century later, this initial scenario of five trade blocs evolved into a 
broad, complex network of intra- and extraregional preferential trade agreements 
1 LAIA, also known by its Spanish acronym ALADI, was founded in 1980 and its members are currently 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Nicaragua has been in the process of accession since 2011.
WHAT ARE THE RESULTS?
WHAT SHOULD  
THE AGENDA BE? 
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(PTAs) that reaches as far as Europe and Asia and covers a wide, varied range of 
disciplines from trade through investment to labor regulation. The initial agree-
ments themselves underwent major changes born out of internal conflicts, shifting 
memberships, the emergence of competing initiatives such as the Pacific Alliance 
(PA), and, in some cases, new commitments toward deeper integration. They have 
also been joined by new sectoral initiatives that work on specific issues: infrastruc-
ture and other development issues are the focus of the Initiative for the Integration 
of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) and the Mesoamerica 
Plan, while the Latin American Integrated Market (MILA) is financially orient-
ed. New regional institutions with objectives beyond an economic agenda have 
also emerged, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
These developments raise important questions that are key to designing an effec-
tive policy agenda for the coming decades and generations: what lessons can be 
drawn from the experiences of this last quarter century? Has the “new regional-
ism” met the economic and political expectations around it? Which institutional 
architecture has delivered the best results—common markets, customs unions, 
or free trade zones? How do intraregional agreements compare to extraregional 
ones? How have regional and multilateral integration interacted? How can we 
build on the legacy of these initiatives?
This is not the first time these questions have been asked. There is a vast literature 
on the new regionalism in LAC, but most of the empirical analysis focuses on the 
economic impacts (trade and investment) and institutional developments of the 
1990s, as reviewed and analyzed by the IDB (2002). What has been almost entirely 
absent is a solid and comprehensive analysis of the crucial developments in the 
first decade and a half of the 21st century, when the region’s integration initiatives 
were tested by major events such as the proliferation of new PTAs, the marked 
divergences in member countries’ political cycles, the emergence of China and 
global value chains, the onset of negotiations around mega-agreements such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), the Great Recession, and, most recently, the Brexit referendum 
and the United States’ decision not to ratify the TPP and to renegotiate NAFTA.2
2 The TPP was signed in 2016 between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. The US subsequently withdrew on January 23, 2017, 
but in March 2018 the remaining 11 members agreed to go ahead with implementing a modified agreement 
which was renamed Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. 
See, for instance, https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2018/03/economist-explains-8. The 
TTIP is an agreement between the United States and Europe whose negotiations were interrupted by the 
Brexit referendum. See https://ustr.gov/ttip.
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This report seeks to revisit these questions and is organized into five sections.3 
The first tries to pinpoint the main economic motivations behind LAC’s age-old 
push for deeper integration. It argues that this has always been about the scale 
and specialization gains that a larger market can bring and their impact on extra-
regional exports. The second section addresses the questions of how far LAC has 
gone in its pursuit of integration, and where it now stands in terms of the depth, 
breadth, and implementation of its main PTAs. It reveals that there has been 
significant progress in building a vast network of intraregional PTAs, but that 
integration still suffers from excessive fragmentation, implementation issues, 
and important missing links in terms of relationships and products covered.
The third section combines the best methodological tools available to assess how 
far LAC integration has fulfilled governments’ expectations. It looks at the impact 
of PTAs on intraregional trade, trade diversion, and extraregional exports. The 
evidence suggests that even though considerable progress has been made in liber-
alizing and boosting intraregional trade, the impact on extraregional exports has 
mostly been confined to PTAs that involve large partners outside the region. The 
small size and similar comparative advantages of the intraregional PTAs, as well 
as deficiencies in implementation, seem to explain most of the results. 
The fourth section takes stock of the findings and outlines an agenda for closing 
the gap between expectations and results, against the backdrop of the recent 
changes in the world economy. Its main message is that there is a need to go 
beyond the current mosaic of small agreements and work toward a unified re-
gional market—ultimately a LAC free trade agreement or LAC-FTA—building 
upon the existing network of PTAs. The key challenges are filling in the remain-
ing product and relationship gaps and unifying the spaghetti bowl of rules of 
origin (RoOs).
The fifth and final section offers a few estimates of the potential trade gains as-
sociated with a move toward a unified regional market. It argues that though the 
gains are far from a panacea, the region can hardly afford to leave them on the 
table in this challenging trade environment. Moreover, addressing the current 
fragmentation is the best way to strengthen the economic fundamentals of what 
is essentially a long-professed political goal.
3 A preview of some of the findings and policy recommendations of this report appeared in Powell (2017).

1WHY INTEGRATION?
LAC regional integration has always been about improving lives by reaping size 
and specialization gains. That much was clear in this proposal put forward by 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) in the late 1950s: “The 
progressive realization of the common market will gradually transform it through 
the major advantages that may arise from a more rational organization of the pro-
ductive system in which the land’s potential is used most effectively and in which 
industry can grow, moving beyond the narrow limits of the domestic market. This 
increased productivity would then build on its already significant contribution to 
standards of living in Latin America.”4
It goes on to argue that: “Increasing industrial exports to the rest of the world 
may be one of the consequences of the common market, even if it is not its direct, 
primary, immediate objective. This objective is twofold; a) to intensively develop 
the industrial exports of each country in Latin America to the rest of these, and 
b) to foster the traditional trade in primary products ...”5
Thirty years later, these very same expectations around scale and specialization 
would inspire a new wave of integration initiatives and still seem to be guiding 
today’s policy makers. All around the region, integration agreements are still 
sold on the idea that a larger, more competitive market will make firms more 
productive on the back of scale and specialization gains while providing more 
opportunities for every member to diversify toward higher value-added goods 
or tasks, usually associated with manufacturing.6
S
E
C
T
IO
N
4 ECLAC (1959: 4). Translated from the Spanish-language original.
5 ECLAC (1959: 7). Translated from the Spanish-language original.
6 See, for example, Argentina’s Strategic Industrial Plan 2020 (2011: 275).
AGREEMENTS ARE STILL 
BEING SOLD ON SCALE AND 
SPECIALIZATION GAINS 
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As far back as Adam Smith, economic theory provides broad support for the 
importance of these gains, but the case for regional trade liberalization, as 
opposed to unilateral or wider multilateral liberalization, is not so clear-cut. 
Still, there are good reasons for pursuing a regional strategy. The first has to do 
with the need for reciprocity. In the context of unilateral liberalizations, large 
countries have an incentive to apply what is known as an optimal tariff to im-
prove their terms of trade. Since they account for a significant share of global 
markets, a tariff would reduce demand for their imports, leading to a drop in 
the prices of their imports vis-à-vis the prices of their exports. If there were no 
coordination, countries left to their own unilateral devices might then apply 
relatively high tariffs, an outcome that would be inefficient compared to a co-
ordinated agreement on a lower tariff structure. Countries’ decisions around 
their tariff policies then become like the prisoner’s dilemma, and some level 
of coordination is required to avoid an inefficient, uncoordinated outcome.7 
The same coordination problem arises in connection with countries’ incen-
tives for protecting their markets to scale up at home and be more competitive 
abroad.8 In addition to this fundamental coordination problem, there is also 
the argument that reciprocity may yield more predictable market access.9
Why regional? Since coordination can happen at both the regional and mul-
tilateral levels, the case for a regional approach must go beyond the need for 
reciprocity. It must bring in arguments about strategy, such as the greater sim-
plicity and speed of regional negotiations, the potential of PTAs to minimize the 
disadvantages of country size to capture welfare and growth-enhancing sectors 
with increasing returns, and their potential for minimizing adjustment costs 
and maximizing gains by giving members more time to adjust and learn how to 
survive in a more competitive multilateral environment.10
More complicated than justifying the theoretical relevance of a regional approach 
is how to go about its implementation. There is a vast literature, starting with 
Viner (1950), that draws attention to the risks of regional integration—which 
range from trade diversion to agglomeration—and discusses optimal strategies 
in terms of partners and PTA design.11 The resulting message is clear: the mo-
tivation behind them might be the same, but not all integration schemes are 
equal. The range of combinations between types of partner (e.g., North–South or 
7 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
8 For example, Venables (1987), Brander and Spencer (1984), Ossa (2011), and Mrázová (2011).
9 Limão and Maggi (2015).
10 See Cooper and Massell (1965) and Devlin and Ffrench-Davis (1999). See, for example, Baldwin (2009) and 
Estevadeordal et al. (2009) for a  review of the arguments for regional integration.
11 For example, Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1996), Venables (2003), and Baldwin (2011).
MORE COMPLICATED THAN 
JUSTIFYING THE PTAs 
THEORETICAL RELEVANCE  
IS HOW TO TO GO ABOUT ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION  
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South–South) and types of design (e.g., customs unions, free trade zones, or com-
mon markets) can produce vastly different results. This is particularly relevant to 
understanding results and properly framing expectations about LAC integration. 
As has been shown elsewhere, the limitations of market size and similarity of 
comparative advantages in South–South agreements make them more prone to 
trade diversion and to the divergence of member country incomes.12
Likewise, regional integration initiatives do not emerge in an economic and 
political vacuum. If the macroeconomic and growth fundamentals are weak, 
as has been often the case in the region until recently, benefits are likely to be 
minimal. If there is no political consensus within and across member coun-
tries on what economic policies to follow, the results are also bound to be dis-
appointing. The external environment also matters. An agreement signed in a 
world economy with few agreements is likely to involve different motivations 
and payoffs than an agreement signed in a world heavily populated by PTAs 
like the one we are living in today. For instance, in the early 1990s, preferences 
that formed part of even relatively small agreements could go some way to-
ward meeting the objectives of trade creation and scale gains, whereas that is 
unlikely in the current context of mega-economies and agreements. There has 
also been a radical change in perspective. Early on, signing PTAs may have 
been seen as a proactive trade policy; now, however, they are perceived as little 
more than a damage limitation exercise, as countries scramble to minimize 
trade diversion costs.13
Politics also matter. Even though it seems that economics has historically 
been the main driver of LAC integration, it was clearly not the only motiva-
tion. Both governments and academics usually mention political or political 
economy–related reasons for integration. Unlike economic motivations, these 
reasons are harder to generalize for the whole region and their results much 
harder to assess empirically. All the same, they cannot be ignored, particularly 
because they often play an important role in explaining design and implemen-
tation decisions. The main, most often-cited political motivation is the quest 
for security and political stability in the region, clearly inspired by the example 
of the European Union.14 The main idea is that an increase in the intraregional 
flow of goods, investment, and people creates a web of common interest that 
can reduce rivalries among member states and forge political consensus on 
12 See Venables (2003) and Moncarz, Olarreaga, and Vaillant (2016).
13 See Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012).
14 See, for example, World Bank (2000).
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
MOTIVATIONS ALSO 
MATTER
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issues such as democratic rule and economic policies. This seems to have been 
a major motivation behind agreements such as MERCOSUR, CAN, the CACM 
and CARICOM. The results, as is discussed in the following sections, have been 
mixed.
Along with security and stability comes the idea that regional agreements can 
increase member countries’ bargaining power in international negotiations, in-
cluding the signing of other trade agreements. It is harder to disagree with the 
logic of this argument, but has it actually proved to be the case? Have members 
of subregional agreements effectively exercised this advantage when negotiat-
ing new treaties with other countries or blocs? Again, LAC’s experience seems 
mixed and it is important to understand why, since the benefits can be sub-
stantial—particularly for small countries, as seems to have been the case in the 
negotiations of CAFTA and the CARIFORUM-EU PTA.
In the realm of political economy, the so-called lock-in or domestic-commitment 
argument is particularly prominent and has even been the subject of a formal 
theory.15 The main idea is that trade agreements can help governments to reduce 
the influence of domestic lobbies and, therefore, guarantee the consolidation of 
sound economic policies. The most frequently cited example in the region is 
Mexico and the negotiation of NAFTA, but this could be easily extended to all 
North–South agreements LAC countries have signed.16 How important this mo-
tivation was for the signing of these agreements is difficult to assess because there 
is no clear counterfactual. It is hard to believe, though, that these agreements 
would have been signed if sizeable market access gains were not on the table. In 
any case, even a cursory look at the countries in the region that have engaged in 
North–South agreements reveals that they did manage to achieve a significant 
degree of stability in their economic policies. That is not the case, though, for the 
intraregional, South–South PTAs, where, for instance, MERCOSUR and CAN 
experienced significant volatility in their member countries’ economic policies.
While acknowledging the relevance of political or political economy–related 
motivations, the fundamental premise of this report is that they are unlikely to 
have been the dominant force behind the “new regionalism” in LAC and could 
hardly have been acted upon without a clear economic motivation. The analysis 
in the following sections focuses precisely on how the region acted upon this 
motivation and the results obtained so far.
15 See, for example, Fernandez and Portes (1998) and Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2007).
16 See, for example, Whalley (1998).
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2SECTIONLAC’S JOURNEY TO INTEGRATION: HOW AND HOW FAR DID IT GO?
LAC arguably started pursuing regional integration earlier than any other region 
in the world except Europe and has gone much further in doing so. However, it 
has been a long and winding road, one that illustrates the difficulties in translat-
ing sound motivations into effective designs and implementation. LAFTA, for 
instance, which was launched in 1960 and was the most promising of the early 
initiatives due to the size of the market involved, had no chance of producing 
meaningful scale and diversification gains if liberalization was supposed to be 
mainly restricted to “industries that do not exist yet, or that are at an early stage 
of development” so as to protect “existing industries.”17 The initiative aimed at 
free trade by 1973 but never came close to achieving its objectives due to mem-
ber countries’ pursuit of protectionist industrialization strategies.18
These contradictions between integration objectives and national policies also 
undermined the subregional initiatives that followed, seen as a more viable al-
ternative to a complex regionwide agreement. The Central American Common 
Market (CACM, 1960), the Andean Community (CAN, 1969), and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM, 1973) (see boxes 2 to 4) all failed to significantly dis-
mantle trade barriers, which was aggravated by the fact that they represented 
significantly smaller markets than LAFTA, which undercut their potential gains.
In 1980, the region made another attempt at a regionwide integration through 
the signing of the Montevideo Treaty, which established the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA). Unlike LAFTA, LAIA does not require that bi-
17 ECLAC (1959: 4). Translated from the Spanish-language original.
18 LAFTA was signed in February 1960, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay. Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela became members shortly thereafter. See Milenky (1973).
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lateral preferences be extended to all the other members of the agreement (the 
most favored nation, or MFN, clause). Despite these more flexible rules, the new 
arrangement did little to free up intraregional trade, at least in its first decade, as 
members remained committed to protectionist strategies.19 However, it laid the 
legal framework for the proliferation of intraregional PTAs that followed, which 
contributed significantly to free intraregional trade but with one important col-
lateral cost: the fragmentation and dilution of trade gains.
This proliferation of PTAs came in the 1990s when this mismatch between in-
tegration and national policies was much reduced by a regionwide shift toward 
market-friendly policies. In the context of what became known as the “Great 
Liberalization,” LAC embarked on a new wave of regional integration initiatives 
which advanced hand-in-hand with unilateral and multilateral liberalizations 
and thus were less prone to conflicts between regional and national trade poli-
cies and less exposed to trade diversion.20 Unfortunately, the trend toward frag-
mentation triggered by the disappointment around LAFTA not only endured 
but also came to include a very active bilateral component.
Under the guise of the “new regionalism,” the subregional dimension was 
reinvigorated with the creation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
(CSME, 1989), the relaunch of CACM (1991) and CAN (1993), and the 
establishment of a new bloc, MERCOSUR (1991). Inspired by the European 
Union model, they all aimed to create customs unions or even single markets 
(CARICOM) with free movement of goods, services, and labor and an extensive 
list of supranational institutions. While these arrangements all made significant 
advances compared to their previous incarnations, particularly in terms of freeing 
intrabloc trade, they generally fell short of implementing full customs unions or 
even free trade zones. Some, such as the CACM, came closer than others to 
achieving this, but not enough to eliminate “exceptions” or cumbersome and 
costly RoOs.21 They also struggled to develop effective regional institutions that 
had sufficient technical expertise and political clout to pursue the goals of the 
agreements, enforce their rules, and mediate disputes (see boxes 2 to 5). That 
was particularly the case for CAN, where political disagreements eventually led 
to Venezuela leaving the agreement in 2006.
19 See, e.g., Da Silva Bichara (2012).
20 For details on the “Great Liberalization” see Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013). On the “new regionalism” see, 
for example, Estevadeordal, Giordano, and Ramos (2014), Inter-American Development Bank (2002), Porta 
(2008), and Lagos (2008) and references cited therein.
21 See box 1 for a definition of rules of origin.
THE NEW REGIONALISM 
BROUGHT FREER 
INTRAREGIONAL TRADE BUT 
ALSO FRAGMENTATION
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The weakness of regional institutions, compounded by the imperfect nature of 
the customs unions, also undermined the blocs’ abilities to negotiate with the 
rest of the world, whether within or outside the region, which eventually led to 
new perforations of the common external tariff (CET) as members sought to 
sign new PTAs bilaterally.
With the benefit of hindsight, the difficulties faced by these agreements were 
perhaps to have been expected. Size brings benefits but it also entails costs, 
The RoOs in PTAs are the criteria that establish 
the degree to which materials or components 
imported from nonmember countries can 
be incorporated into a product and have it 
still qualify for duty-free treatment under the 
agreement. These criteria are negotiated as 
part of the agreement and can range from the 
very restrictive (almost no imported materials 
allowed) to the quite permissive (significant 
imported inputs allowed). Such rules are 
necessary to prevent goods from nonmembers 
entering through the lowest-tariff member and 
then moving freely to higher-tariff members, 
thus circumventing their tariffs. Regardless of 
the restrictiveness of RoOs and the need for 
them, these types of controls can impede trade 
flows among a group of countries, even if they 
all share PTAs.
WHAT IS CUMULATION OF RoOs?
One feature of almost all RoOs is the ability to “cumulate” inputs from other members of the 
agreement. For example, within NAFTA, auto parts from Mexico can be used in auto assembly in the 
United States and not disqualify the resulting cars from preferential treatment going into Canada, 
because all three countries are NAFTA members and so intermediate inputs from any one of them 
can be treated as “originating” in any of the others. Within the agreement, supply chains can thus 
function freely and the resulting products can benefit from it. However, the formation of more 
sophisticated supply chains across countries linked by different agreements can be limited by the 
fact that there is no cumulation across agreements.
BOX 1  WHAT ARE RULES OF ORiGiN (RoOs)?
United
States
The value of the
Mexican auto
parts counts as
North American 
Mexico
Canada
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which come in the form of heterogeneous preferences.22 The larger and deeper 
the political union is, the more difficult it is to devise policies and produce pub-
lic goods that satisfy every member’s political and economic preferences. This 
is particularly true when these preferences are volatile and member countries 
lack solid institutions to promote consensus and anchor regional institutional 
development.
To put it plainly, replicating the European model without Europe’s political con-
sensus and financial and institutional resources was bound to be a bumpy ride, 
and this was confirmed by the reality on the ground. What is perhaps surprising 
is that even for the CACM and CARICOM, which have relatively small polit-
ical and economic territories (all but three CARICOM countries—Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti—are classified by the United Nation as “mi-
crostates”) and which obviously stand to gain from sharing social and physical 
infrastructure, such trade-offs between the size of the union and the complexity 
of satisfying all parties’ preferences have proven too steep to accept.23
In any event, however miscalculated the political ambitions behind these agree-
ments were and whatever the shortcomings in their implementation, their trade 
gains were bound to be relatively small because of the inherent limitation of 
their economic size and the similarity of comparative advantages within them, 
as will be discussed in more detail in section 3.
Perhaps understanding these limitations and trade-offs better, Mexico and Chile 
took a different path and avoided ambitious regional projects in favor of stan-
dard PTAs, most of which were bilateral, except for Mexico’s membership of 
NAFTA (1994).24 NAFTA was a breakthrough on at least two counts: it broke 
with the customs union/single market model and went beyond the region to 
sign a PTA with none of the limitations of size and comparative advantages 
typical of the intra-LAC PTAs. NAFTA also opened the door to several other 
extraregional PTAs involving the US, Europe, and Asia, including the recently 
negotiated but as yet unratified TPP and its reduced version, the CPTPP. This 
expansion was spearheaded by Mexico and Chile, followed by Peru, Colombia, 
and Central America.
While it made perfect economic sense for Chile and Mexico to embark on such 
endeavors, this process brought greater fragmentation to the region, as what 
22 See Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
23 See Mesquita Moreira and Mendoza (2007) for a detailed discussion about these trade-offs in CARICOM.
24 See Miller (2016) for a detailed description of the agreement.
MEXICO AND CHILE TOOK 
A DIFFERENT PATH AND 
AVOIDED AMBITIOUS 
REGIONAL PROJECTS IN 
FAVOR OF STANDARD PTAs
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would come to be known as the “spaghetti bowl” was piled high with regional 
and bilateral PTAs, that rested on an even larger collection of RoOs. There is no 
doubt that LAC is mostly better off with this tangle of PTAs than with no PTAs 
at all, as it has significantly reduced trade costs for intraregional trade. It is also 
clear, though, that it has left the region worse off than if it had been free of the 
distortions of multiple preferences and RoOs, as originally envisaged by LAFTA.
The good news is that, ironically, this legacy of fragmentation has left a strong 
platform from which the region can resume its quest for an integrated market, 
with enough scale and resource diversity to generate significant trade gains and 
boost its competitive position abroad. There have already been concrete initia-
tives to take advantage of this platform by consolidating existing agreements 
and harmonizing preferences and rules. The most prominent of these initia-
tives is the Pacific Alliance, an agreement between Colombia, Chile, Mexico, 
and Peru that was launched in 2012 (see box 6). Mexico’s 2011 agreement 
with Central America, which consolidated four previous bilateral agreements, 
points in the same direction. The big prize, though, would be a regionwide 
consolidation of existing agreements: an initiative along the lines of what as 
unsuccessfully attempted, in a hemispheric scale, with the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA) in the early 2000s. Is it an unrealistic preposition? This 
question can only be answered by having a clear understanding of how far the 
region has gone in liberalizing intraregional trade.25
Surprisingly Close to Free Intraregional 
Trade, But…
Where does the region stand on liberalizing intraregional trade? Excluding 
those agreements that cover less than 80% of products, there are currently 33 
LAC-to-LAC PTAs in force, including the four original blocs discussed earlier 
(CACM, MERCOSUR, CAN, and CARICOM; see Annex 1). This network of 
agreements covers bilateral relationships accounting for approximately 85% of 
the current value of intraregional trade, and nearly half of that takes place with-
in the four original agreements themselves (figure 2.1).26 The other half is made 
up of bilateral or plurilateral PTAs, including those that connect Mexico and 
Chile to other LAC countries and MERCOSUR and CAN member countries.
THE GOOD NEWS IS 
THAT THIS LEGACY OF 
FRAGMENTATION HAS LEFT 
A STRONG PLATFORM FROM 
WHICH THE REGION CAN 
RESUME ITS QUEST FOR AN 
INTEGRATED MARKET
25 For an analysis of the FTAA initiative,  see Estevadeordal et al. (2004).
26 IDB estimates based on INTrade for 2016.
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BOX 2  THE CENTRAL AMERiCAN COMMON MARKET (CACM)a
The General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration which established the CACM was 
signed in December 1960 by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Membership was later 
expanded to include Costa Rica in 1962 and Panama in 2012. The CACM was originally established 
with the objective of forming a customs union within five years. However, the unfavorable economic 
environment of the 1970s and 1980s, together with military conflict in some countries, led to 
stagnation in the integration process until the early 1990s, when it regained momentum and became 
heavily institutionalized.
In 1991, countries reaffirmed their political commitment to integration through the Tegucigalpa 
Protocol, which created the Central American Integration System (SICA).b The SICA is an overarching 
framework under which four subsystems were later established to manage economic, social, 
political, and cultural integration. In 1993, a protocol to the 1960 General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration created the Subsystem for Economic Integration, whose technical and 
administrative body is the Secretariat for Economic Integration (SIECA), to oversee the application 
of all legal instruments regulating trade relations. This protocol effectively brought the CACM within 
the larger institutional framework of the SICA, which also includes the Central American Parliament 
and the Central American Court of Justice.
In terms of trade regulations, over 99% of tariff lines are eligible for duty-free treatment among 
the five original bloc members.c Similarly, norms were enacted to reduce nontariff barriers (NTBs), 
including those pertaining to technical and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, while safeguard 
measures were excluded from application among member countries.
With regard to deeper disciplines, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
signed the CACM Agreement on Investment and Trade in Services in 2002.d However, as the agreement 
recognizes the limitations established in national legislation, signing it did not necessarily imply 
that cross-border services and investment would be liberalized to a greater degree than what was 
already allowed under each country’s internal regulations and under multilateral agreements such 
as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Although, as its name implies, the CACM aims to achieve a common market, it is still in the process of 
establishing a customs union, which is expected for 2024. As of 2014, the CET covered 95.7% of tariff 
lines (8-digit level). However, following Panama’s entry into the bloc, this figure was substantially 
reduced due to the country’s exclusion of several tariff lines from its harmonization commitments. 
Moreover, negotiations of extrabloc PTAs on a bilateral basis further perforated the CET, as individual 
members extended different tariff preferences to nonmember countries.
As with other ambitious LAC integration schemes, the CACM’s challenge is to turn a complex and 
costly institutional and legal apparatus (SICA is made up of approximately 600 legal instruments) into 
an effective tool for regional integration. There are improvements to be made in implementation—
which could be facilitated by more realistic goals—and in coordination between regional and 
national institutions. SIECA, for instance, is often charged with implementing potentially conflicting 
instructions emanating from political bodies, such as the SICA.
(continued on next page)
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BOX 2  THE CENTRAL AMERiCAN COMMON MARKET (CACM)a (continued)
The time seems ripe for the subregion to take stock of its integration objectives. A common market, 
with fully functional supranational institutions, has proved to be an elusive proposition, either 
because of limited financial and institutional resources or because member countries are not 
ready to compromise on their national interests. The customs union seems to be a more viable 
proposition, but then the whole institutional and legal apparatus would need to be streamlined and 
focus on the objective at hand. The status quo does seem to be the best option to rationalize the 
use of scarce financial and institutional resources and maximize the gains from integration.
a  This box draws on, but also departs from, Santamaría and Zúñiga (2016).
b  Belize and the Dominican Republic became full members of the SICA in 2000 and 2013, respectively, but are not party 
to the CACM.
c  Unroasted coffee and cane sugar are the only general exceptions to the duty-free rule, in addition to a short list of 
bilateral exceptions. The figures exclude Panama, which acceded in 2012 and is in the process of eliminating intrabloc tariffs.
d  Two additional protocols on investment and trade in services were signed in 2007 and 2011, but are pending ratification.
BOX 3  THE ANDEAN COMMUNiTY (CAN)a
(continued on next page)
The agreement, then known as the Andean Pact, was originally signed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, with the goal of forming a common market. Venezuela joined the 
group in 1973, and Chile left in 1976 amid disagreements about the bloc’s idea of fostering more 
import substitution. The relaunching of the agreement came in 1992, under the auspices of the 
“new regionalism,” when a free trade area was finally implemented with ambitions to become a 
customs union. The bloc’s relaunch was accompanied by greater institutionalization of the regional 
integration process under the framework of the Andean Integration System. The system is made up 
of both intergovernmental and supranational bodies: the former includes the Andean Presidential 
Council, the Andean Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the Commission of the Andean 
Community, while the Andean Parliament, the General Secretariat, and the Andean Court of Justice 
perform supranational legislative, executive, and judiciary functions, respectively.
All products enjoy duty-free status when traded among the four member countries. Common 
regulations on technical and sanitary measures and cross-border transportation, among other 
matters, were also adopted. However, residual protection has disrupted trade relations, particularly 
with regards to the imposition of safeguard measures, which are allowed and have been utilized in a 
few circumstances.b Moreover, although member countries have agreed to submit any trade disputes 
to the Court of Justice, its decisions have often yielded no consequences for the offending country.
As to services, the general framework adopted recognizes MFN and national treatment (NT) principles 
as established in the GATS. In practice, apart from Bolivia and the financial and broadcasting sectors, 
trade in services is fully liberalized. In terms of investment, no harmonized legal framework exists, 
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BOX 3  THE ANDEAN COMMUNiTY (CAN)a (continued)
which led individual countries to negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) among themselves 
and with third parties. The stance on foreign investment adopted by Colombia and Peru, which 
have aggressively pursued more comprehensive BITs and subjected themselves to international 
arbitration, has been distinct from that of Bolivia and Ecuador, which have tended to restrict the 
scope of such agreements and rejected the authority of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The bloc’s ambitious integration goals were eventually undermined by growing political and economic 
divergences among members countries, with Colombia and Peru pushing for market-oriented policies 
and greater integration with the world economy, while Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador were pivoting 
back toward the more interventionist and protectionist policies of the Andean Pact. Venezuela 
eventually left the bloc in 2006 and joined MERCOSUR, while Colombia and Peru started signing 
bilateral PTAs with the US, EU, and Asia, and joined Mexico and Peru to form the Pacific Alliance in 
2011 (see box 5). This growing divergence marked the end of the bloc’s customs union ambitions. Even 
though all member countries had adopted a CET in 1995, its implementation was suspended in 2007 
and replaced by a common tariff policy to facilitate negotiations with third parties.
Despite radically dialing back its ambitions for a free trade agreement, the bloc still carries the costs 
of supranational institutions. The time is ripe for rethinking their functionality and, in fact, that of 
the whole agreement, in the face of the new realities of integration in the subregion.
a  This box draws on, but also departs from, COMEXPERU (2016).
b  Ecuador has initiated the application of safeguard measures against Colombia and Peru five times, most recently in 
2015, having received authorization from the CAN’s General Secretariat on three occasions.
BOX 4  THE CARiBBEAN COMMUNiTY (CARiCOM)a
CARICOM was officially established in 1973 with the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas by Barbados, 
Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Membership was expanded in later years with the 
inclusion of Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Montserrat, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. In 1989, the CARICOM Heads of 
Government agreed to advance the integration process by establishing the CSME, which would entail 
the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor (i.e. the single market), the harmonization of 
economic policy, and possibly the adoption of a single currency (i.e. the single economy).b
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CSME entered into force in January 2006, and 
a revised governance structure was also adopted. The Conference of Heads of Government and 
the Council of Ministers are the main CARICOM decision-making bodies. They are assisted by a 
(continued on next page)
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BOX 4  THE CARiBBEAN COMMUNiTY (CARiCOM)a (continued)
permanent secretariat, five ministerial councils, and four technical committees responsible for 
enacting and implementing policy in different areas (finance, foreign relations, human and social 
development, trade and economic development, national security, and law enforcement). Finally, 
the Caribbean Court of Justice was established as the final court of appeal, but not all member 
states have implemented provisions to subject themselves to its authority.
In moving forward with the implementation of the CSME, CARICOM countries agreed to a two-phase 
approach: the single market was to be fully implemented by 2008, and the single economy by 2015. 
To date, approximately 70% of the commitments undertaken to create the single market have been 
implemented—the greatest progress has been on ensuring the free movement of goods and people. 
However, large disparities still exist in the average tariffs imposed by individual member states as 
exceptions abound.c
NTBs in the form of excise duties, customs surcharges, taxes on foreign currency transactions, and 
environmental fees, among others, are prevalent and particularly restrictive for some key products 
traded within the region. The 12-member states of both CARICOM and the CSME apply a CET on 
goods originating in nonmember countries. However, there is a wide dispersion in the range of 
actual tariffs implemented, as the CET contains several perforations and some countries have yet 
to apply it fully.
With regard to deeper disciplines, liberalization of trade in services has been slow, with many 
of the required legislative and administrative measures found not to be fully implemented. 
Although member countries approved a draft CARICOM Financial Services Agreement, a regionwide 
investment regime is not yet in place. Moreover, little has been achieved toward implementing the 
single economy, as the harmonization of macroeconomic and sectoral policies has not yet become 
a reality.
With the single market at least a decade behind schedule, the subregion would do well to revisit 
where it stands in the trade-off between size and national preferences and rethink the path it 
wants to follow. As argued elsewhere (Mesquita Moreira and Mendoza, 2007), the CSME can offer 
important gains that come from sharing physical and social infrastructure, but this would require 
compromising on national preferences, which has proved to be elusive. A customs union is less 
demanding in this regard and could be instrumental in facilitating negotiations to increase the 
bloc’s market access in Latin America and elsewhere, which is imperative given the erosion of the 
historic nonreciprocal preferential access to traditional trade partners in Europe and North America. 
The status quo—this gray zone between a common market, customs union, and free trade zone—
entails significant credibility costs and undermines trade gains. As with others PTAs in the region, 
the bloc has a lot to benefit from a thorough and realistic revision of its goals.
a  This box draws on, but also departs from, Nurse (2016).
b  Three countries are members of CARICOM, but not of the CSME: Haiti, Montserrat, and The Bahamas.
c  A special regime for “disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors” was established within the framework of the CSME 
treaty, excluding some member states from application—or allowing them to delay implementation—of provisions.
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BOX 5  THE SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR)a
MERCOSUR was established in 1991 when Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Treaty 
of Asunción. Venezuela was granted full membership in 2012 but has recently been suspended 
for political reasons, while Bolivia is in the process of accession.b The bloc’s original aim was 
to become a common market characterized by: (i) the free movement of goods, services, and 
production factors, (ii) a CET and common commercial policies with respect to third parties and 
in multilateral fora, (iii) the coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies, and (iv) the 
harmonization of rules and regulations in relevant areas. While considerable progress has been 
made toward the first two goals, there is still a sizeable implementation gap, which is even more 
pronounced in the latter two.c
MERCOSUR’s ambition of becoming a deeply integrated area was met with an equally ambitious 
institutional framework. Three intergovernmental bodies—the Common Market Council, the 
Common Market Group, and the MERCOSUR Trade Commission—share decision-making authority, 
alongside a permanent secretariat and supranational bodies such as a parliament (Parlasur) and 
the Permanent Review Tribunal.
Tariffs and NTBs were largely eliminated among member countries in the first four years of the 
agreement, except for sugar and vehicles, but politically negotiated exceptions to the bloc’s 
rules have been common. Moreover, many NTBs, safeguards, and special schemes such as import 
licensing and export processing zones have been implemented, even though these are not allowed 
under MERCOSUR rules, and are disrupting intrabloc trade flows.d Recently (2016–2017), under the 
auspices of an ad hoc task force (Grupo Ad Hoc, in Spanish), the bloc has made significant progress 
toward identifying and eliminating many of these NTBs, but quite a few remain.e
With regard to deeper disciplines, in 2005 the Montevideo Protocol on Trade in Services came into 
force. This protocol is generally in line with the GATS but had a more ambitious goal of universal 
liberalization within 10 years, which was not accomplished.f On the matter of investment, 
after two failed attempts, the bloc finally signed, in April 2017, an investment cooperation and 
facilitation protocol, which includes a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism.g Another 
important progress step forward was the signing of the government procurement protocol in 
December 2017, an agreement that has long eluded the bloc.h Both protocols are in the process 
of ratification.
One area in which MERCOSUR has made noteworthy progress is on facilitating intrabloc labor 
movement. Since 2009, when a residency agreement came into force, nationals of MERCOSUR 
member countries and of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have been able to apply for 
residency in the territory of any other signatory state, subject only to a criminal background check 
and the payment of fees.i But while requests for residency have been streamlined, burdensome 
requirements for the mutual recognition of degrees and diplomas, which would allow migrants to 
work abroad, still pose barriers to intrabloc relocation (Baraldi 2014).
(continued on next page)
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BOX 5  THE SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR)a (continued)
With regard to extrabloc relations, member countries agreed to a CET in 1994, which currently covers 
70.8% of tariff lines. Since being established, the CET has been perforated by a series of exceptions 
whose removal has been postponed until 2024. Additionally, although members have agreed to 
the collective negotiation of PTAs with third parties, agreements previously signed by individual 
countries remain valid, and the negotiation of new ones, even if on a collective basis, does not 
require identical liberalization commitments. MERCOSUR has not been very active in signing PTAs 
outside the LAIA area, having signed only a limited number of partial agreements with countries 
like India and Israel. Recently, though, new administrations in member countries have been trying 
to make up for this inaction, resuming in earnest previously stalled negotiations, such as the one 
with the European Union, and announcing new ones with EFTA (European Free Trade Agreement), 
Canada, Korea, Japan, ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand. The bloc is also engaged in a formal 
dialogue about convergence with the Pacific Alliance (see IDB 2017).
As with other LAC deep integration schemes, MERCOSUR has made substantial progress on 
liberalizing intraregional trade but fell short of implementing its more ambitious goals of a customs 
union and a common market, facing difficulties in the implementation of its rules, despite its heavy 
institutional apparatus. As in the other cases, the status quo can be significantly improved: after 
more than a quarter of a century, the bloc is still caught between a free trade zone, a customs 
union, and a common market, without having fully implemented any of these schemes. To boost 
its credibility, the MERCOSUR needs to undertake an urgent, realistic review of its objectives and 
implementation mechanisms. If anything, the experience of the past 26 years suggests that member 
countries have underestimated the difficulties of a building a stable political consensus around key 
policy principles.
a  This box draws on, but also departs from, Campos and Gayá (2016).
b  Accession to MERCOSUR is a two-step process: first, all member countries sign an Accession Protocol with the applicant 
country, which is subsequently ratified by their national congresses, if ratification of international treaties is mandatory per 
domestic legislation. As of early 2017, the Brazilian Congress was yet to ratify Bolivia’s Accession Protocol, which was signed 
in 2015. In July 2016, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay blocked Venezuela from taking on the pro tempore presidency 
of the MERCOSUR, on the grounds that the country had not fulfilled its accession commitments. In August 2017, Venezuela 
was notified of its impending suspension over failure to comply with the bloc’s democratic clause (Ushuaia Protocol).
c  See Vaillant (2014) for a detailed discussion of MERCOSUR’s evolution.
d  For example, while MERCOSUR regulations prohibit the application of safeguards, countries have applied them in 
accordance with WTO rules.
e  See IDB (2017), p.49.
f  Paraguay has not yet ratified the protocol.
g  Protocolo de Cooperación y Facilitación de Inversiones Intra-MERCOSUR in Spanish. See http://www.mre.gov.py/
tratados/public_web/ConsultaMercosur.aspx.
h  Protocolo de Contrataciones Públicas de MERCOSUR in Spanish. See http://www.mre.gov.py/tratados/public_web/
ConsultaMercosur.aspx.
i  If approved, residency is initially granted for a period of two years, and can become permanent if the migrant shows 
proof of sufficient income.
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BOX 6  THE PACiFiC ALLiANCE (PA)
The Pacific Alliance (PA) was officially established in April 2011 by the governments of Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Peru to create an area of deep integration to boost economic growth, development, and 
competitiveness. It would do so by progressively advancing toward the free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and people and by serving as a platform for the global integration of its member 
countries, especially with the Asia-Pacific.
In May 2016, the Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance entered 
into force, establishing a free trade zone. This protocol harmonized and deepened the scope of 
previous existing bilateral trade agreements between the four member countries, resulting in 
the immediate elimination of tariffs on 92% of goods traded among them, with a schedule for 
the elimination of remaining tariffs and the expansion of trade opportunities. The PA countries 
committed to liberalizing all goods traded among them (except for sugar and related products). 
Goods that were not previously included in bilateral agreements are thus now part of the PA’s free 
trade zone; some examples of these include dairy, rice, wheat, rubber products, and some trailers. 
In 2018, in line with the schedule, tariffs were eliminated on eggs, pork and related products, 
turkey, sea products, and instant coffee, among others, bringing the PA closer to its objective of 
free movement of goods.
The PA is facilitating trade through initiatives such as the Authorized Economic Operator program, 
which expedites the movement of goods and improves safety, and the interoperability of the Single 
Windows for Foreign Trade (VUCEs), which works by connecting the different countries’ VUCEs with 
one another. Consequently, the administrative procedures for international trade can take place 
through a single, automated, online portal, eliminating the use of paper and making the flow of 
goods more efficient. The PA’s VUCE system passed a major milestone in 2017, when the exchange of 
phytosanitary certificates began, and the bloc is working to implement a digital certificate of origin 
and harmonize customs declarations.
From a private sector perspective, the PA grants businesspeople access to a seamless market 
and enables them to obtain inputs at more competitive prices, to achieve economies of scale, 
and to enter a network of more than 70 RTAs that include the world’s largest economies. The 
PA countries have also adopted a unique set of RoOs that allow for cumulation of origin. The 
Additional Protocol thus provides the basis for increased trade and investment within the PA, 
as well as more integrated supply chains for achieving higher levels of competitiveness in third-
country markets.
The PA is also pursuing a broad, emerging agenda to advance the integration of its financial markets. 
In 2015, the Presidents’ Summit created the Council of Finance Ministers to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the financial integration of the PA to ensure solid, stable, sustainable, 
inclusive growth, triggering a progressive agenda to promote and facilitate financial operations 
and increase certainty among investors. This agenda includes: (i) creating a “funds passport,” by 
which a collective investment vehicle (CIV) will be recognized in the PA region once one of the PA 
(continued on next page)
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BOX 6  THE PACiFiC ALLiANCE (PA) (continued)
countries has granted a CIV authorization; (ii) harmonizing the tax treatment for pension funds, 
which establishes a cap of 10% on taxes applicable to these investments and prevents double 
taxation; (iii) promoting exports of services by facilitating administrative procedures that include 
online accreditation and verification of service providers’ residences and fiscal incentives such as 
avoiding double taxation for international trade in services; (iv) strengthening the FinTech market, 
ensuring an efficient, coordinated regulatory framework to drive financial inclusion, including 
for SMEs, and safe electronic payments; (v) attracting private and institutional investment for 
infrastructure projects, observing best practices on public–private partnerships; and (vi) issuing a 
joint catastrophe bond (CatBond) worth US$1.3 billion, a share of which will be issued to a country 
after an earthquake depending on its magnitude and location, while the regulatory harmonization 
of the four countries will enable future such issues. The first step toward the financial integration 
of the PA was the gradual interconnection of member countries’ stock markets to form the Latin 
American Integrated Market (MILA), creating the second-largest stock exchange in LAC with 
a market capitalization of more than US$700 billion and that includes over a thousand listed 
companies. 
The trade and financial pillars are complemented by functional cooperation efforts, which include 
innovation, sustainable mining practices, support for SMEs, joint embassies, the elimination of 
visas for intraregional tourists (in place since 2013), gender, and education, including university 
scholarships. This cooperation goes beyond the public sector to include the private sector, led by 
the PA Business Council (CEAP). 
Some observers have labeled the Pacific Alliance a “convergence experiment” within the complex 
web of PTAs in LAC (Villarreal 2016). It differs from other initiatives in that it represents a pragmatic 
and innovative approach to building upon existing free trade areas to achieve greater economic 
integration and serve as a global export platform, which is complemented by the integration of 
PA’s financial markets. In addition, it is much leaner in terms of institutionalization, as it relies on 
the coordination between the ministries and agencies of the four member countries and some 
IFIs. For instance, the Council of Finance Ministers and their Working Groups rely on a Technical 
Secretariat provided by the Inter-American Development Bank rather than a permanent secretariat 
and supranational bodies. As such, the PA may be providing an innovative model for how to knit 
together free trade areas and financial markets in LAC and link them to extraregional initiatives. 
In fact, the group has sparked considerable interest at the regional and global levels. In LAC, this 
has included the establishment of a formal dialogue with MERCOSUR to promote convergence 
trade and trade facilitation convergence between the two blocs, including a roadmap adopted 
at the ministerial level (IDB 2017). Beyond the region, the PA includes 52 observer countries, and 
negotiations are at an advanced stage with the four PA’s Associate Members (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Singapore) toward establishing liberalized trade.
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FIGURE 2.1  iNTRA-LAC PREFERENTiAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Peru
Bolivia
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Paraguay
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Argentina
Guatemala
Mexico
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Bahamas
Jamaica Haiti Dominican Rep.
Barbados
Trinidad and Tobago
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Nicaragua
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Panama
Suriname
GuyanaColombia
Ecuador
Chile
Source: IDB estimates with INTrade data.
Note: The picture is organized around the 1990s regional agreements, including Mexico that is part of NAFTA. 
Annex I provides a list of the PTAs included and their grouping by core agreement.
CARICOM
MERCOSUR
CAN
CACM
Mexico
Although this network is fragmented and was built with little attempt to co-
ordinate or synchronize liberalization schedules, it has been very effective in 
bringing down traditional trade barriers to intraregional trade. As shown in fig-
ure 2.2, the process of reducing tariffs has been, or will be, completed within 
the next few years for all countries in terms of both the share of tariff lines and 
the share of trade covered. This extensive coverage and their advanced stage 
of implementation support the argument made earlier that all these decades 
of fragmentation have left a strong platform from which LAC can launch an 
attempt to fully integrate the regional market. If the region is so close to free 
intraregional trade, LAFTA’s once idealistic-sounding objectives suddenly seem 
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a realistic proposition. At the same time, however, it is important not to under-
estimate the task ahead. There are at least two important gaps to be filled: one 
relates to goods, services, and investment and the other to relationships.
The goods, services, and investment gap. The first has to do with the product 
coverage of the existing PTAs. Even though most PTAs will have reached their 
full liberalization potential by 2020, tariffs on a number of products will not be 
completely eliminated. These exclusions cover only a small fraction of total trade, 
but they involve major exports for some of the countries involved. Exclusions in 
the Andean and Central American subregions are concentrated in agricultural 
and labor-intensive goods, whereas in MERCOSUR they mostly fall on machin-
ery (much of which is exempted from the CET) and motor vehicles, which are 
subject to tariff quotas and balanced-trade requirements (see table 2.1).
There are also issues relating to services and investment coverage, which varies 
significantly across the network of PTAs (figure 2.3). While nearly all agreements 
involving CAN, the CACM, and Mexico have specific disciplines on trade in ser-
vices and on investment, only half of MERCOSUR agreements include services, 
while investment is dealt with separately in bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
FIGURE 2.2   NEGOTiATED TARiFF REDUCTiON SCHEDULES 
(Percentage of duty-free intraregional trade based on 2014 trade values)
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the year the tariff elimination process is complete. This analysis assumes all trade would comply with the respective RoOs to be eligible for duty-free 
treatment and does not reflect actual preference utilization rates. Each line represents the weighted average of the individual bilateral tariff concessions 
involving the countries of the group with intra-LAC partners. Bilateral trade is used as weights.
IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO 
UNDERESTIMATE THE TASK 
AHEAD. THERE ARE AT LEAST 
TWO IMPORTANT GAPS TO 
BE FILLED: ONE RELATES
TO GOODS, SERVICES, AND 
INVESTMENT AND THE 
OTHER TO RELATIONSHIPS
CONNECTING THE DOTS26
As shown in figure 2.4, within the universe of agreements that do contain pro-
visions for services and investment, nearly all establish MFN and national treat-
ment obligations, though the language might differ. In agreements where MFN 
treatment is not granted, the reason is often that countries within core agree-
ments opted to reserve the right to liberalize further among themselves without 
TABLE 2.1   ExCLUDED TRADE BY SECTOR 
(Percentage of intraregional trade in excluded products based on 2014 trade values)
Section Description CACM CAN MERCOSUR Mexico Chile CARICOM
1 Animal Products 8% 34% 4% 26% 1% 0%
2 Vegetable Products 2% 17% 0% 13% 0% 0%
3 Animal/Vegetable Fats 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
4 Processed Foods/Tobacco 48% 29% 2% 23% 95% 97%
5 Minerals 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6 Chemicals 2% 0% 9% 7% 3% 0%
7 Plastics 2% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0%
8 Leather 0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0%
9 Wood Products 19% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0%
10 Paper Products 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
11 Textiles and Apparel 2% 19% 7% 0% 0% 0%
12 Footwear 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
13 Stone/Glassware 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
14 Precious/Semi-Precious Mat. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
15 Base Metals 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0%
16 Machinery and Elec. Equip. 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0%
17 Motor Vehicles/Vessels 10% 0% 20% 31% 0% 0%
18 Precision Instruments 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0%
19 Arms and Munitions 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20 Misc. Articles 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 3%
21 Art and Antiques 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Source: IDB estimates with INTrade data.
Note: Value of bilateral imports of goods excluded from preferential treatment. Due to changes in the Harmonized System and national tariff 
nomenclatures over time, calculations are at the subheading (6-digit) level. Subheadings are considered to be excluded if any of the tariff lines 
associated with the subheading is excluded from full tariff elimination under the agreement. CARICOM only permits exclusions of products in 
intraregional trade by countries designated as less developed, of which Belize is the only IDB member. These figures are thus based on Belize’s imports 
of the excluded products from CARICOM.
THERE IS STILL WORK TO BE 
DONE IN EXPANDING THE 
COVERAGE OF SERVICES AND 
INVESTMENT
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FIGURE 2.3   COvERAGE OF PROviSiONS ON SERviCES AND iNvESTMENTS 
(Percentage of intra-LAC agreements)
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Source: IDB estimates.
Note: Horizontal investment disciplines refer to those found in specific investment chapters within PTAs and are modeled on BITs. These differ from 
investment as a mode of supply in the services chapters of some PTAs.
FIGURE 2.4   COvERAGE OF SERviCES AND iNvESTMENT DiSCiPLiNES 
(Percentage of Intra-LAC agreements with services and investment provisions)
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having to extend this treatment to other partners. Most services chapters have 
specific disciplines on market access, but very few are included in investment 
chapters.
Of the agreements analyzed, 77% contain provisions on domestic regulations 
in service industries, about half of which replicate the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) provisions while the other half follow the NAFTA 
approach of including a best-endeavor necessity test that implies even weak-
er regulatory discipline than the GATS.27 With few exceptions, agreements 
expressly exclude subsidies and government procurement from services dis-
ciplines. Furthermore, very few agreements contain provisions on emergency 
safeguard measures. Finally, regarding investment-specific disciplines, over 90% 
of agreements include provisions establishing investor-state arbitration, fair and 
equitable treatment, and expropriation.
It should nonetheless be noted that agreeing to disciplines does not mean that 
sectors are fully liberalized. Figure 2.4 shows the coverage of specific disciplines 
on services and investment in the subgroup of intra-LAC PTAs that includes 
services and investment provisions, but it does not address the content of such 
disciplines, their level of convergence across agreements, or the actual commit-
ments undertaken by countries in their liberalization schedules.
LAC countries also follow different scheduling approaches when it comes to 
services, with two main models being followed. The first model is the GATS 
approach, based on a positive list in which parties specify the level and type of 
foreign participation allowed for each service sector. The second approach is 
based on the NAFTA model, following a negative list that implies that trade is 
unrestricted across all service sectors unless limitations are scheduled. Of the 
intraregional agreements, 14% utilize a positive list for services, 77% use a neg-
ative list, and 9% use a hybrid of the two.28
The relationship gap. The other important gap is in the coverage of bilateral 
or subregional relationships. As mentioned earlier, just under 20% (in val-
ue) of regional trade, corresponding to a total of 183 bilateral links, remains 
excluded from preferential treatment (figure 2.5). The bulk of trade not cov-
ered by PTAs is between MERCOSUR countries and Mexico and between 
27 As stated in NAFTA-type agreements, domestic regulation provisions are best-endeavor undertakings only, 
meaning that instead of guaranteeing that domestic regulations will meet standards, they require that states 
make a good faith effort to comply.
28 In general, MERCOSUR follows a positive list approach, CARICOM utilizes a hybrid, and the others use 
a negative list.
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FIGURE 2.5   MiSSiNG LiNKS iN LAC’S iNTEGRATiON ARCHiTECTURE 
(Percentage of LAC’s intraregional trade by value and number of bilateral relationships 
lacking formal PTA)
Source: IDB estimates.
Note: This figure shows LAC’s bilateral trade relationships (links) that are not covered by PTAs. They are seen from the perspective of Mexico (blue lines), 
Central America (green), and the Caribbean (brown). The thickness of the lines is proportional to the value of the trade involved.
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the CARICOM countries and Latin America. The former consists of a few 
high-value trade flows, while the latter is the sum of many lower-value trade 
relations.
Although these missing links comprise less than 20% of the value of intra-
regional trade, two qualifications are in order. First, the fact that the share 
of non-PTA trade is relatively low may be partially attributable to its non-
preferential nature, in other words, it is possible that the share of trade flows 
between non-PTA countries would increase if market access were facilitated 
by the signing of new agreements. Second, and particularly relevant in the 
case of MERCOSUR–Mexico, these flows involve the largest economies in 
Latin America (Brazil and Mexico) and include products with higher value 
added than those exported extraregionally, potentially holding a key to the 
formation of regional value chains. In sum, while most of current trade may 
take place under preferences, completing these missing links may generate 
yet more trade.
To sum up these product and relationship gaps, table 2.2 gives a different 
perspective by bringing them together in a matrix format. As in figure 2.2, 
the focus is on duty-free goods under PTAs, but this time the coverage ratio is 
weighted by the partner’s exports to the world rather than bilateral trade. This 
gives a more accurate picture since bilateral trade weights tend to overestimate 
the degree of liberalization. Goods with duty-free rates are most likely to have 
larger trade flows. The broad picture of the missing relationships does not 
change, but it is clear that the degree of liberalization within and between the 
existing PTAs—in particular between MERCOSUR and CAN countries—is 
significantly lower than what bilateral trade weights might suggest.
Beyond the gaps: RoOs. Filling in these gaps will be an important step, but it 
is not the only action necessary to achieve free trade across the region. There 
is also the challenge of addressing the costs of 47 RoOs adopted by the region’s 
33 PTAs.29 RoOs—the “necessary evil” of PTAs—not only restrict firms’ input 
choices but also impose significant compliance and enforcement costs, particu-
larly in the context of multiple PTAs (see box 1).
29 It could be argued that another important challenge is to increase the utilization ratio of existing 
preferences—that is, to make sure exporters use the preferences granted by the existing PTAs. There is not 
enough reliable data to make a general statement about the rate of preference utilization in LAC PTAs. ALADI 
(2017) offers estimates of trade under preferences, but under the general assumption that all preferences are 
fully utilized. Cadot et al. (2014), in turn, suggests that the utilization rates of LAC PTAs are significantly 
higher than those of other South–South PTAs.
JUST UNDER 20% OF 
REGIONAL TRADE 
REMAINS EXCLUDED FROM 
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, 
BUT THE REGION’S
33 PTAs HAVE 47 RoOs
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TABLE 2.2  PERCENTAGE OF ExPORTER’S TOTAL ExPORTS iN PRODUCTS WiTH DUTY-FREE TREATMENT UNDER PTA
Exporter (Preference Recipient)
Importer 
Region
Ex. Region Andean Caribbean Mesoamerica MERCOSUR
BOL
CHL
COL
ECU
PER
VEN
BLZ
BRB
GUY
JAM
SUR
TTO
CRI
GTM
HND
M
EX
NIC
PAN
SLV
ARG
BRA
PRY
URY
I
m
p
o
r
t
e
r
 
(
P
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
G
r
a
n
t
o
r
)
A
n
d
e
a
n
BOL 100% 100% 100% 98% 97% 98% 100% 100%
CHL 87% 87% 96% 72% 98% 88% 97% 90% 96% 95% 100% 99%
COL 100% 96% 100% 100% 87% 92% 68% 93% 40% 65% 35% 43%
ECU 100% 100% 100% nd 54% 33% 30%
PER 100% 84% 100% 100% 82% 84% 70% 75% 99% 97%
VEN 100% 68% 69% 61% 59%
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
BLZ 94% 81% 96% 100% nd
BRB 84% 81% 96% 100% nd
GUY 84% 94% 96% 100% nd
JAM 84% 94% 81% 100% nd
SUR 84% 94% 81% 96% nd
TTO 84% 94% 81% 96% 100%
M
e
s
o
a
m
e
r
i
c
a
CRI 93% 88% 85% 81% 84% 89% 93% 94%
GTM 84% 78% 97% 81% 74% 89% 80% 94%
HND 93% 79% 97% 85% 72% 89% 71% 92%
MEX 90% 95% 92% 84% 87% 72% 70% 86% 89% 93%
NIC 97% 85% 81% 96% 78% 94%
PAN 94% 91% 60% 59% 43% 44%
SLV 95% 76% 97% 85% 81% 96% 89% 84%
M
E
R
C
O
S
U
R
ARG 100% 96% 95% 98% 100% nd 100% 100% 100%
BRA 100% 96% 97% 99% 100% nd 100% 100% 100%
PRY 100% 97% 75% 84% 100% nd 100% 100% 100%
URY 100% 96% 92% 96% 96% nd 94% 100% 100% 100%
Source: IDB estimates. 
Notes: 
Products with duty-free treatment as of 2017, based on the trade pattern of 2014. Each cell represents the weighted average of the individual bilateral tariff concessions, using the export partner’s exports 
to the world as weights.
Preferences granted to DUR treat exports in category 999999 as duty-free.
Mesoamerica does not include additional liberalization from the Single PTA, and so figures represent a lower-bound estimate.
Intra-Pacific Alliance trade does not include new liberalizations from that agreement, and so figures represent a lower-bound estimate.
nd = no data available. Detailed trade data are not available for Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) or Venezuela (VEN).
Red cells are those relationships where duty-free covers less than 80% of the goods. Blue cells are those where the same coverage varies between 80% and 95% and green cells, 96% to 100%.
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These rules can be more or less restrictive as they allow lesser or greater levels of 
extrabloc content, respectively.30 Figure 2.6 shows the average level of restrictive-
ness of RoOs in LAC PTAs.31 The rules in NAFTA and the agreements signed by 
Mexico tend to be more restrictive, while CAN and many MERCOSUR agree-
ments have less onerous requirements. The Central American rules are heavily 
influenced by the NAFTA and Mexican models, while the CARICOM rules are 
something of an outlier.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the different criteria used to define product-level RoOs in 
the agreements signed by different countries or groups of countries in the region. 
CARICOM and MERCOSUR apply mandatory processing and value-added 
FIGURE 2.6   RESTRiCTivENESS OF RoOs 
(Index)
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Note: The restrictiveness index is derived from an ordinal ranking based on the degree to which the RoOs require that inputs be sourced from within 
the signatory countries, with higher index values associated with a greater share of inputs restricted to regional suppliers. For more details, see 
Estevadeordal et al.  9.  	
e is organized around the 1990s regional agreements, including Mexico, which is part of NAFTA.
30 Estevadeordal et al. (2009).
31 Strictly speaking, the index of restrictiveness measures the observed restrictiveness based on the criteria 
applied to each product. The effective restrictiveness of the rules will depend on the cost-effective availability 
of the necessary materials within the signatory countries. Where such inputs are economically available 
from suppliers within the PTA’s “cumulation zone,” even very demanding rules can have low or negligible 
compliance costs.
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FIGURE 2.7   DEFiNiTiON OF RoOs 
(Percentage of products in each category)
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rules to a relatively large share of products, reflecting the fact that these rules 
were negotiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s (i.e., before NAFTA), and, in 
the case of MERCOSUR, in keeping with the LAFTA/LAIA tradition for de-
fining RoOs.32 Mexico and Central America use a greater variety of tariff-shift 
rules, reflecting NAFTA’s influence as these countries have negotiated more re-
cent agreements.33
While applying different rules does not present a barrier to convergence in 
and of itself, it does indicate a difference in approaches to the discipline. This 
can lead to difficulties in developing mechanisms for cumulation of origin, 
wherein materials originating in a country under one agreement can also be 
32 The LAFTA/LAIA RoO regime requires a change in tariff classification at the heading level or, alternatively, 
a regional value-added of at least 50% of the free-on-board export value. For an overview of RoO regimes, see 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (2008).
33 Tariff shift means that a nonoriginating input must undergo such substantive transformation that the final 
product is classified under a different product heading, subheading, or chapter to be considered originating. 
Schemes utilizing the criterion of change of tariff heading often provide for a wide range of exceptions, given 
that, in some cases, a change of tariff heading may not imply substantial transformation, whereas in others, 
substantial transformation may occur without change of tariff heading.
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considered as originating there for the purposes of another, thus allowing for 
the formation of longer supply chains. The absence of such cumulation can be 
a disincentive to sourcing production materials from the most efficient suppli-
er within the region, which might not necessarily be based on a PTA partner 
country.
In sum, despite the often-overambitious aspirations and design shortcomings 
that have led to excessive fragmentation and to difficulties in implementation, 
LAC’s integration initiative under the “new regionalism” has left the region 
closer to free trade than ever before. The challenges ahead, however, cannot be 
underestimated. The goal of a fully integrated market, which could allow the 
region to go beyond the limited trade gains imposed by fragmentation, can only 
be met by closing the goods/services/investment and relationship gaps and by 
consolidating the existing arsenal of RoOs. Before going into the policy specifics 
of how to go about this goal, it is important to take a closer look at the gains 
obtained so far, which is the objective of the next section.
THE GOAL OF A FULLY 
INTEGRATED MARKET 
CAN ONLY BE MET BY 
CLOSING GAPS AND BY 
CONSOLIDATING RoOs
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Annex I: Intra-LAC Preferential Trade Agreements
CCOM Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
CARICOM–Costa Rica*
CARICOM–Dominican Republic*
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)a
MERCOSUR–Bolivia 
MERCOSUR–Chile 
MERCOSUR–CANb
CAN Andean Community (CAN) 
Colombia–Chile 
Colombia–Costa Rica*°
Colombia–Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras)*
Peru–Panama*
Peru–Chile
Peru–Costa Rica*
Peru–Honduras*°
Ecuador–Chile°
CACM Central American Common Market (CACM) 
Central America–Chile 
Central America–Dominican Republic 
Central America–Panama*
Central America–Mexicoc
Panama–Chile*
Mexico Pacific Alliance (Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile)*
Mexico–Chile 
Mexico–Panama*
Mexico–Uruguay 
Mexico–Colombia 
Mexico–Peru*
Mexico–Bolivia 
Source: IDB with INTrade data.
Notes:
* Not included in the goods analysis in sections III and IV (figures 2.3, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, and table 2.1).
° Not included in the services and investment analysis in section III (figures 2.4 and 2.5).
Two of the above subsume several agreements, so that the 29 agreements referenced in the table correspond to 33 different legal agreements as cited 
in the text. Furthermore, RoOs are negotiated on a bilateral basis in some agreements. As such, the following should be noted for the goods analysis: 
a included as bilateral agreements between MERCOSUR member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and Venezuela; b Included as bilateral 
agreements between MERCOSUR member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and CAN countries (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) covering 
both ACE 58 between MERCOSUR and Peru, and ACE 59 between MERCOSUR and Colombia and Ecuador; c Included as bilateral/plurilateral agreements 
between Mexico–Costa Rica, Mexico–Nicaragua, and Mexico–Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) as well as the later Single FTA.
3SECTIONA QUARTER OF A CENTURY LATER:  WHAT ARE THE RESULTS? 
In LAC’s tour de force to leverage regional integration into a better standing in 
the world economy, the odds were stacked against success. The relatively small 
size of intraregional PTAs and the similarity of the members’ comparative ad-
vantages inevitably imposed a tight limit on trade gains. But the proof is in the 
numbers: did these intraregional PTAs actually boost trade within the group? 
And did they substantially raise productivity and hence alter the region’s role in 
the global economy?
The precise contribution of LAC’s “new regionalism” PTAs is hard to pin down, 
as most were implemented alongside unilateral and multilateral liberalizations 
and against a background of significant currency and macroeconomic volatility. 
Figure 3.1 provides a first approximation of these gains, looking at a key trade 
outcome—intraregional share in total trade. As can be seen, all the agreements 
signed or relaunched in the early 1990s were followed, as was to be expected, 
by increases in the intraregional share of total trade. These were mostly driven 
by manufacturing, in some cases more significantly than others (e.g., Andean 
Community and MERCOSUR). Figure 3.2, in turn, shows that these gains do 
not seem to have been the product of a massive trade diversion, as both intra-
regional and world trade expanded in tandem.
The share of interregional trade, though, seems to have peaked in the early 2000s. 
The ensuing decline was much more pronounced in the Andean Community, 
MERCOSUR, and CARICOM. Structural changes in the world economy, such 
as the emergence of China, and growing trade frictions inside MERCOSUR and 
the Andean Community seem to have played an important part in reversing the 
trend toward growth. However, it is unlikely that even in more favorable circum-
stances the share of intraregional trade would have kept growing much beyond 
its peak in the early 2000s, as the limitations of size and factor endowments 
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FIGURE 3.1  SHARE OF iNTRAREGiONAL TRADE iN TOTAL TRADE
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FIGURE 3.2   TRENDS iN iNTRAREGiONAL AND WORLD TRADE FOR SELECTED LAC PTAs. 
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Source: IDB estimates with INTrade data.
Note: CARICOM time series is shorter due to a lack of intraregional data. Missing information on world trade was filled with partners’ mirror data.
would have eventually kicked in. In fact, recent empirical evidence suggests that, 
once size and other geographical variables are considered, LAC does not seem 
to have much room for expanding intraregional trade.34 These limitations, of 
course, tend to be even more binding given the current fragmentation of PTAs.
34 See Bown et al. (2017), chapter 2.
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As argued earlier, the main motivation behind these agreements was not to in-
crease the level of regional integration per se, but to reap scale and specializa-
tion gains to take growth opportunities abroad, particularly outside the natural 
resource areas that LAC trade has traditionally centered on. Figure 3.3 provides 
a first, unambitious look at a good proxy for this type of outcome—PTAs’ shares 
in world manufacturing exports. If LAC’s PTAs have had any positive impacts on 
their members’ productivity, these fell short of significantly raising their partici-
pation in the world market for manufactured goods. The remarkable exception is 
Mexico, which appears to have reaped strong benefits from a PTA that brought a 
massive “home market” and a very diverse set of comparative advantages: NAFTA.
A Macro View
This preliminary evidence suggests that intra-LAC PTAs have a positive im-
pact on intrabloc trade but less of an effect on LAC exports to the rest of the 
world, which underlines the limitations of a piecemeal approach to integration. 
However, a more definitive conclusion would demand a more rigorous econo-
metric exercise. Such exercises are usually carried out using a gravity mod-
el—a standard methodology used by trade economists to assess the impact of 
PTAs on trade. The model assumes that trade between countries is a function 
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of the relative size of their economies, the distance between them, and other 
relevant geographical variables. The “PTA effect” is estimated with the help of 
an additional binary variable that captures whether the two countries share 
a PTA. The estimated coefficient of this variable reveals how much bilateral 
trade between PTA members increases compared to trade between countries 
that are not members of the same PTA. Statistical controls are added to make 
sure that the PTA effect is not biased by country-specific idiosyncrasies (such 
as macroeconomic and institutional volatility) that might impact trade but are 
unrelated to PTAs.
There is already a vast literature using gravity models to assess PTAs, including 
LAC PTAs, but much of it suffers from serious methodological problems and is 
mainly focused on the first decade of the agreements in question. Such studies 
fail, for instance, to adequately control for country and PTA idiosyncrasies and 
their results are very disparate.35 However, one recent study addresses many of 
these methodological issues and seems to give a more robust picture of these 
PTA effects, albeit still a partial one. The study focuses exclusively on bilateral 
manufacturing trade between 70 countries in 1986–2006, but, unlike other exer-
cises, it also includes data on domestic trade (proxied by manufacturing output 
less exports), which arguably should be considered in the computation of the 
“PTA effect.”36
The results for the LAC PTAs included in the study are shown in figure 3.4 and 
they point to very strong impacts coming from two of the original “new region-
alism” agreements—the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. These appear 
to have more than doubled (MERCOSUR) or tripled (Andean Community) in-
trabloc trade compared to trade with nonmembers. There is, however, consider-
able heterogeneity across LAC PTAs, making it difficult to identify a pattern. For 
instance, both the best (above the median, e.g. NAFTA) and worst performers 
(below the mean, e.g. Mexico–Uruguay) have intra- and extraregional PTAs be-
tween them. Moreover, the study does not attempt to estimate the importance 
of trade diversion beyond these gains or whether the PTAs in question boosted 
exports to the rest of the world.
To try to reach a better understanding of these issues, in this study, two fur-
ther empirical exercises were carried out in the gravity tradition. The first fol-
lowed a similar approach to the study discussed above, but disaggregated the 
PTA effect into three components: (i) intrabloc trade (when both countries are 
35 See Limão (2016) for a general review of the gravity-based empirical literature on PTAs.
36 See Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin (2016).
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PTA members), (ii) extrabloc imports (when only the importer is a member), 
and (iii) extrabloc exports (when only the exporter is a member).37 This disag-
gregation helped to clarify the questions of whether these agreements boosted 
intrabloc trade (component i) at the expense of nonmembers (component ii) 
and whether they were able to boost extrabloc exports (component iii). The ex-
ercise used a larger sample, which covered more than 200 countries, for a longer 
period (1976–2013), and included the sum of bilateral trade in all sectors. It thus 
captured a larger number of LAC PTAs and better captured the situation before 
and after the agreements.38
This approach, however, has its drawbacks, as it makes it virtually impossi-
ble to include domestic trade (as there is not enough data available) and, to 
37 Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Dai et al. (2014) follow similar approaches.
38 See technical appendix 3.1 for details. A previous version of this exercise appeared in Powell (2017), chapter 
7, based on a less rigorous specification, imposed by computational constraints that have since been overcome. 
This exercise also includes a longer list of intra-LAC PTAs, which were previously limited to the main four 
agreements.
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FIGURE 3.4  iNTRABLOC EFFECTS OF SELECTED LAC PTAs. 1986–2006 (%)
Source: Graph prepared by IDB staff based on Baier, Yotov, and Zyff fiflffi16).
Note: Sample covers 70 countries, 17 of them combined into a single “rest of the world” category, and 65 PTAs. PTAs without statistically significant results 
were assigned zero impact. “Median” corresponds to the median result of the 65 PTAs. 
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identify the agreements’ individual effects.39 To work around these limita-
tions, LAC PTAs were grouped according to two geographical criteria: in-
traregional PTAs (only LAC members) and extraregional PTAs (LAC and 
non-LAC members). The results, presented in figure 3.5, are clearly more 
robust for intraregional PTAs. They seem to confirm the strong impact of 
these on intrabloc trade—an average 64% increase when compared to trade 
with nonmembers. At the same time, the results suggest that these gains can-
not be explained away by a massive trade diversion—in fact, the estimat-
ed impact on extrabloc imports is positive but not statistically significant. 
The results also tend to confirm the limitations of these agreements on boosting 
extrabloc exports, but the fact that the impact is estimated to have been strong-
ly negative (–67% compared to intrabloc exports) is somewhat puzzling. One 
possible explanation is that of exports switching toward more protected and 
lucrative intrabloc markets, but that would require evidence of a massive trade 
diversion. This puzzle, though, might be solved if the unilateral liberalization 
FIGURE 3.5   iMPACT OF LAC PTAs ON iNTRA- AND ExTRABLOC 
TRADE (%)
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Note: LAC-ROW PTAs are NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. Intra-LAC PTAs are listed in technical appendix 3.1. These are 
there results of a gravity model estimated by Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) with pair, exporter-year, and 
importer-year fixed effects. See technical appendix 3.1, table A1, column 8. w stands for results that are not 
statistically significant, *** for those significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
39 The controls used to weed out partners’ idiosyncrasies would be collinear with the variables used to measure 
the impact on trade diversion and extrabloc exports. See technical appendix 3.1.
INTRA-LAC PTAs INCREASED 
INTRAREGIONAL TRADE BY 
64% ON AVERAGE
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that went hand-in-hand with the implementation of most of these agreements 
is brought into the picture. This would be consistent with a scenario where a 
switch in exports toward the regional market (that implies replacing foreign 
with regional suppliers) coexists with an expansion of extraregional imports 
(which benefits from the unilateral liberalization). The trade diversion, then, 
will manifest itself as an export diversion. This point is further illustrated in the 
sectoral discussion below.
Despite this puzzle, these results are far more conclusive than those obtained 
for extraregional PTAs, which are mostly statistically insignificant. Rather than 
suggesting that these agreements were and are irrelevant, which would contra-
dict both the theory and results discussed earlier (e.g., the NAFTA gains shown 
in figure 3.4), this seems to indicate that the empirical strategy failed to properly 
identify these PTA effects. The only statistically significant result points to a 
negative impact on extrabloc exports, which is also somewhat puzzling, since 
larger markets are more likely to generate scale and specialization gains and are, 
therefore, more likely to make local firms more competitive abroad. A possible 
explanation might come from the large size differences between the markets in-
volved (such as Mexico and the US in the case of NAFTA). This, combined with 
trade preferences, could lead the larger partner to absorb most of the smaller 
partner’s productive capacity.
A Sectoral Perspective
The second exercise strays from the well-beaten path of the standard gravity 
model to bring more clarity not just on the effects of individual LAC-PTA but 
also on their sectoral ramifications. Instead of using the total sum of bilateral 
trade and simply a binary, “dummy” variable to capture the PTA effect, it relies 
on bilateral sectoral flows and on additional information about applied tariffs 
and the differences between these and the MFN tariff—the so-called margin 
of preference (MOP).40 This additional information helped us to identify the 
heterogeneity of trade effects between and within PTAs (tariff preferences, for 
instance, vary widely in both dimensions) and it also helped to clarify the chan-
nels through which these effects travel.
This point is illustrated in figure 3.6, which shows the distribution of prefer-
ences by main activity sector for four of the region’s major PTAs—the Andean 
40 See technical appendix 3.2 for details.
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Community, the Central American Common Market (CACM), MERCOSUR, 
and NAFTA.41 As can be seen, the MOPs that MERCOSUR grants its mem-
bers for manufacturing goods are higher, on average, and have greater variance 
among them than those granted to agriculture goods. These MOPs, in turn, are 
distinctly different to those granted by the Andean Community. If the agreement 
is only represented by a dummy variable, these nuances are lost.
To understand these issues further, the PTA effect was broken down into two 
main components. The first is the direct effect from tariff reduction or elimi-
nation among member countries, which is mainly a price effect—Argentina, 
say, gets to sell more cars to Brazil than Mexico because it faces lower tariffs 
there.42 The second effect is the indirect benefits that are usually associated with 
PTAs and that come from factors such as less policy uncertainty, improvements 
in trade facilitation, removal of nontariff barriers, and greater incentives for 
trade-inducing foreign direct investment. Since these effects are not directly re-
lated to import prices, their relevance might not be captured by differences in 
applied tariffs across partners. As is the case in other studies, two other variables 
41 CARICOM is not included because of data constraints.
42 The applied tariff might not be capturing all the direct effects if, for instance, the level of utilization of 
the agreement is low (which, as mentioned before, does not seem to be the case for LAC PTAs), with firms 
choosing to pay the MFN tariff to avoid stringent rules of origin or due to a lack of information.
FIGURE 3.6   DiSTRiBUTiON OF MARGiNS OF PREFERENCE 
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were introduced to make sure these effects were measured adequately: a general 
PTA dummy, such as the one used in previous exercises, and the PTA’s MOPs.43
The main assumption behind the use of MOPs is that some of these indirect 
effects, such as FDI, might be correlated with the scale of MOPs. For instance, 
the higher the MOP for vehicles that the US grants to its NAFTA partners, the 
greater the incentive for nonmember countries to invest in Mexico or Canada to 
have better access to the US market.
As in the first exercise, these trade effects were broken down into intra- and 
extrabloc imports and extrabloc exports to address the issues of trade diversion 
and export promotion. However, the inclusion of all this additional information 
in the analysis was not without cost. Due to sheer volume of data (the exer-
cise covers bilateral relationships among 157 countries, 1200 products, and 296 
PTAs between 1995 and 2013), all country and product idiosyncrasies and the 
selection bias created by a substantial number of nonexistent bilateral relation-
ships could not be adequately controlled for due to computational constraints. 
Moreover, due to the lack of data on worldwide preferential tariffs, the sample 
period starts after the signing of most LAC PTAs, which made it more difficult 
to identify their effects.44 Though important, these limitations do not seem to 
compromise the integrity of the analysis entirely, which at the very least sheds 
some light on previously unexplored issues.
The results focus on the same four major LAC PTAs mentioned above and are 
reported at three different levels of aggregation: the economy, sector, and sub-
sector levels. In the case of NAFTA, only bilateral relationships involving Mexico 
are considered since the main objective of the analysis is to capture the effects on 
LAC countries. Figures 3.7 to 3.9 present the first set of economy-wide results. 
They reaffirm, first, the individual statistical and economic significance of LAC’s 
main PTAs, as suggested earlier. However, except for MERCOSUR, they point 
to much smaller impacts, ranging between 8% to 12% (figure 3.7)—clearly at 
the lower end of existing gravity estimates, such as  those discussed in figure 3.4.
These results also show that intrabloc impacts go beyond lower tariffs and that 
some of the benefits come from indirect effects that are mostly, but not always, cor-
related with the MOP, as is revealed by the statistical significance of the PTA dum-
my. Even though tariff elimination is not the only source of benefits, it accounts for 
more than half of the effects in most cases, except again for MERCOSUR, where 
43 See Cipollina et al. (2013) and Cirera et al. 2016.
44 See technical appendix 3.2 for details.
PTA IMPACTS GO BEYOND 
PREFERENCES TO INCLUDE 
GAINS, FOR INSTANCE, 
ON TRADE FACILITATION, 
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FIGURE 3.7   iNTRABLOC TRADE EFFECTS FOR SELECTED  
LAC PTAs
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Source: IDB estimates.
Note: Simulation based on the sum of the effects on main economic activities using the estimated coefficients 
presented in table A.3.3, columns 4, 6, and 8 of technical appendix 3.2. The tariff, indirect, and residual effect 
come from the tariff reduction, MOPs, and a catch-all PTA residual, respectively. NAFTA includes only Mexico’s 
relationship with its two partners.
FIGURE 3.8   TRADE EFFECTS ON ExTRABLOC FLOWS FOR 
SELECTED LAC PTAs
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Note: Simulation based on the sum of the effects on main economic activities using the estimated coefficients 
presented in table A.3.3, columns 4, 6, and 8 of technical appendix 3.2. NAFTA includes only Mexico’s relationship 
with its two partners.
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the MOP is the dominant force. This exception might be related to the magnitude 
of blocs’ MOPs, particularly in manufacturing, and the direct association between 
these and high NTBs on extrabloc imports, particularly in the last decade.45
The evidence on intrabloc gains is complemented by the results on the impact 
of PTAs on extrabloc flows. There are two important messages here (figure 3.8). 
First, there is no substantial trade diversion in the PTAs that were included, 
which reaffirms the results of the first exercise. The only bloc for which there 
is a negative, statistically significant impact is the CACM, but this impact is 
less than 2%. This seems consistent with the fact that most agreements have 
relatively low MFN tariffs and extrabloc NTBs. The exception to this rule, once 
more, is MERCOSUR, a result that is difficult to square with the bloc’s relative-
ly high levels of protectionism. One hypothesis, based on the high variance of 
protection across sectors, is that economy-wide estimates reflect some sort of 
compensation across sectors, in which those with low levels of trade diversion 
more than offset sectors that are highly affected.
FIGURE 3.9   iNTRABLOC TRADE EFFECTS ON SELECTED  
LAC PTAs: AGRiCULTURE, MANUFACTURiNG,  
AND MiNiNG
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presented in table A.3.3, columns 4, 6, and 8 of technical appendix 3.2. The tariff, indirect, and residual effect 
come from the tariff reduction, MOPs, and a catch-all PTA residual, respectively. Sectoral classification based on 
HS 1988/92. NAFTA includes only Mexico’s relationship with its two partners.
45 See section 2.
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The second message also broadly reaffirms the results of the first exercise, but 
with more detail and nuances. It centers on the lack of a positive impact on 
extrabloc exports for most intra-LAC PTAs, except for CACM, a result that is 
at odds with the relatively small size of this bloc’s market. This inconsistency 
might be related to the fact that CACM coexisted with the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) for six of 
the nine years of the period of analysis (1995–2013), which makes it difficult 
to disentangle their effects.46 CAFTA-DR involves a much larger extraregional 
partner, with a widely different set of comparative advantages. That would also 
suggest a positive impact for NAFTA, but here, as in the previous exercise, the 
US tends to absorb most of Mexico’s export capacity.
The second set of results breaks these effects down into broad sectors. As shown 
in figure 3.9, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community were the blocs with the 
highest intersectoral variation in intrabloc gains. In the former, manufacturing 
has a slight lead over agriculture, but gains in both sectors are mainly driven by 
indirect factors associated with the MOP. The most salient feature in the latter is 
the negative indirect impact on agriculture, which was possibly driven by intra-
bloc NTBs. There is much less variation across sectors in the other PTAs.
The results on extrabloc flows (figure 3.10) show that the small trade diversion 
observed earlier within the CACM (i.e., the negative impact on extrabloc im-
ports) comes entirely from manufacturing. If the results are analyzed at an even 
finer sectoral disaggregation, there is no evidence of any statistically significant 
trade diversion within MERCOSUR. Aside from possible data limitations, the 
explanation for the MERCOSUR puzzle might be related to the difficulties in 
identifying this distortion in an agreement that has had some of the highest 
MFN rates in the region, but that was implemented in tandem with a signifi-
cant unilateral liberalization.47 This multidimensional liberalization has boost-
ed both intra- and extraregional imports, which in sectors such as road vehicles 
had been at near autarkic levels (see box 3.1).
Regarding extrabloc exports, the results show that agriculture is the main fac-
tor behind CACM gains, followed closely by manufacturing. In contrast, there 
are significant negative impacts on agriculture in both MERCOSUR and the 
46 CAFTA-DR entered into force for the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in 
2006, for the Dominican Republic in 2007, and for Costa Rica in 2009.
47 For Brazil, see Mesquita Moreira and Correa (1998). For Argentina, see, for example. Galiani and Sanguinetti 
(2003). Other papers such as Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Freund (2010), which cover different periods and 
use different methodologies, also failed to find evidence of trade diversion in MERCOSUR.
MERCOSUR AND THE 
ANDEAN COMMUNITY WERE 
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INTERSECTORAL VARIATION 
IN INTRABLOC GAINS
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FIGURE 3.10   TRADE EFFECTS ON ExTRABLOC FLOWS: 
AGRiCULTURE, MANUFACTURiNG,  
AND MiNiNG FOR SELECTED LAC PTAs
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presented in table A.3.3, columns 4, 6, and 8 of the technical appendix 3.2. Sectoral classification based on HS 
1988/92. NAFTA includes only Mexico’s relationship with its two partners.
Andean Community and only the former seems to have suffered an adverse 
impact on manufacturing exports (–11%).
The third set of results goes a step further and shows the effects at the subsector 
level. It is beyond the scope of this report to offer a detailed analysis for each 
sector-PTA pair, but some patterns are worth noting. These include the presence 
of labor-intensive sectors (e.g., textile, clothing, and footwear) and agricultural 
sectors (meat and processed food) among the highest intrabloc trade gains in all 
LAC PTAs (figure 3.11). Capital-intensive sectors such as transportation prod-
ucts also lead the rankings for MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. As 
expected, what all these sectors have in common is relatively high MFN tariffs 
and MOPs, which hints at their weak competitive position against extrabloc 
imports, particularly from Asia. The contours of this correlation can be seen in 
figure 3.12.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 detail the subsector results for extrabloc flows, consid-
ering only the blocs where the impact on exports or imports were statistical-
ly significant at the sector level. In the CACM, the extrabloc gains seem to be 
correlated with the comparative advantages that member countries have in the 
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BOX 3.1  MERCOSUR’S TRADE DivERSiON PUZZLE: THE AUTOMOTivE iNDUSTRY
Even though MERCOSUR has some of the highest MOPs among LAC PTAs, if not world PTAs, standard 
econometric tools largely fail to identify statistically significant signs of trade diversion (i.e., a shift from 
extra- to intrabloc suppliers), even at the sectoral level. The dynamics of trade and trade policy in the 
MERCOSUR automotive sector help to illustrate the empirical challenges around identifying this effect.
Since the MERCOSUR agreement was signed, the automotive sector (including auto parts) has 
accounted for 20% of the MERCOSUR trade, on average, and has also enjoyed one of the highest 
nominal MOPs, although quantifying the actual magnitude of this is far from a trivial task. Passenger 
cars, for instance, had a 20% MFN tariff in the first decade of the agreement, which was later raised 
to 35%. However, vehicles, alongside sugar, have figured permanently among the exceptions to 
the free trade zone and have been subjected to “administered trade.” In other words, bilateral 
trade between Brazil and Argentina, which account for nearly all the bloc’s vehicle production, 
has been subjected to a rule that imposes a de facto quota on duty-free trade, based on a cap on 
trade imbalances: a member’s exports cannot be more than 1.5 times greater than its imports.a 
To complicate things further, in the mid-2000s, the two countries adopted several NTBs, ranging 
from hard-to-obtain import licenses to discriminatory taxes on car imports, which had a direct, 
heterogeneous effect on market access for both members and nonmembers.b
To add a final layer of complexity, the intricate implementation of this PTA came back-to-back with 
the unilateral liberalization of trade during the bloc’s first five years of existence, a process that was 
eventually embodied in the common external tariff. This not only drastically reduced the MFN tariff 
for cars (Brazil’s import tariff for cars was as high as 116% in 1988), but also eliminated stringent 
NTBs that effectively ensured that import penetration was negligible.c
Figure B.3.1 shows how trade in passenger cars has behaved during these complex changes in 
trade rules and barriers. The bloc was in a state of near autarky in the late 1980s, right before 
the agreement. So, it is fair to say that the agreement has created both intra- and extraregional 
trade where there was virtually none, and in this sense, there has not been any trade diversion. 
However, it is also reasonable to argue that whatever the actual values of MOPs have been, they 
have led intraregional trade to represent a much higher share of both imports and exports than 
would have been possible under free trade. That much is supported by the fact that extraregional 
exports remain limited, which is testimony to the lack of competitiveness of MERCOSUR products. 
In fact, in 2016, the value of extraregional exports, which account for a mere 20% of total MERCOSUR 
exports, were lower than in 1988 when measured in constant prices. This clearly falls short of the 
bloc’s motivations of becoming a platform to boost its members’ exports. More than 25 years 
after the agreement was signed, the signs of the “dynamic effects” of trade diversion have yet to 
materialize.
a  See Castaño and Piñero (2016) for details.
b  See IDB (2017).
c  See Braga, Kume, and Ferro (1988).
(continued on next page)
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FIGURE B.3.1   MERCOSUR iNTRA- AND ExTRABLOC TRADE iN PASSENGER 
CARS. 1988–2016, US$ MiLLiON, 2009 PRiCES
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BOX 3.1  MERCOSUR’S TRADE DivERSiON PUZZLE: THE AUTOMOTivE iNDUSTRY (continued)
CAFTA-DR market, namely food and labor-intensive goods, although it is hard 
to disentangle the effects of these two blocs from one another, as mentioned 
earlier. In the Andean Community, the negative impact on extrabloc exports 
are concentrated in meat, vegetables, and grains, whereas in MERCOSUR, the 
losses are led by a mix of highly competitive sectors (probably driven by a shift 
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FIGURE 3.12   CORRELATiON BETWEEN iNTRABLOC LAC-PTA GAiNS AND  
MFN TARiFFS BY SUBSECTOR (%)
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toward more lucrative markets) and less competitive and highly protected ones, 
such as textiles, clothing, footwear, and transportation equipment, none of 
which seemed to have leveraged the common market to boost exports. Finally, 
figure 3.14 presents the results for the only bloc where trade diversion was sta-
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FIGURE 3.13   ExTRABLO
C ExPO
RT EFFECTS FO
R SELECTED LAC PTAs BY  
SUBSECTO
R (%
)
–30
–20
Percentage
–10 0
ANDEAN
0
100
Percentage200
300
CACM
Meat
Vegetable & Grains
Processed Food
Minerals
Fuel
Chemicals
Plastic & Rubber
Leather Prod
Wood & Paper
Textile & Clothing
Footwear
Stone & Glass
Metal Prod
Mach & Electronics
Transport
Minerals
Fuel
Mach & Electronics
Stone & Glass
Metal Prod
Chemicals
Transport
Plastic & Rubber
Wood & Paper
Meat
Leather Prod
Vegetable & Grains
Footwear
Textile & Clothing
Processed Food
–50
Percentage
–25 0
M
ERCO
SUR
Meat
Vegetable & Grains
Footwear
Textile & Clothing
Plastic & Rubber Prod
Processed Food
Leather Prod
Transport
Metal Prod
Mach & Electronics
Chemicals
Wood & Paper
Stone & Glass
Minerals
Fuel
Source: IDB estim
ates.
Note: Sim
ulation based on the sum
 of the effects on m
ain econom
ic activities using the estim
ated coefficients presented in table A.3.3, colum
ns 4, 6, 
and 8 of technical appendix 3.2. Sectoral classification based on HS 1988/92.
CONNECTING THE DOTS58
FIGURE 3.14   CACM ExTRABLOC iMPORT EFFECTS BY  
SUBSECTOR (%)
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tistically significant—CACM. Here, too, as expected, there seems to be a high 
correlation with subsector MFN levels.
In conclusion, these wide-ranging statistical results send at least three clear, 
robust messages. First, intra-LAC PTAs had a significant impact on intrabloc 
trade, one that closely follows MOPs at the sector level. Second, there is no evi-
dence of significant trade diversion, even though there are grounds to be skep-
tical of this result, particularly in the case of MERSCOSUR. And third, despite 
being a leitmotif of the region’s integration initiatives, there seems to be little ev-
idence that intra-LAC trade functioned as an export platform for extraregional 
markets. The CACM is the exception, but its effects seem to be entwined with 
those of the CAFTA-DR.
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Technical Appendix 3.1 
A Macro Gravity View of the PTA Effect
Methodology
To address the impact that regional trade agreements have on trade flows, the 
following gravity equation was estimated:
X RTAln ,ijt ijt
B
ij it jt ijtα γ δ λ ε= + + + +  (1)
where X
ijt
 are exports from country i to country j during year t, X RTAt ijt
Bα γ= + is a binary 
indicator variable equal to 1 if countries i and j have a regional trade agreement in 
year t, and γ
ij
, δ
it
, and λ
jt
 are, respectively, pair, exporter-year, and importer-year 
fixed effects. The pair fixed effect, γ
ij
, controls for factors that influence trade 
costs like the distance between the pair of countries and whether they have a 
common language or share a border. The importer-year and exporter-year fixed 
effects control for the size of each country and for what Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003) have termed “multilateral resistances.” Multilateral resistances 
are essentially the price indices of each country and are a measure of how com-
petitive a market is: the more sellers that are competing in a market, the lower 
the price index. Size variables could be proxied by the GDP of each country but 
price indices are more complex since they depend not only on the trade costs 
between i and j but also on the trade costs between all the pairs, including those 
that do not involve country i.
In the second step, the following equation, which recovers the trade diversion 
effects of agreements, was estimated:48
X RTA RTA RTAln ,ijt
B
ijt
B M
ijt
M X
ijt
X
ij it jt ijtα α α γ δ λ ε= + + + + + +  (2)
where RTA RB M ijt
M Xα α= + + + is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the importing country, 
j, is a member of a trade agreement with a country other than i and A RTAM X ijt
Xα γ+ + is a 
binary indicator variable equal to 1 if the exporting country, i, is a member of a 
trade agreement with a country other than j. If the coefficient αM (αX) is nega-
tive, then RTAs are generating trade diversion, since imports from (exports to) 
48 Dai et al. (2014) also estimate the trade diversion effects of PTAs.
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third countries are being substituted by imports from countries belonging to 
the RTA.
In the third step, RTAs were classified into agreements between Latin American 
countries (LAC–LAC); agreements between Latin American countries and the rest 
of the world (LAC–ROW), and agreements between the rest of the world that do 
not include LAC countries (ROW–ROW).49 The following equation was estimated:
X LAC LAC LAC LAC LAC LAC Lln _ _ _ _ijt
B
ijt
B M
ijt
M X
ijt
X B
1 1 1 2β β β β= + + + 
(3)
C LAC ROW LAC ROW LAC ROW R_ _ _ _ijt
X B
ijt
B M
ijt
M X
ijt
X B
1 2 2 2β β β β+ + + + + +
W ROW ROW ROW ROW ROW ROW_ _ _ _ _ ,ijt
X B
ijt
B M
ijt
M X
ijt
X
2 2 3 3 3β β β β β γ+ + + + + +
W_ ,ijt
X
ij it jt ijtβ γ δ λ ε+ + + + +
Ideally, one would like to have estimated the trade diversion effects of individual 
agreements, such as MERCOSUR or NAFTA. However, this was not possible 
because the inclusion of trade diversion binary indicators causes collinearity. 
For example, if indicators for MERCOUR are included, the sum of the bilateral 
MERCOSUR indicator and the export diversion MERCOSUR indicator would 
be equal to the sum of the exporter-year fixed effects of MERCOSUR countries. 
Not including exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects could generate a 
bias in the estimated coefficients. As explained above, the importer-year and 
exporter-year fixed effects control for unobservable changes in country size and 
multilateral resistances that could be correlated with countries’ belonging to an 
RTA. By grouping agreements as in equation (3), the fixed effects are not col-
linear with the trade diversion binary indicators since some countries in each 
group belong to more than one agreement.
Equations (1) to (3) were estimated using the Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) approach. This was developed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), who 
point out that estimating the gravity equation in logarithmic form by Ordinary 
Least Squares can lead to inconsistent estimates if the error term is heteroske-
dastic. OLS estimates are also reported for comparison.50
49 The LAC group includes Latin American counties belonging to the six main RTAs in the region (AC, 
CACM, CAFTA-DR, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA): Antigua, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. The agreements between these countries, besides the main six are: AC-MERCOSUR, 
CACM–Mexico, MERCOSUR–Bolivia, MERCOSUR–Chile, CARICOM–Colombia, CARICOM–Costa Rica, 
CARICOM–Cuba, CARICOM–Dominican Republic, and CARICOM–Venezuela.
50 The Stata command ppml_panel_sg developed by Thomas Zylkin was used (http://www.tomzylkin.com/
research.html).
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Sample of countries
Main sample (146 countries): AGO, ALB, ARE, ARG, ARM, ATG, AUS, AUT, AZE, BEL, BEN, BFA, BGD, BGR, BHR, BIH, BLR, 
BOL, BRA, BRB, BRN, CAN, CHE, CHL, CHN, CIV, CMR, COG, COL, CRI, CUB, CYP, CZE, DEU, DMA, DNK, DOM, DZA, ECU, EGY, 
ESP, EST, ETH, FIN, FJI, FRA, FRO, GAB, GBR, GEO, GHA, GIN, GMB, GRC, GRL, GTM, GUY, HKG, HND, HRV, HUN, IDN, IND, 
IRL, IRN, ISL, ISR, ITA, JAM, JOR, JPN, KAZ, KEN, KGZ, KOR, KWT, LBN, LBR, LBY, LCA, LKA, LTU, LUX, LVA, MAC, MAR, MDA, 
MDG, MEX, MKD, MLI, MLT, MOZ, MRT, MUS, MWI, MYS, NCL, NER, NGA, NIC, NLD, NOR, NPL, NZL, OMN, PAK, PAN, PER, 
PHL, PNG, POL, PRT, PRY, PYF, QAT, ROM, ROW, RUS, RWA, SAU, SEN, SGP, SLV, SUD, SVK, SVN, SWE, SYC, SYR, TGO, THA, 
TTO, TUN, TUR, TZA, UGA, UKR, URY, USA, VEN, VNM, YEM, ZAF, ZMB, ZWE.
Rest of the world (59 countries): AIA, ANT, ASM, ATA, ATF, BAT, BES, BLM, BMU, BVT, CCK, COK, CSK, CUW, CXR, DDR, 
ESH, GIB, GLP, GUF, GUM, HMD, IMN, IOT, KN1, MCO, MID, MNG, MNP, MNT, MTQ, MYT, NFK, NIU, PCE, PCN, PCZ, PLW, PRI, 
PRK, PSE, REU, SER, SGS, SOM, SSD, SXM, TCA, TKL, TMP, UMI, USP, VAT, VGB, VIR, WLF, YDR, YUG, ZAR.
Member Countries and Start Date of Agreements under Study
Agreement Member Countries Year
Andean Community (AC) Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela (left in 2001) 1996
Central American Common 
Market (CACM)
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama 1991
CAFTA-DR Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, USA
2006
CARICOM Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Belize and 
Trinidad and Tobago
1989
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 1991
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, USA 1990
Notes: (i) The start dates used for all agreements except MERCOSUR and NAFTA were their relaunches in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see figure 2.1 
and boxes 2 to 5), since they had barely been enforced until then. NAFTA’s start date was set as the year negotiations were announced (1990), with the 
aim of identifying anticipation effects and out of concern for the pre-existing maquilas program. The alternative use of the enforcement date (1994) as 
the start date did not affect significantly the results.
(ii) Bahamas, Belize, Grenada, Haiti, Monserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Surinam were not included in the CARICOM 
group since the proportion of zeroes in the data was higher than 60% for these countries.
Data
Annual bilateral trade flows for more than two hundred countries for 1976–2013 
were taken from the United Nations Comtrade Database, SITC Revision 1. We 
followed Feenstra et al. (2005) by using imports that originated in country i as 
reported by country j, whenever they were available, since they tend to be more 
accurately reported than exports. This information was complemented by the 
reverse export flow as reported by country j, whenever imports were missing.
The variable indicating whether a pair of countries has a trade agreement was 
constructed using the data from Kohl et al. (2016). This data included 296 agree-
ments for 201 countries for the period 1948–2013.
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If a pair of countries that appeared in Comtrade data did not appear in the 
agreements data, it was assumed that there was no agreement between them. 
Countries that did not have an agreement with any other country were then 
aggregated into a category called “rest of the world” (RoW), following Anderson 
and Yotov (2016). Countries for which the percentage of zeroes in the trade data 
was higher than 60% were also discarded. This procedure yielded a sample of 
146 countries plus the RoW aggregate.
Results
TABLE A.3.1  THE iMPACT OF REGiONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON BiLATERAL TRADE FLOWS
Panel A: OLS Panel B: PPML
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)
RTAB Ł7***
Ł48]
Ł9***
Ł47]
Ł
Ł
Ł**
Ł
RTAM .49
Ł
1.104***
[0.111]
RTAX 0.248
[0.290]
0.861**
[0.385]
RTA_LAC_LACB 0.332***
[0.0763]
0.333***
[0.0764]
0.518***
[0.0959]
0.494***
[0.0973]
RTA_LAC_LACM 0.661***
[0.144]
0.364
[0.695]
RTA_LAC_LACX 0.382***
[0.135]
–0.511***
[0.150]
RTA_LAC_ROWB –0.032
[0.0592]
–0.0374
[0.0614]
0.0834
[0.0547]
–0.0216
[0.0576]
RTA_LAC_ROWM 0.0136
[0.137]
0.00293
[0.0520]
RTA_LAC_ROWX –0.0761
[0.119]
–0.250***
[0.0720]
RTA_ROW_ROWB 0.360***
[0.0285]
0.363***
[0.0285]
–0.0146
[0.0525]
0.0536*
[0.0284]
RTA_ROW_ROWM 0.457
[0.361]
0.732***
[0.178]
RTA_ROW_ROWX Ł77
Ł7]
Ł1**
Ł2]
Observations 516,501 516,501 516,501 516,501 693,144 693,144 693,144 693,144
R-squared 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867  0.990 0.993 0.991 0.992
Notes: the table contains the gravity equation estimates where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral imports for 1976–2013. All 
regressions include importer-year, exporter-year, and pair fixed effects. Superscript B indicates that both countries belong to the RTA, M indicates that 
only the importing country belongs to the RTA, and X that only the exporting country belongs to the RTA. Panel A was estimated by OLS and Panel B was 
estimated by PPML. Standard errors clustered by pair. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Technical Appendix 3.2 
A Sectoral Gravity View of the PTA Effect
Building on the literature on US and EU unilateral preferences, such as Cipollina 
et al. (2013) and Cirera et al. (2016), this exercise extended the standard gravity 
model to better identify the heterogeneity of trade effects between and within 
LAC PTAs, as well as the channels through which these effects travel. To do so, 
we used sectoral bilateral flows (at HS 4-digit level) and incorporated two extra 
terms in the model to capture the impact of tariffs and MOPs. The tariff term 
captures the PTA direct impact of lower applied tariffs and the MOP term is a 
proxy for the indirect effects of PTAs, including less trade policy uncertainty, 
improvements in trade facilitation, removal of nontariff barriers, and greater 
incentives for trade-inducing foreign direct investment. The main assumption is 
that the larger the MOP, the higher these indirect benefits are likely to be.
To make sure the exercise captured all indirect effects, the standard, general 
PTA dummy was still included in the model in case these effects did not all 
correlate with the MOP. As in the first exercise, discussed in technical appen-
dix 3.1, these trade effects were broken down into intra- and extrabloc im-
ports and extrabloc exports to address the issues of trade diversion and export 
promotion.
The Model
The preferred specification is:
ln M ln TF pln MOP ln MOP P P( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (ijt
S
ijt
S
ijt
S
k ijt
S
k ki kj∑ ∑β δ= + + + + + × × + +
β δ∑ × ×Pkj )+ ϕkln(1+MOPiktSk∑ )×[Pki−(Pki×Pkj )]+ σ∑ × − × ω γ δ λ ε
P P ln MOP P P P PTA)] (1 ) [ ( )] ,kj k kjt
S
k kj ki kj ijt i∑ σ ω× + + × − × + +
A] ,ijt ij
s
it
s
jt
s
ijt
sσ ω γ δ λ ε+ + + + +
 
(A1)
where
i is the reporting (importer) country,
j is the partner (exporter) country,
t denotes the sample period,
s is the HS 4-digit product code, and
k is an individual PTA.
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The results displayed are limited to the four LAC PTAs of interests:51 the 
Andean Community (AC), the Central American Common Market (CACM), 
MERCOSUR (MSUR), and NAFTA. To isolate the effects on Mexico, bilateral 
trade between United States and Canada was excluded in NAFTA.
ln M l( )ijt
S  denotes country i’s imports from partner country j of product s in year t.
M ln TF p(1 ) (ijt
Sβ δ= +  denotes the applied tariff rate country i imposes on imports from country j of 
product s in year t. The applied tariff TF TFPRFijt
s
ijt
s=  if there is a PTA (or unilat-
eral preferential program), and TF TFMFNijt
s
ijt
s=  otherwise. Note, all the available 
preferential tariff data between country i and j is included in the model, no matter 
whether country i and j are members of the four LAC PTAs defined above.
MOP is defined as MOP TFMFN TFPRFijt
s
ijt
s
ijt
s
= −  if there is a PTA between im-
porter i and exporter j at year t, and MOP Tijt
s
= − 0 otherwise. Note, all the MOPs 
between country i and j are included in the model, no matter whether country i 
and j are members of the four LAC PTAs defined above.
P
ki
 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i is a member of PTA k and 
0 otherwise.
P
kj
 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country j is a member of PTA k and 
0 otherwise.
MOPikt
s  is the MOP that importer i gives to member countries of PTA k. When
MOP Tijt
s  is different for different member country j, MOPikt
s  is the simple average 
of MOP Tijt
s
= − for all countries j (j ≠ i) of PTA k.
MOPkjt
s  is the MOP that exporter j receives from members of PTA k. When 
MOP Tijt
s  is different for different country i, MOPkjt
s  is the simple average of MOP Tijt
s  
for all countries i (i ≠ j) of PTA k.
PTA
ijt
 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is a PTA between country i 
and j in year t and 0 otherwise.
When both i and j are in PTA k, both P
ki
 and P
kj
 are equal to 1. The fourth and 
fifth terms in equation (A1) disappear because P
ki
 – (P
ki
 × P
kj
) = 0 and P
kj
 – (P
ki
 × 
P
kj
) = 0. β captures the effect of tariff change. The direct effect of PTA k on trade 
between member countries can be inferred from this value. The indirect effect 
of PTA k on trade is captured by ρ + δ
k
.
51 CARICOM could not be included in the analysis because preferential tariff data is missing for most of the 
observations.
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When i is a member of PTA k and j is not, P
ki
 = 1 and P
kj
 = 0. The third and fifth 
terms disappear because P
ki
 × P
kj
 = 0 and P
kj
 – (P
ki
 × P
kj
) = 0. The coefficient of 
the fourth term φ
k
 captures the effect of PTA k on members’ imports from non-
member countries.
When j is a member of PTA k and i is not, P
ki
 = 0 and P
kj
 = 1. The third and 
fourth terms disappear because P
ki
 × P
kj
 = 0 and P
kj
 – (P
ki
 × P
kj
) = 0. The coeffi-
cient of the fifth term σ
k
 captures the effect of PTA k on nonmembers’ imports 
from member countries, that is, member countries’ exports to nonmembers.
] ,t ij
sσ ω γ δ+ + , ] ,t i it
sσ ω γ δ+ + and ] ,jt
sσ ω λ ε+ + are  respectively, pair-sector, importer-year-sector, and 
exporter-year-sector fixed effects.
] ,ijt
sσ ω λ ε+  is the error term.
This specification follows the so-called gold standard of gravity equations 
(Anderson and Yotov 2012) as closely as possible, using fixed effects to con-
trol for size, product, and geographical characteristics. The full implementa-
tion of the gold standard would require the use of all the sector fixed effects 
at the 4-digit level. That is, importer-year-hs4digit, exporter-year-hs4digit, and 
importer-exporter-hs4digit. However, as the MFN tariff is one component of 
the MOP and is highly collinear with the import-year-hs4digit fixed effect, the 
coefficient of the MOP could not be estimated.52 The solution was to use what is 
arguably the second-most-demanding specification, replacing import-year-hs-
4digit with importer-year-hs2digit fixed effects in the regression. Another less 
demanding specification with importer-year fixed effects was also run as a ro-
bustness check. Computational constraints imposed another limitation on the 
estimation. The sheer volume of data and the high-dimension fixed effects made 
it impossible to go beyond an ordinary-least-square-with-fixed-effects estima-
tion strategy, which, as is well known, has heteroskedasticity and selection bias 
issues, the latter produced by the substantial number of zero-trade relationships. 
The PPML strategy (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) that is widely used to ad-
dress these issues would not converge to results even when using high-dimension 
fixed effects procedures such as those proposed by Larch et al. (2017). Another 
restriction of their procedure is that it requires the inclusion of the most de-
manding fixed effects, namely importer-year-hs4digit, exporter-year-hs4digit, 
and importer-exporter-hs4digit, which could not be applied here because of the 
limitations in the data explained above.
52 In the dataset, the MFN tariff of an importer for a specific HS 6-digit product and year is the same for all 
exporters. At HS 4-digit level, the only variation comes from the composition of HS 6-digit items that two 
countries trade.
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Data
Bilateral import data at HS 6-digit level was obtained from UN Comtrade. The 
sample covers 157 reporting countries for 1995–2013. For the regressions, im-
port data was aggregated to HS 4-digit level. The PTAs included are obtained 
from Kohl et al. (2016), which included 296 agreements for 201 countries for 
the period 1948–2013. We made an effort to collect the MFN tariff and the 
preferential tariff for as many PTAs as possible. Data on tariffs was obtained 
from UNCTAD-TRAINS, supplemented by data from IDB INTrade and LAIA 
Preferential Tariff data. When there were multiple preferential tariff rates, the 
lowest one was applied. The HS 6-digit tariff is the simple average of tariffs at tariff 
line value. The HS 4-digit tariff is the simple average of tariffs at HS 6-digit level. 
The sectoral classification was derived from the HS system: manufacturing (Mnf) 
includes processed food, chemicals, plastics and rubber, leather products, wood 
and paper, textiles and clothing, footwear, stone glass, metal products, machinery 
and electronics, and transport; agriculture (Agr) includes meat and vegetable and 
grains; and mining (Min) includes minerals and fuel. These 15 disaggregated sub-
sectors were created based on HS 2-digits (as shown in table A.3.2).
Results
Table A.3.3 presents the regression results. The results in column 1 and 2 used the 
whole sample, whereas those in column 3 to 8 used only the corresponding sector. 
The odd-numbered columns contain results with importer-year, exporter-year-hs-
4digit, and importer-exporter-hs4digit fixed effects. The even-numbered col-
umns contain those with importer-year-hs2digit, exporter-year-hs4digit, and 
import-export-hs4digit fixed effects.
Simulation
The regression results in table A.3.3 only revealed if a partial effect was positive 
or negative, but the size of the total PTA effect could not be read directly from 
the coefficients. Counterfactual simulations were therefore carried out to reveal 
the size of the PTA effect.
As argued earlier, the model breaks down the trade effect of PTA k into multiple 
components. The direct effect from lower tariffs is captured by β. The MOP-
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related indirect effects are captured by ρ + δ
k
. The residual PTA effects are cap-
tured by ω. The coefficient φ
k
 captures PTA k’s effect on member imports from 
nonmembers and σ
k
 captures PTA k’s effect on member exports to nonmembers.
Using the estimated coefficients at the sectoral level with the most demand-
ing specification (importer-year-hs2digit, exporter-year-hs4digit, and import-
er-exporter-hs4digit) in columns 4, 6, and 8 of table A.3.3, and the average value 
of tariff (TFMFN ijavg
S  and TFPREijavg
S
) and MOP(MOPijavg
S , MOPikavg
S , and MOPkjavg
S ) 
between 1995 and 2013, seven import values were simulated. First, the imports 
of country i from country j (i and j can be any country in the sample) at HS 
4-digit level if there were no PTAs. These would be equivalent to
MnoPTA ln TFMFN FEexp( ( (1 )) ),ij
S
ijavg
S
ijavg
Sβ= + +  (A2)
where, N FE1 )) )ijavg
Sβ +  is the estimation of fixed effects. Note, three sets of fixed effects 
are estimated in each regression, importer-year-hs2digit (FEit
HS2), export-
er-year-hs4digit (FE jt
HS4), and importer-exporter-hs4digit (FEij
HS4). For product s, 
the total fixed effects is: FE FE FE FEijt
s
it
s
jt
s
ij
s
= + + . As FEit
s
= + and FE jt
s
= +  vary over year 
t, FEijt
s  varies too. Therefore, we use the average value of FEijt
s  between 1995 and 
2013, i.e. N FE1 )) )ijavg
Sβ +  to do the simulation. 
Second, the imports of country p from country q (both p and q are members of 
a PTA) at HS 4-digit level if the PTA only reduces tariffs from the MFN rate to 
the preferential rate. That is,
Mtf pq
S
= exp(β(ln(1+TFPREpqavgS ))+FEpqavgS ).  (A3)
Third, the imports of country p from country q at HS 4-digit level if the PTA 
only brings in the MOP. That is,
Mmoppq
s
= exp(β(ln(1+TFMFN pqavgs ))+ δ
β ))+(p+δk )(ln(1+MOPpqavgs ))+FEpqavgs ).  
(A4)
Fourth, the imports of country p from country q at HS 4-digit level if the PTA 
only affects imports through the dummy variable. That is,
Mdummy pq
s
= exp(β(ln(1+TFMFN pqavgs ))+ω+FEpqavgs ).  (A5)
Fifth, the imports of country p from country q at HS 4-digit level if the PTA 
effect includes all three components. That is,
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Mfullpq
s
= exp(β(ln(1+TFPREpqavgs ))+ ρ δ ω
β ))+(ρ+δk )(ln(1+MOPpqavgs ))+ω+FEpqavgs ).  
(A6)
Sixth, the imports of country p from nonmember country n with PTA k is sim-
ulated as
MfNM pn
s
= exp(β(ln(1+TFMFN pnavgs ))+ϕ
β ))+ϕkln(1+MOPpkavgs ))+FEpnavgs ).  
(A7)
Last, the exports of country q to nonmember country n with PTA k is simulated as
EtNMnq
s
= exp(β(ln(1+TFMFNnqavgs ))+σkln(1+MOPkqavgs )+FEnqavgs ).  (A8)
For all member countries p and q in PTA k, the direct, tariff effect of PTA k on 
within bloc trade is calculated as
TFeffectk=
∑ p∑q∑s Mtf pqs
∑ p∑q∑s MnoPTApqs
−1.  (A9)
The indirect (MOP) effect is
MOPeffectk=
∑ p∑q∑s Mmoppqs
∑ p∑q∑s MnoPTApqs
−1.  (A10)
The residual PTA dummy effect is
DMYeffect
Mdummy
MnoPTA
1.k
p q s pq
s
p q s pq
s
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
−  (A11)
The total PTA effect including all three components at the same time is
Fulleffect
Mfull
MnoPTA
1.k
p q s pq
s
p q s pq
s
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
−  (A12)
As the exponential function is nonlinear, the sum of TFeffect
k
, MOPeffect
k
, and 
DMYeffect
k
 is not exactly equal to Fulleffect
k
. To be consistent, Fulleffect
k
 was 
distributed among the three components proportionally to their estimated size. 
In other words, the adjusted effects are calculated as
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TFeffect
TFeffect
TFeffect MOPeffect DMYeffect
Fulleffect .k
AD k
k k k
k=
+ +
 (A13)
MOPeffect
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The effect of PTA k on members’ imports from nonmembers is
MfNMeffect
MfNM
MnoPTA
1.k
p n s pn
s
p n s pn
s
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
−  (A16)
The effect of PTA k on members’ exports to nonmembers is,
EtNMeffect
EtNM
MnoPTA
1.k
n q s nq
s
n q s nq
s
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
−  (A17)
TABLE A.3.2  SECTORAL GRAviTY. HS CHAPTERS BY SUBSECTORS
Sector Subsector HS
Agriculture (Agr) Meat 01 02 03 04 05
Vegetable & Grains 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
Mining (Min) Minerals 25 26 6801 6802 6803 6804 6805 6806
Fuel 27
Manufacturing (Mnf) Processed Food 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Chemicals 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Plastics & Rubber 39 40
Leather Products 41 42 43
Wood & Paper 44 45 46 47 48 49 
Textiles & Clothing 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
Footwear 64 65 66 67 
Stone & Glass 68 (exclude 6801 6802 6803 6804 6805 6806) 69 70 71
Metal Products 72 73 74 75 76 78 79 80 81 82 83
Machinery & Electronics 84 85
Transport 86 87 88 89
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TABLE A.3.3  SECTORAL GRAviTY. ESTiMATiON RESULTS
 (1) (2)  
 
(3) (4)  
 
(5) (6)  
 
(7) (8)
 Whole Sample Agr Mnf Min
(S1) (S2) (S1) (S2) (S1) (S2) (S1) (S2)
ariff –0.817***
(0.015)
–0.629***
(0.018)
–0.699***
(0.036)
–0.607***
(0.045)
–0.820***
(0.016)
–0.626***
(0.020)
–0.693***
(0.132)
–0.864***
(0.153)
lnMOP 0.281***
(0.023)
0.339***
(0.026)
0.127**
(0.050)
0.156***
(0.057)
0.302***
(0.026)
0.393***
(0.029)
0.729***
(0.240)
0.508**
(0.251)
lnMOP_AC_intra –0.569**
(0.248)
–0.195
(0.254)
–2.876**
(1.222)
–2.557**
(1.256)
–0.401
(0.255)
–0.062
(0.261)
–2.826
(2.301)
–2.530
(2.252)
lnMOP_CACM_ 
intra
–0.279
(0.341)
–0.090
(0.361)
–1.714
(1.062)
–0.452
(1.120)
–0.136
(0.360)
–0.124
(0.381)
2.726
(2.869)
2.046
(2.953)
lnMOP_MSUR_ 
intra
1.345***
(0.348)
1.731***
(0.350)
3.074*
(1.706)
3.288**
(1.676)
1.086***
(0.354)
1.321***
(0.356)
4.597
(3.529)
6.916**
(3.442)
lnMOP_NAFTA_ 
intra
0.501
(0.918)
0.285
(0.890)
–0.581
(1.593)
–0.509
(1.515)
0.836
(1.022)
0.390
(0.995)
–2.807
(17.781)
3.903
(18.360)
lnMOP_AC_imp –0.191***
(0.056)
0.012
(0.063)
0.038
(0.235)
–0.197
(0.249)
–0.159***
(0.058)
0.028
(0.066)
–0.185
(0.518)
0.305
(0.556)
lnMOP_CACM_imp –0.737***
(0.101)
–0.234**
(0.110)
–0.357
(0.358)
0.019
(0.343)
–0.831***
(0.105)
–0.297**
(0.117)
1.214
(0.921)
0.818
(0.947)
lnMOP_MSUR_imp –0.106
(0.070)
0.129
(0.079)
0.107
(0.460)
0.189
(0.482)
–0.123*
(0.071)
0.114
(0.080)
1.231
(0.979)
0.500
(1.081)
lnMOP_NAFTA_
imp
0.028
(0.079)
0.046
(0.096)
–0.250
(0.276)
–0.130
(0.296)
0.091
(0.082)
0.020
(0.103)
0.929
(1.422)
2.438*
(1.472)
lnMOP_AC_exp –0.608*
(0.314)
–0.261
(0.315)
–3.445***
(1.265)
–3.229**
(1.296)
–0.402
(0.326)
–0.061
(0.327)
–3.109
(2.835)
–3.047
(2.830)
lnMOP_CACM_exp 10.228***
(0.623)
7.216***
(0.624)
7.890***
(1.888)
5.771***
(1.886)
10.455***
(0.663)
7.428***
(0.663)
6.649
(6.758)
4.612
(6.895)
lnMOP_MSUR_exp –1.289***
(0.344)
–1.305***
(0.344)
–7.262***
(2.170)
–6.551***
(2.213)
–1.119***
(0.348)
–1.301***
(0.348)
–2.224
(4.074)
2.379
(4.115)
lnMOP_NAFTA_
exp
0.760
(0.943)
0.501
(0.912)
–1.196
(1.582)
–1.204
(1.502)
0.960
(1.063)
0.724
(1.030)
2.451
(17.835)
9.925
(18.425)
PTA 0.026***
(0.003)
0.029***
(0.003)
–0.018
(0.011)
–0.018
(0.011)
0.029***
(0.003)
0.032***
(0.003)
0.024
(0.020)
0.030
(0.019)
Observations 41,415,939 41,412,904 2,938,738 2,938,218 37,383,961 37,381,652 1,093,240 1,093,023
R-squared 0.818 0.821 0.826 0.830 0.817 0.820 0.819 0.822
imp#exp#hs4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
exp#year#hs4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
imp#year Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
imp#year#hs2 No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes
Standard errors cluster by imp#exp#hs4 in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As argued earlier, LAC’s regional integration initiatives suffer from an original 
sin: fragmentation. There are just too many small PTAs. This setup has been 
working against the main economic motivation behind these agreements, name-
ly productivity gains capable of making the region more competitive. The way 
to rescue these initiatives and make them more economically relevant was also 
hinted at in the previous sections: the region needs to move toward a regionwide 
FTA or LAC-FTA, which would constitute a market worth about US$5 trillion 
or approximately 7% of global GDP. This would constitute a critical mass large 
enough to allow efficient firms to grow and develop value chains that could sig-
nificantly boost productivity. But how should the region go about getting to this 
promised land?
To anyone with any knowledge of the historical tribulations that have plagued 
LAC PTAs, this proposal might appear to be yet another of the overly ambitious 
visions that litter the region’s history. In fact, no more than ten years ago, LAIA 
put forward a similar proposal on which progress has yet to be made.53 Why 
would this time be any different?
First, as noted earlier, LAC is facing a different and more challenging trade en-
vironment, one that promises to be merciless to small agreements. Either they 
acquire a critical economic mass or they face a slow death or, worse yet, irrele-
vancy. Second, the network of agreements built over the last 25 years provides 
the region with a powerful platform to build upon. As was shown in section 2, 
the region is much closer to free intraregional trade than conventional wisdom 
might suggest. Third, LAC has built up more than half a century of integration 
53 ALADI (2007).
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experience that will help guide policy decisions. And finally, LAC’s political pen-
dulum seems to be swinging back toward a more pragmatic and less ideological 
view of integration. As ever, though, the devil may be in the details.
To be sure, there is more than one route to reach a free trade area. The region 
stands to benefit even if it only travels part of the way, as it awaits the right 
political conditions to finish the journey. This process could be described as 
consisting of different “stops,” the complexity of which correlates to the distance 
traveled (see figure 4.1), as do the potential rewards. Governments can pick the 
itinerary that best suits their motivations and political constraints. They could 
take a more cautious, step-by-step approach, beginning by extending the cumu-
lation of RoOs among existing agreements, or they could travel nonstop toward 
establishing a LAC-FTA. They could even opt for something in between these 
two approaches.54 However, it is important for them to fully understand what is 
required to reach each “stop” along the way and the gains and limitations of the 
different options.
54 Similar options have been discussed before in the context of initiatives to “multilateralize regionalism” in 
the Americas. See Estevadeordal, Shearer, and Suominen (2009) and Estevadeordal and Suominen (2009). The 
discussion in this section draws on but also departs from Cornejo (forthcoming).
FIGURE 4.1   TRADE GAiNS AND COMPLExiTY OF LAC’S  
ROAD MAP TO iNTEGRATiON
Higher trade gains
Lower trade gains
Higher
complexity
Lower
complexity
LAC-FTA
 Filling missing PTA links
 Single RoOs for existing PTAs
Extended RoOs
cumulation for
existing PTAs
Source: 
THERE IS MORE THAT ONE 
ROUTE TO REACH A FREE 
TRADE AREA AND THE 
REGION STANDS TO BENEFIT 
EVEN IF IT ONLY TRAVELS 
PART OF THE WAY
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Extended Cumulation
The first and most modest stop on the route to a LAC-FTA would be to incor-
porate so-called diagonal or extended cumulation (see box 4.1) into the RoO 
regimes for existing LAC PTAs. That is, the possibility of inputs that are sourced 
from third countries and used in production in one of the member countries 
BOX 4.1   CAN RoO CUMULATiON BE ExTENDED TO COMMON THiRD PARTiES?
PTAs do not generally provide for any cumulation 
of inputs from nonmember countries (so-called 
extended or diagonal cumulation), even if all 
members also have PTAs with a common third 
party. This is beginning to change, however, as 
mechanisms of this type have been introduced 
in different forms in some recent agreements, 
such as those of Canada with Colombia and 
Peru, and in a limited way in the agreements 
between MERCOSUR and the Andean countries.
In principle, then, one option to advance LAC 
integration would be to promote the adoption 
of extended cumulation provisions in existing 
PTAs, thus enabling materials that would enter 
a given destination market duty-free if exported 
directly (under a PTA between the producer of 
the materials and that destination market) to be 
treated as originating in that destination market 
if used in further production in another of that country’s PTA partners. The figure above shows 
the case of Colombia and Central America. Colombia has a PTA with Costa Rica and another with 
Guatemala and El Salvador. As it stands today, inputs sold by Costa Rica to Guatemala, say textiles, 
which are then used in the production of other goods, say apparel, to be exported to Colombia, are 
not considered to have originated in Guatemala so the country’s exporters cannot benefit from the 
preferences of the Colombia–Guatemala–El Salvador PTA. That would be possible if the PTA were 
amended to include the possibility of extended cumulation.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires exporters to understand and document 
compliance with the RoOs from many different PTAs, even ones to which their home country is not a 
party, and it requires customs organizations to be able to administer this complex system as well. An 
alternative approach is to bring all countries interested in deepening productive integration together 
and negotiate a single new set of RoOs under which all countries can cumulate from all others.
PTAs BETWEEN COLOMBiA AND CENTRAL 
AMERiCA AND THE OPTiON OF ExTENDED 
CUMULATiON
Costa Rica
Colombia
El Salvador
Fabric from
Costa Rica
Costa Rica is in CACM and
has an FTA with Colombia
Sewing thread
from Colombia
Apparel assembly
and duty-free sale
to Colombia
(if extended
cumulation
were enabled)
GTM and SLV are in CACM and
have a separate FTA with Colombia
Fabric from
El Salvador
Guatemala
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being treated as “originating” there, therefore making these inputs eligible for 
preferential treatment in intrabloc trade. What this boils down to is that inputs 
sourced, say, by a Brazilian firm from a member country of the Pacific Alliance 
and later incorporated into a product exported to Argentina would be treated as 
MERCOSUR inputs and, therefore, would not stop the exported product from 
enjoying full MERCOSUR preferences.
To reach this point on the route to a full FTA, governments could work with 
existing intra-LAC PTAs, including the so-called Economic Complementarity 
Agreements (ECAs) within the LAIA framework, and would not need to harmo-
nize their RoOs (i.e., all PTAs would not need to have the same set of RoOs).55 
Several examples of this practice already exist in the region, even though not 
all of them are operational. For instance, the MERCOSUR’s ECAs with mem-
bers of the Andean Community include the possibility of extended cumulation, 
even though their RoOs were not harmonized, even within a single agreement. 
That is the case of MERCOSUR’s agreement with Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador (ECA 59), where RoOs are defined bilaterally between members.56 In 
this case, a Colombian firm, for instance, can use inputs from Peru in its exports 
to Uruguay if they meet the Colombia–Uruguay RoOs. If the same firm wants 
to use the same input in a product it then exports to Brazil, it will have to meet 
the requirements of the Brazil–Colombia rules. Mexico’s ECA with Uruguay, 
Chile’s ECA with Ecuador and CAFTA’s relationship with Mexico share similar 
arrangements, although they each have their own peculiarities.
The move toward extended cumulation could continue to follow this sponta-
neous pattern, relying on individual initiatives among existing PTAs, or coun-
tries could go a step further and build on existing commonalities to standardize 
implementation across the region. The latter option could, for instance, take the 
form of an ad-hoc document, negotiated at regional fora such as LAIA, which 
would regulate the mechanism and facilitate its adoption. Whatever the instru-
ment used, this document would have to be flexible enough to accommodate 
idiosyncrasies, but without compromising its ability to consolidate a set of com-
mon guidelines that would help negotiations and reduce the cost of enforcement 
and compliance.57
55 Economic complementarity agreements (ECAs) are bilateral trade agreements signed between LAIA 
members under the framework established by article 4 of the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo. They usually do 
not cover all products and services. There are currently 112 ECAs in force. See http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/
textacdos.nsf/vacewebR.
56 The other two ECAs are with Peru (ECA 58) and Bolivia (ECA 36).
57 See Cornejo (forthcoming).
EXTENDED CUMULATION 
CAN BE IMPLEMENTED 
USING THE EXISTING INTRA-
LAC PTAs  
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These guidelines should cover issues such as:
i. The inclusion of a clause in the text of the agreement allowing for extended 
cumulation, with details regarding the circumstances of its implementation;
ii. The requirement that all members have PTAs with a common third party 
from which inputs will be accumulated. This is important to avoid trade 
“deflections” or triangulations. For instance, let’s say that country A and B 
are part of a PTA that allows cumulation of inputs from a third party, C. 
B and C have a PTA between them, but A and C do not. In this case, if C 
exports, say, an auto part directly to A, it would be subject to an MFN tariff, 
but if C exports the same part to B, which uses it in a car exported to A, it 
would not have to pay any tariff on the part. Trade flows and value chains 
would clearly be distorted, regardless of comparative advantages;
iii. A definition of the sectoral scope of the cumulation, which could cover all 
products or be restricted to a single sector, say, textiles;
iv. The requirement that cumulation should be restricted to duty-free trade 
between all the parties involved in the relevant sector or product, again to 
avoid triangulations. To use the same example as above, if A and B now have 
agreements with C, but B offers higher preferences than A for auto parts ex-
ported by C, exporters might channel their parts through the C-B-A route, 
even if this not the most efficient pattern of specialization;
v. A definition of which RoOs the third-party input will have to comply with, 
which could be those applied between the third party and the member 
country using the input or those applied between member countries trading 
the final product (i.e. the A-C rules or the B-C rules);
vi. A definition of customs procedures to issue and validate third-party certif-
icates of origin.
A Unified RoO Regime
Extending cumulation will bring improvements to the status quo while only in-
curring small political costs, but the gains are likely to be marginal, if anything, 
because exporters and customs agents will still be dealing with 47 sets of prod-
uct-specific rules among the 33 intra-LAC PTAs. The costs of enforcing and 
ensuring compliance with these rules—whose tariff-equivalent estimates range 
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from 2% to 15% ad valorem—are likely to be made even steeper by adding the 
cumulation mechanism.58 Moreover, this wide variation in RoOs leaves the door 
open to trade deflection, creating incentives for traders to shift toward countries 
with less stringent rules. To add more substance to these gains, governments will 
have to consider traveling further down the road to a LAC-FTA, at least to a stop 
where agreements could unify or harmonize their RoO regimes.
The best precedent to illustrate this option is the Pan-European Cumulation 
System (PECS) which started to operate in 1997. In the mid-1990s, Europe was in 
similar situation as LAC is today, with approximately 60 bilateral PTAs, each with 
its own complex set of RoOs. As expected, this complexity imposed costly barri-
ers to the development of efficient regional value chains and eventually prompted 
governments (EU15, EFTA, CEFTA, and the Baltic states) to amend their various 
PTAs to adopt a common RoO regime.59 The unification of RoOs was not seen 
as an end in itself but rather as a precondition for allowing extended cumulation 
across all the existing PTAs. This is suggestive of how difficult the previous option 
of extending cumulation without unifying RoO regimes is likely to be.
Unifying RoOs, though desirable, is a far from trivial task, particularly in a re-
gion which lacks Europe’s hub-and-spoke model, where the center has enough 
economic and political gravitational pull to lead the process. The best that LAC 
can hope for is for the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR to lead the initiative, 
with two of their largest economies—Mexico and Brazil—willing to put their 
economic and political weight behind it. But even if the political will is eventu-
ally there, what would be the best way to go about it?
The idea of RoO convergence, just like the broader regional integration goal, 
is not new. It was already present in the 1980 Montevideo Treaty that created 
LAIA, leading to the development of the General Regime of Origin (Régimen 
de Origen General, ROG), which was supposed to be applied to all PTAs under 
the LAIA framework.60 The regime never really took off and was soon over-
whelmed by bilateral and regional initiatives that developed their own regimes. 
Most analysts attribute these difficulties to governance issues (e.g., consensus 
voting) and member countries’ divergent trade policies.61 Although these diffi-
58 See, for instance, De Melo and Carrère (2006) and Cadestin et al. (2016) for the ad-valorem equivalents.
59 Turkey joined in 1999 and the so-called “Barcelona countries” (Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco) 
did so in 2002. See Augier et al. (2005) and Augier et al. (2007).
60 See ALADI (2007). The General Origin Regime was established in 1987 by LAIA’s Resolution 78 and later 
updated by Resolution 252 in 1999.
61 The FTAA negotiations also included a chapter on harmonizing rules of origin, but on a hemispheric scale. 
See Estevadeordal et. al (2004). More recently (July 2016), LAIA’s negotiating committee made a renewed 
attempted to modernize the ROG, but the results have yet to be seen. See, for instance, Cornejo (forthcoming).
UNIFYING RoOs, THOUGH 
DESIRABLE, IS FAR 
FROM A TRIVIAL TASK, 
PARTICULARLY IN A REGION 
WHICH LACKS EUROPE’S 
HUB-AND-SPOKE MODEL
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culties may not bode well for a regional institutional route toward RoO conver-
gence, it seems clear that governments’ stances toward trade policy have since 
evolved dramatically, with MERCOSUR joining the Pacific Alliance in a con-
sensus toward more liberal and pragmatic trade and integration policies. This 
could open up a window of opportunity for reforming LAIA’s governance and 
procedures, including expanding its membership to include Central America 
and the Caribbean.
Whether the route is institutional or through the sole initiative of selected 
countries or PTAs, it is important to think through the specifics of what it is 
that countries are trying to achieve since these factors can play a significant 
role in the success of negotiations. For instance, should governments aim for a 
total replacement of RoOs, as in the agreement signed by Mexico in 2011 with 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which replaced 
previous bilateral agreements?62 Or should they follow the Pacific Alliance or 
CAFTA-DR models, where a unified RoO regime coexists alongside those of 
the previous regimes? As a concrete example of this latter case, a Peruvian firm, 
for instance, can choose between the RoOs of the Andean Community or the 
Pacific Alliance when planning to export to Colombia.
Given the complexities of the current PTA network and the difficulties of a re-
gionwide negotiation, the second option is likely to be the most effective strate-
gy. This might sound contradictory at first since it implies adding another layer 
of rules to a “spaghetti bowl” that is already full to the brim. However, this strat-
egy spares countries from having to renegotiate previous existing agreements 
and also has an attractive Darwinian dimension to it, in that firms can pick the 
regimes that make the most sense to them and eventually the “good,” least costly 
sets of rules will drive the “bad,” more costly ones into disuse.63
Whether they decide to replace old rules or add extra new ones, countries first 
have to first to agree on guidelines on product and country participation, like 
those discussed earlier for extended cumulation. In fact, since the sole purpose 
of a common RoO regime is to facilitate the very mechanism of extended cumu-
lation, it must incorporate most of the same guidelines. The difference between 
the two approaches lies in the effort to create a common standard for treating 
62 See (https://intradebid.org/acuerdo/view?id=151188).
63 In order to keep things tidy and transparent, data should be collected on which regimes are used in practice 
so that this “revealed preference” can help remove unused regimes from the books, and inform amendments 
to the “living” agreements.
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third-country, nonpreferential inputs to cut enforcement and compliance costs 
and give countries and firms a wider choice of suppliers within the region.
As before, these guidelines must ensure that there are no incentives for trade de-
flection. This means that both the RoOs and preferences for any product traded 
between all three countries involved must be the same. Since these preferences 
vary significantly across LAC’s 33 intraregional agreements, it would be imper-
ative to restrict negotiations toward a common RoO regime to those products 
that already benefit or that will eventually benefit from duty-free status, assum-
ing that a new regionwide FTA will not be negotiated. This immediately implies 
that each participating country must have an agreement with all the others in-
volved in the negotiation, otherwise there would be no way of finding a com-
mon preference denominator. Failing that, the applicability of the new regime 
will necessarily vary by subset of countries in the supply chain.
These requirements also imply that unless LAC governments are prepared to 
go further down the road and start filling in key gaps in their relationships, the 
goal of converging to a common RoO regime will be most likely limited to sub-
groups where countries are already connected through PTAs and most prod-
ucts are already traded duty-free. The strongest candidates would be the Pacific 
Alliance and Central America countries, on the one hand, and the MERCOSUR 
and Andean countries (Chile, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador) on the 
other. However, this apparent limitation can be seen in a more favorable light if 
thought of as a “convergence in stages,” where the number of RoO rules in the 
region is progressively brought down by successive negotiations at the subre-
gional level.
Apart from the geographical and product scope of the convergence, there is also 
a need to agree on the methods and modalities of the negotiation. The challenge 
here is to balance flexibility with the need to ensure meaningful gains. Too little 
flexibility would be inimical to a timely and successful outcome, particularly in an 
environment of tight political constraints and strong sensitivities. Too much flex-
ibility, though, would undermine the goal of unifying the rules. This report leans 
toward using flexibility sparingly and prioritizing convergence gains, particularly 
because excessive flexibility has been one of the root causes of the region’s current 
state of fragmentation. An approach to methods and modalities that allows for 
adjustments according to governments’ preferences would be a reasonable com-
promise. This would require the following guidelines being taken into account:
i. The new RoO regime should be based on the least restrictive rules among all 
existing bilateral rules. The principle should be “do no harm” to existing trade.
UNLESS GOVERNMENTS ARE 
PREPARED TO GO FURTHER 
DOWN THE ROAD AND 
START FILLING IN KEY GAPS 
IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS, 
THE GOAL OF CONVERGING 
RoOS WILL BE MOST LIKELY 
LIMITED
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ii. These bilateral rules should remain in effect, offering not only an alternative 
but also a way of supplementing the new regime in areas not covered by the 
negotiations. For instance, if there is no agreement on issues such as the “de 
minimis” rule or forms of origin certification, these details could be left up 
to bilateral rules.64
iii. All the general normative outcomes related to RoO enforcement should be 
accepted and adopted by all countries involved: the so-called single under-
taking approach to ensure uniformity in implementation.
iv. In contrast, the negotiation and adoption of product-specific rules could 
follow a “variable geometry,” where countries could pick and choose which 
products they want to negotiate and enforce. The option of extended cumu-
lation for a particular product would only be available for those countries 
that negotiated and accepted the common rule.
v. The common product-specific rule could be based on alternative criteria for 
qualification (e.g., changes in tariff classification, the bloc’s value-added, or 
special processing rules) if there is a need to give countries more flexibility 
in applying these rules.
vi. Countries can join the common rule after negotiations are concluded, but 
they will have to accept it as is.
Filling in Missing Links
The above two stops on the route to a full regional FTA—extended cumulation 
and a unified RoO regime with extended cumulation—are attractive options 
for moving toward a free regional market for intermediate goods if govern-
ments want to avoid the political costs of negotiating new PTAs. The downside, 
though, is also evident. To avoid the risks of trade deflection, this market can 
only be fully developed if missing links in the region’s network of agreements 
are filled in. Subregional markets alone are unlikely to have the critical mass 
that would allow for the full development of regional value chains. In addition, 
these two options do not address the fragmentation of the final product market 
(for consumer and capital goods), which would remain constrained by missing 
agreements and heterogeneous preferences.
64 De minimis rules allow for a certain percentage of the final price of the good to be of nonoriginating inputs; 
that is, inputs that do not qualify under the relevant rules of origin.
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In other words, if governments are really committed to leveraging regional in-
tegration into a tool to move the productivity needle and gain markets abroad, 
they can hardly avoid investing political capital in filling the gaps in PTAs. Here, 
too, there are at least two options: relying on the prospect that these gaps would 
be filled in voluntarily or investing in a coordinated, regionwide solution. The 
former, “hands-off,” solution would clearly require less political capital, but the 
incentives are less obvious, particularly for those missing links involving smaller 
economies. For instance, the incentives for expanding the network of agree-
ments between Central America and the Caribbean, given the limited size of 
their markets, will be significantly lower if the initiative does not become part of 
a coordinated effort to create a regional market.
The best hope for the “hands-off ” solution is that the largest economies in the 
region finally see the obvious benefits of signing comprehensive PTAs. This is 
the case for the missing links between Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which 
together account for 70% of LAC’s GDP and for 58% of its intraregional trade. 
Action on this front could create momentum for other new PTAs in the region.65
These three countries are already linked by partial agreements under the 
umbrella of LAIA’s ECA 54 (2002), which provides a legal and normative 
framework for bilateral trade negotiations between Mexico and each of the 
MERCOSUR members. Within this framework, Mexico has signed bilateral 
agreements with Brazil (ECA 53, 2002), Argentina (ECA 6, 2002), and Uruguay 
(ECA 60, 2003). All four countries also signed a separate agreement for vehicles 
and auto parts (ECA 55, 2002), with specific bilateral commitments.66 Of these 
ECAs, only the one with Uruguay went on to become a full trade agreement, 
under the WTO “substantially all trade” definition. The agreement with Brazil 
covers approximately only 14% of tradable products, of which only 45% were 
granted duty-free status. The agreement with Argentina, in turn, is somewhat 
more comprehensive but does not go beyond 30% of tradable goods. The auto 
agreements are also far from comprehensive, with quotas for duty-free goods.67
As mentioned earlier, there are good reasons to believe that the odds of these 
missing links being filled have never been so high thanks to swings in the po-
65 Data for 2016 from WDI (GDP) and INTrade (trade).
66 For the text of the agreements see http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp. The countries involved also 
benefit from LAIA Regional Tariff Preference Agreement (AR.PAR 4), whereby countries grant across-
the-board tariff preferences to other members according to their level of development, subject to a list of 
exceptions. For Brazil and Mexico, for instance, preferences are set at 20%. See https://bit.ly/2pHiybc.
67 See CNI (2016) for a detailed analysis of ECA 53. For ECA 6, see https://intradebid.org/acuerdo/210. For 
the details of the auto agreement see https://intradebid.org/acuerdo/view?id=137.
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litical cycle both at home and abroad. Recent administrations in Brazil and 
Argentina already signaled they willingness to resume their trade liberalization 
agenda of the early 1990s, creating opportunities for more ambitious integration 
initiatives.
Mexico, in turn, after investing most of its political capital in deepening its trade 
relationship with the US, is in the process of renegotiating NAFTA. With nearly 
80% of its trade concentrated in the US, Mexico has never had a greater incen-
tive to look for alternatives and to invest into a deeper trade relationship with 
Brazil and Argentina despite past setbacks.68
What is at stake is a valuable opportunity to (a) diversify its trade and reduce 
its exposure to political and economic risks in the world’s largest economy; 
(b) mitigate the costs of trade diversion from its PTAs, particularly from NAFTA 
(Mexico’s average MFN rate was 7% in 2017); and (c) take advantage of poten-
tially high preferences associated with MERCOSUR’s relative high MFN tariffs 
(a 14% simple average in 2017).69
A commitment by Brazil and Argentina to initiate a process of unilateral liber-
alization alongside their preferential initiatives could help convince Mexico that 
this time things will be different and that they are now fully committed to in-
tegration. In any event, ongoing bilateral negotiations between Mexico and its 
two MERCOSUR partners with a view to increasing the scope of ECAs 6 and 
53 suggest that these optimistic expectations about filling in this historic gap are 
well founded.70
The LAC-FTA Option
The final and most ambitious destination on this road—a regionwide free trade 
area—is the coordinated alternative to the hands-off approach discussed in the 
previous sections. It carries the highest political risks and is up against a cred-
68 The most recent setback came in 2011, when Brazil, after accumulating significant trade deficits in vehicles 
with Mexico, threatened to renounce ECA 55, which eventually led to a renegotiation of the agreement which 
included quotas. Argentina followed suit with a similar threat to its ECA 55, which was also settled though 
renegotiation and quotas. See, for instance, http://www.livingstonintl.com/trade-agreement-for-automotive-
sector-between-mercosur-and-mexico-economic-complementation-agreement-no-55/.
69 Tariff data from WTO’s tariff analysis on line. Simple averages at subheading level.
70 See CNI (2016) and https://www.gob.mx/se/prensa/finaliza-la-tercera-ronda-de-negociaciones-para-la-
ampliacion-y-profundizacion-del-acuerdo-de-complementacion-economica-no-6-entre-mexico-y-argentina 
(in Spanish).
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ibility gap made formidable by a long history of failed attempts. However, as it 
simultaneously unifies RoOs and addresses the relationship and product gaps in 
the PTA network, it is the initiative that is most likely to deliver the productivity 
gains that have historically motivated integration in the region, and to do so in a 
timely fashion. Moreover, as noted earlier, there are good reasons to believe that 
this time things could be different, and failure might be averted, if the region 
learns from its past mistakes.
Top among the lessons learned is that complex architectures like a customs 
union with supranational institutions and intricate disciplines should be avoid-
ed. Instead, the objective should be a “plain vanilla” free trade zone, with a focus 
on goods and services as a first step. Other chapters on intellectual property, la-
bor, or the environment, which have become popular in some PTAs, should not 
be ruled out, but they are not the main goal. Borrowing from the recently nego-
tiated Pacific Alliance, these areas may be considered once the foundations for 
a regional free trade area for goods and services is firmly in place. Likewise, the 
institutional architecture should be intergovernmental rather than supranation-
al in nature, with a commission made up of ministers or senior-level officials 
overseeing the implementation and operation of the agreement and guiding its 
future evolution.
The first step for this type of initiative would be for the interested parties to 
call for a summit of heads of state and presidents, whose main objective would 
be to outline the goals, mechanisms, and timetable for the negotiation process. 
There would be no need for all the region’s governments to be involved during 
these early stages. All that would be required is a critical mass of countries with 
enough gravitational pull to get the momentum going. However, taking a page 
from the Pacific Alliance’s playbook, all aspiring members should be required to 
already be party to bilateral or subregional PTAs to facilitate and signal a strong 
commitment to these new negotiations—a must in the face of the region’s cred-
ibility gap.
In this regard, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are again in a unique position to 
make this happen. As was noted earlier, these three countries account for LAC’s 
most significant missing economic links, and their willingness to make a solid 
“down payment” in the form of bilateral PTAs would be a strong statement about 
the viability of a potential LAC-FTA. This move could eventually bring together 
the region’s largest subregional blocs—the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR—
whose combined US$4.3-trillion market accounts for 81% of LAC’s GDP. There 
are already concrete, promising signs that this convergence is more than wish-
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71 See IDB (2017).
ful thinking. In 2017, the two blocs launched an initiative that points in this 
direction, setting up a formal dialogue forum and agreeing on a convergence 
road map, which includes initiatives on extended cumulation, trade facilitation, 
NTBs, and trade in services.71
Negotiations toward the agreement should follow similar guidelines to those 
discussed for the intermediate stops on the route to the full LAC-FTA: that is, 
guidelines that strive to strike the right balance between flexibility and mean-
ingful results. The first guiding principle should be for the LAC-FTA to be a 
“living agreement,” one whose text should allow for the addition of new mem-
bers and new issues. It should create conditions for negotiations to move ahead 
with a hard core of participants and issues, without precluding the possibility of 
future expansion in both these areas when political and economic conditions 
allow. There should be incentives for “early birds” though, since size matters for 
the success of the take-off. Latecomers would have to accept the original rules as 
given, except when issues are incorporated after their accession.
Another page this LAC-FTA should take from the Pacific Alliance book is that 
it does not necessarily have to replace existing PTAs. Instead, it could offer a 
more comprehensive and rational solution for trading goods and services, while 
allowing members to opt to maintain their existing intraregional schemes. PTAs 
can be particularly relevant for deeper and more complex integration objectives 
such as the free movement of labor or shared institutions, which require a po-
litical consensus that is more likely to be achieved among a smaller group of 
countries.
Negotiations toward the common RoO regime and the harmonization of pref-
erences (which should eventually converge to 100% or duty-free) should look 
for a common denominator and require a single undertaking for all norma-
tive aspects of enforcement (i.e., acceptance of all rules as a package, with no 
“cherry picking”). Convergence to the common rule and preferences, though, 
should take a “variable geometry” approach to accommodate sensitivities. 
Members’ phase-in schedules may be partner- and product-specific (for in-
stance, Argentina’s convergence to the common rule/preferences in trading auto 
parts with Mexico could differ from Colombia’s or even its own preferences in 
trading wheat with Mexico), possibly taking advantage of what has already been 
negotiated under bilateral or subregional PTAs. Exceptions, however, should be 
kept to a minimum and the median product–partner timeframe should be no 
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longer than five years, with a maximum of seven years; a requirement consis-
tent with the urgency that the current global trading environment demands and 
with the fact that most adjustment costs have already been paid off in this last 
quarter century of integration.
In line with the need for a light institutional architecture, all members should 
still be able to resort to the WTO to resolve general trade disputes, as well as 
to use trade remedy tools compatible with the WTO framework, such as anti-
dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards. Disputes specific to the imple-
mentation or violation of the agreement should be dealt with by ad hoc panels 
appointed by LAC-FTA members and whose decisions are binding, consistent 
with the “quasi-judicial” model used by most PTAs worldwide, including those 
in LAC.72 To keep the architecture simple and to avoid political quagmires, the 
dispute settlement provisions should be based exclusively on a state-to-state 
mechanism, without allowing for investor-to-state claims.
The agreement should also include a broad chapter on trade facilitation, covering 
not just customs-related measures but also mechanisms capable of minimizing 
transportation and transaction costs, such as technical standards, phytosanitary 
measures, and logistics. While efforts to rationalize and promote the harmo-
nization of these measures do not necessarily depend on a formal trade agree-
ment, this platform represents a major opportunity to facilitate coordination 
and enforce the commitments already contained in a series of subregional ini-
tiatives relating to both infrastructure (e.g., the Initiative for the Integration of 
the Regional Infrastructure of South America [IIRSA] and the Mesoamerica 
Integration and Development Project) and trade facilitation (interoperability 
of single-window systems and authorized economic operator programs, mostly 
carried out within existing PTAs). As shown in IDB (2014), the region still has a 
long way to go to meet recently negotiated multilateral standards and a region-
wide agreement could be an important platform for promoting and coordinat-
ing reforms.73
As argued elsewhere, given LAC’s historical gaps in these areas, solutions for 
which have long proved elusive, trade gains several orders of magnitude higher 
than pure tariff elimination initiatives could be generated by coordinating and 
financing transnational investments in transport infrastructure. That will be the 
case, for instance, for improving all border crossings in Latin America or de-
72 See Chase et al. (2013).
73 See Volpe (2016) for an evaluation of existing trade facilitation initiatives. For details of the infrastructure 
initiatives mentioned here, see http://www.iirsa.org/ and http://www.proyectomesoamerica.org/.
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veloping a harmonized and pro-competition regulatory framework (such as a 
regionwide open sky agreement to increase competition in air cargo services).74
Likewise, trade stands to benefit significantly from the regional interoperabil-
ity of single-window systems, which enable trade and customs authorities to 
exchange and process information quickly, or the mutual recognition of au-
thorized economic operator programs, whereby customs administrations work 
with large-scale traders to secure the supply chain while simplifying customs 
processes. This potential impact is particularly significant for the development 
of regional value chains.75 These are issues that include both “hard” (e.g., phys-
ical infrastructure) and “soft” (e.g., rules and regulations) components. The 
latter are particularly attractive because they usually require limited financial 
resources—a key advantage in times of fiscal strain.
74 See Mesquita Moreira, Volpe, and Blyde (2008) and Mesquita Moreira, Blyde, Molina, and Volpe (2013). 
For details on the Agua Negra project see http://www19.iadb.org/intal/conexionintal/2016/09/27/tunel-
binacional-agua-negra-un-programa-estrategico/?lang=en.
75 See Volpe (2016) (There are already concrete, promising signs that this convergence is more than wishful 
thinking. In 2017, the two blocs launched an initiative that points in this direction, setting up a formal 
dialogue forum and agreeing on a convergence road map, which includes initiatives on extended cumulation, 
trade facilitation, NTBs, and trade in services.) and Blyde (2014).
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5SECTIONESTIMATING THE GAINS
How much can LAC expect to gain by promoting PTA convergence and moving 
toward a regionwide agreement? As in the analysis of the legacy of these PTAs in 
section 2, the focus here is on trade outcomes and not on more complex issues 
such welfare and growth, which, despite their relevance, are beyond the scope 
of this study. Whatever the impacts on these dimensions are—and mainstream 
economic theory suggests that they are likely to be positive—the main channel 
through which they expected to “travel” is trade flows. An accurate estimate of 
trade impacts therefore goes a long way toward painting the whole picture.
To get a better grasp of what is at stake, a combination of partial and general 
approaches will be used to measure immediate and general equilibrium (econ-
omy-wide) impacts, respectively. The analysis of potential gains moves from the 
simplest to the most complex of the “destinations” discussed in the previous 
section. As will become clear, these gains are no panacea, yet they are far from 
negligible, and the region can hardly afford to leave them on the table in today’s 
challenging trade environment. Moreover, addressing the current fragmenta-
tion is the best way to strengthen the economic fundamentals of what is essen-
tially a long-professed political goal.
Extended Cumulation, Convergence of 
Rules of Origin, and Regional Value Chains
As argued elsewhere (Blyde, 2014), LAC has not been able to capitalize on the 
recent surge in global value chains (GVCs) through which goods that were pre-
viously produced in one country are sliced up and coproduced in many parts 
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of the world.76 As shown in figure 5.1, the share of foreign value-added in total 
exports (a typical measure of GVC participation) of the average country in LAC 
is significantly lower than in Asia and Europe. What is even more striking is 
how few intraregional linkages there are in LAC (that is, intraregional value 
chains or RVCs). It seems reasonable to assume that the current fragmentation 
into PTAs may be playing an important role in driving these results, alongside 
other structural issues such as the relatively small size of the region’s economies, 
similar comparative advantages, and high transportation costs.77
To put it simply, the co-existence of several different trade agreements with limited 
membership scope and which function as unconnected silos is not very conducive 
to the emergence of regionwide supply chains. In principle, this “spaghetti bowl” of 
76 There is growing evidence that when firms participate in international supply chains they can benefit from 
technical and managerial knowledge that flows across these production networks and which can ultimately 
translate into productivity gains. See Blyde (2014).
77 Behind the average numbers in figure 5.1 there is significant heterogeneity across Latin American countries 
in terms of how much and how countries participate in GVCs. For instance, Mexico and countries in Central 
America are more engaged in production networks, particularly with North America, and tend to participate 
in the final stages of the production process. For their part, countries in South America typically enter supply 
chains in the early stages. Some of these differences are explained by natural factors. For instance, proximity 
to the US makes Mexico an ideal recipient of offshoring activities. Likewise, the sheer abundance of natural 
resources in South America biases these countries to participate in more upstream stages of GVCs supplying 
raw materials.
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agreements might encourage production linkages between members, but it limits 
the emergence of supply chains between countries and across agreements by mak-
ing it too costly to use foreign inputs from outside the blocs due to the combina-
tion of tariff rates and rules of origin. A couple of examples reveal this more clearly.
The first case is an exporter from Mexico. While NAFTA may have created incen-
tives for the development of supply chains between Mexico and the US, it imposed 
hurdles for suppliers elsewhere, particularly in the rest of LAC. To shed light on 
this, it is worth reviewing the choices that a Mexican exporter had up to the cur-
rent renegotiation of the agreement.78 One choice was to comply with the NAFTA 
RoOs, which granted free market access to Canada and the US. In this case, a 
Mexican export firm had to source most of its inputs from within the agreement, 
even though there were more efficient or cost-effective suppliers elsewhere. The 
second choice was not to comply with the RoOs, pick the most competitive sup-
plier regardless of its origin, and thus potentially face MFN tariffs in the US and 
Canada. As was to be expected, the evidence available suggests that the first op-
tion was the dominant choice: Mexican imports of intermediate goods from third 
countries fell by around 30% after NAFTA was signed (Conconi et al., 2018).79
The second example comes from Chile and is explained in more detail in box 
5.1. It is a quantitative exercise that uses customs data and compares exporters’ 
choices of inputs when they sell goods to the US and other destinations. The 
results show that after the US–Chile PTA came into force, the firms that entered 
the US market reduced their sourcing of imports from MERCOSUR by around 
22% on average relative to their counterparts that did not export to the US.
These examples from Mexico and Chile illustrate a common pattern found 
around the world: PTAs bias incentives toward member countries’ suppliers at 
the expense of third parties (Blyde and Faggioni, 2016). The burning question, 
then, is how far the average LAC country’s PTA network has hindered the devel-
opment of RVCs. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 present a couple of regional comparisons 
based on very simple indicators that provide some insights into this question. 
They are an attempt to measure the disincentive for the average LAC country to 
source inputs from the region when the sourcing partner is not fully integrated 
into the importing country’s trade network.
78 The new US administration that took office in January 2017 called for a renegotiation of the agreement, 
which is still ongoing. See https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf.
79 Cadestin et al., (2016) applies a methodology similar to that used by Conconi et al. (2018) to a number of 
Latin American countries. The study finds that, on average, RoOs reduce the imports of intermediates from 
non-PTA members by 23.5%.
HOW FAR HAS THE 
REGION’S FRAGMENTED PTA 
NETWORK HINDERED THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF RVCS?
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BOX 5.1   CHiLE–US PTA AND SOURCiNG FROM THiRD COUNTRiES
To what extent do RoOs affect sourcing patterns from PTA members? An econometric exercise 
focusing on the 2004 Chile–US PTA helps to shed some light on this issue. The exercise employs 
customs data from Chile to examine whether the agreement’s RoOs induced changes in Chilean 
exporters’ sourcing patterns. It is reasonable to expect that the PTA might have led Chilean firms to 
reduce imports of inputs from countries other than the US when these are used to produce goods 
targeted for the US market. The main question here is about the size of this impact.
The exercise is based on a simple but robust strategy that involves a comparison of changes in 
sourcing patterns after the agreement. It looks at two groups of Chilean exporters: one group that 
entered the US market after the PTA and one that did not. More precisely, the variable of interest 
measures how the share of intermediate imports from third countries changed after the agreement, 
controlling for changes in sourcing patterns that might have arisen for reasons that are unrelated 
to RoOs (such as changes in tariff preferences with third countries or innovations in production 
techniques).
In principle this analysis could have been carried out for any partner, but to make the exercise more 
robust, the focus was on Chile’s imports from MERCOSUR.a The data covers all imports and exports 
for 2002 and 2006 at the transaction level (two years before and after the PTA went into force). As 
suggested above, only imports of intermediate inputs that are assumed to have been used in the 
production of exports by a particular firm are considered. Those imports are those that have a 
positive coefficient in the direct inputs requirements of the input–output (I–O) table. Chile’s I–O 
tables are not very disaggregated, so a US I–O table was used on the assumption that technical 
production requirements do not vary greatly from one country to the next, a standard procedure in 
the GVC literature.b
In general, the results confirm that Chilean exporters that entered the US market after the Chile–US 
PTA reduced their intermediate imports from MERCOSUR countries because of RoOs. The share 
of intermediate imports from these countries dropped by about 5 percentage points. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation that considers the initial average share of intermediate imports from 
MERCOSUR indicates that there was an average decline of about 22% in the level of imports from 
these countries.
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
The following equation was estimated:
Δ
Mijk
Mij
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟=Entryij+Di+Djk+εijk
where Mijk represents the imports from firm i of intermediate good j from country k (any country 
except the US); Mij is the total imports from firm i of intermediate good j. Entryij is a variable that 
(continued on next page)
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BOX 5.1   CHiLE–US PTA AND SOURCiNG FROM THiRD COUNTRiES (continued)
takes the value of 1 if firm i exported a good that used input j to any country except the US in 2002 
(before the Chile–US PTA entered into force) and then exported the same good to the US in 2006 
(after the Chile–US PTA entered into force). Conversely, Entryij takes the value of 0 if firm i exported 
a good that used input j to any country except the US in both 2002 and 2006. Finally, Di is a variable 
that controls for differences in firm characteristics and Djk is a variable that controls for differences 
in product–country factors, like tariff preferences or transportation costs, which may differ at the 
product–country level.
The estimation, shown in table B.5.1-1, indicates that the results are robust to alternative combinations 
of fixed effects, including the most demanding specification in column 4. The coefficient on the 
Entry variable in this column implies that the share of imports from firm i of intermediate good 
j from MERCOSUR countries decreases by 4.7 percentage points for those firms that entered the 
US market after the Chile–US PTA came into force. This implies an average decline in the level of 
imports from these countries of about 22%.
a  The rationale for the decision to focus on MERCOSUR is that between 2002 and 2006 (the period of analysis), additional 
PTAs came into force between Chile and other countries, such as its agreements with the EU (2003), EFTA (2004), and the 
Republic of Korea (2004). Accordingly, Chilean firms’ imports from these countries might have been affected by these 
agreements. While the product–country variable might control for such factors, a more robust strategy is to consider 
the change in imports from a narrower set of countries whose trade status with Chile did not change during the period 
of analysis. It is worth mentioning that Chile and MERCOSUR countries signed an economic complementarity agreement 
in 1996.
b  More precisely, the table used was the 2002 direct requirements I-O table provided by the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), which includes 320 products at NAICS 6-digit level. The trade data was converted from HS to NAICS using 
concordance tables provided by the BEA.
TABLE B.5.1-1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry –0.0338*
(0.0182)
–0.0340*
(0.0183)
–0.0466**
(0.0198)
–0.0468**
(0.0200)
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of origin fixed effect No Yes Yes No
Product fixed effect No No Yes No
Country of origin-product fixed effect No No No Yes
R2 0.153 0.154 0.177 0.211
Number of observations 8193 8193 8172 8040
Source: IDB estimates.
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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FIGURE 5.2   THE AvERAGE NUMBER OF SiGNED PTAs WHiCH 
REGiONAL PARTNERS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF
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In figure 5.2, LAC is benchmarked against Asia and the EU in terms of the num-
ber of agreements that the average country in each region has signed with other 
countries in the world which a partner country from the same region is not also 
a member of. An example may help to clarify this comparison. In this exercise, 
LAC includes 17 countries, so any given country within it—say Argentina—thus 
has 16 bilateral relationships within the region. For each of these 16 countries, 
the first step in the exercise is to compute the number of PTAs that Argentina has 
signed with the world that the country in question is not also a member of (say, 
the number of Argentina’s PTAs in which Colombia is not a member of) and 
then do the same for every other LAC country. The second step is to average the 
number of these PTAs across the 16 relationships to reach a final, aggregate re-
sult for Argentina. To obtain the result for each region, the procedure described 
above is followed for every country within it and the aggregate country results 
are then averaged across all the countries. As the figure shows, the average LAC 
country has signed 3.9 agreements which a partner from the region is not also a 
member of. In Asia, this same number is 2.2, while in Europe it is 0.80,81
Along similar lines, figure 5.3 presents the average share of exports that go to mem-
bers of trade agreements which a given partner country from the region is not also 
a member of. For the average LAC country, 34.6% of its exports go to members of 
trade agreements which its LAC partner countries are not party to. This percent-
age is substantially higher than those of Asia (15.2%) and the EU (0%).82 That is, 
when it comes to sourcing inputs from its own region, a country in Europe or in 
Asia has lower value-chain limitations than a country in LAC because they sell 
larger shares of their exports to countries that are party to trade agreements which 
a potential sourcing country from within the same region is also a member of.
These figures suggest that the steps discussed earlier—which range from extend-
ing cumulation between existing agreements and filling in gaps in relationships 
80 The exercise can be repeated counting only the PTAs signed in the country’s own region. In this case, the 
average LAC country has signed 2.6 agreements in LAC which a partner from the region is not also a member 
of. In Asia, this same number is 1.2, while in Europe it is 0.
81 Asia consists of East Asian and ASEAN countries: Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Taipei, Thailand, and Vietnam. The EU 
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. LAC is made up of: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
82 If only PTAs signed in the country’s own region are counted, the corresponding figures are 20.9% for LAC, 
13.4% for Asia and 0% for Europe.
WHEN IT COMES TO 
SOURCING INPUTS FROM ITS 
OWN REGION, A COUNTRY 
IN EUROPE OR IN ASIA 
HAS LOWER VALUE-CHAIN 
LIMITATIONS THAN A 
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to negotiating a regionwide FTA—have the potential to make a significant, posi-
tive impact on LAC’s RVCs. But is it possible to specify the magnitude and direc-
tions of these trade gains? The Pan-European Cumulation System, discussed in 
section 4, may prove useful when mapping the direction of these effects. It is es-
timated that extended cumulation within a common RoO regime has increased 
the probability of spoke countries (that is, countries that do not belong to the 
EU core or hub) exporting intermediate goods to other spoke countries and to 
the EU, while simultaneously decreasing the probability of the EU exporting 
intermediate inputs to the spoke countries (Bombarda and Gamberoni, 2013). 
To put it simply, a convergence along the lines discussed earlier is likely to create 
value chain opportunities beyond the relationship with the large countries in the 
region, opening the door for a denser, less geographically concentrated network.
Although the European experience is instructive in terms of direction, it does 
not go very far in suggesting the magnitude of the impact. There are obvious 
differences between LAC and the EU in terms of country size, income levels, 
endowments, and geographical factors. Fortunately, LAC has its own localized 
experiences with this type of convergence, which might not be on the same scale 
as those in Europe but are relevant enough to provide some useful insights.
One such example is the cumulation system between Central America and 
Mexico. Between 1995 and 2001, Mexico signed separate agreements with Costa 
Rica (1995), Nicaragua (1998), and the “Northern Triangle” of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras (2001). These agreements did not provide for cumula-
tion among all six countries and thus, in a sense, they resemble the old European 
trade architecture of one hub (Mexico) and three separate spokes (each PTA). 
For example, chocolate from Costa Rica would not pay import tariffs in Mexico if 
it was produced entirely in Costa Rica, but this would not be the case if a substan-
tial part of the inputs, say the chocolate liquor, came from Honduras. In 2011, 
however, these six countries signed a new agreement that enables full cumulation 
between them under a single set of RoOs, giving firms much more flexibility as to 
where they can source their inputs and sell their final products.
Preliminary evidence using data from Costa Rica suggests that this greater flex-
ibility when sourcing inputs might have triggered more production sharing 
across Central America. For instance, a simple comparison using trade data at 
the transaction level shows that the number of Costa Rican firms exporting to 
Mexico that used inputs from other Central American countries increased by 
20% between 2010 and 2013, whereas the number of other exporters remained 
flat. These findings were reinforced by a more robust exercise, explained in 
more detail in box 5.2, which examines the change in the sourcing patterns of 
MEXICO’S 2011 SINGLE PTA 
WITH CENTRAL AMERICA 
HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT 
ON REGIONAL VALUE CHAINS
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BOX 5.2   CUMULATiON OF RULES OF ORiGiN ACROSS MExiCO AND  
CENTRAL AMERiCA
In 2011, Mexico signed a new PTA with Central America that replaced three separate bilateral 
agreements with Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the so-called Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras). The new agreement unified the rules of origin and, unlike its predecessors, allowed 
for full cumulation of inputs among member countries. Until then, Costa Rica, for instance, could 
not use inputs from El Salvador in exports to Mexico without losing its preferences there. What was 
the actual impact of this PTA on value chains?
An initial response to this question can be found in an econometric exercise that looks at Costa 
Rican firms and compares their sourcing patterns when exporting to Mexico (the treatment) and to 
other countries (the control), comparing results from before and after the new agreement. This is a 
difference-in-difference analysis.
The results indicate that inputs that are sourced from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, or Nicaragua 
and that can be used in the production of goods that are exported to Mexico increased by around 3 
percentage points. Since only 3% of the inputs that can be used in exports to Mexico are originally 
sourced from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, or Nicaragua,a the effect implies a doubling of the 
percentage of inputs sourced from any of these countries.
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
First, the exercise identifies all the Costa Rican firms i that exported products k to Mexico in both 
2010 (before the agreement) and 2013 (after the agreement). This is the treatment group. Second, it 
identifies all the firms i that exported products k only to countries other than Mexico in 2010 and 
2013. This is the control group. This forms the basis for the treatment variable, Treatmentik, which 
takes the value of 1 if firm i exported good k to Mexico in both years. On the other hand, Treatmentik 
takes the value of 0 if firm i exported good k only to non-Mexican destinations in both years.
The dependent variable describes the sourcing of the inputs that could be used in exports of good 
k. So, with the help of an input–output table, all the goods j that could be used as an input for 
each export k (i.e., all those that exhibit a direct technical coefficient that is greater than zero) were 
identified in both the treatment and control groups. This information was used to create a dummy 
variable, Dijkmt, which is equal to 1 if firm i imports an input j from country m (El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua) that can be used to produce export k in year t (2010 or 2013).
To eliminate the time dimension, the change in Dijkmt between 2013 and 2010 was considered. 
Accordingly, ΔDijkm is equal to 1 if Dijkmt is equal to 1 in 2013 and 0 in 2010. Conversely, ΔDijkm is equal 
to –1 if Dijkmt is equal to 0 in 2013 and 1 in 2010. Finally, ΔDijkm is equal to 0 if Dijkmt is equal to 0 or 1 in 
both years. The regression to be estimated takes the following form:
ΔDijkm = β • Treamentik + Di + Djm + Djk + εijkm 
where Di is a variable that controls for differences in firm characteristics; Djm is a variable that 
controls for differences in importing-country factors, like tariff preferences or transportation costs 
(continued on next page)
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that may differ at the product–country level, and Djk is a variable that controls for differences in 
production characteristics, such as the proportion of input j used in the production of output k. 
Finally, εijkm is the error term that is clustered at the level of variation of the treatment variable.
The exercise uses transaction-level data from Costa Rica for exports and imports for the years 2010 
and 2013. For each record, there is information on the value of exports (imports), the type of good 
at the HS 10-digit level, the destination (origin) country, and the exporter (importer) identification 
number. The trade data is converted from HS to NAICS using concordance tables provided by the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Inputs are identified using the 2002 direct requirements I–O 
table provided by the BEA.
Table B.5.2-1 shows the results with the progressive inclusion of fixed effects. Column 1 shows the 
results with the country of origin and input fixed effect. It is particularly important to control for these 
factors because the incentives of sourcing a particular good from a particular country might depend 
not only on the RoO agreement but also on the tariff preferences that Costa Rica grants to Central 
American countries. The coefficient on the treatment variable in this column implies that the agreement 
induced an increase of 4.7 percentage points in the sourcing of inputs from El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, or Nicaragua. Column 2 presents the results when differences in firm characteristics are 
controlled for—the coefficient decreases (in absolute value) but it is still statistically significant. 
In column 3, there are controls for differences in production characteristics such as input–output 
proportions. The estimated coefficient is slightly smaller than in column 2 but is still significant at the 
10% level. According to this result, the agreement induced an increase of 3.2 percentage points in the 
sourcing of inputs from the full-cumulation countries. Note that initially only 3.8% of the inputs that 
could potentially be used in exports to Mexico were sourced from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
or Nicaragua. The agreement therefore raises this percentage to 7%, an increase of 184%.
a  The rest of the inputs come from other countries and from Costa Rica itself.
TABLE B.5.2-1
(1) (2) (3)
Treßàáâãà äåäæç7***
èäåä173)
0.0361**
(0.0173)
0.0318*
(0.0171)
éountry of origin-input fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effect No Yes Yes
Input-output fixed effect No No Yes
R2 0.146 0.177 0.206
Number of observations 575,754 575,754 575,657
Source: IDB estimates.
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
BOX 5.2   CUMULATiON OF RULES OF ORiGiN ACROSS MExiCO AND  
CENTRAL AMERiCA (continued)
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BOX 5.3  GRAviTY MODEL WiTH TRADE iN vALUE-ADDED
The impact of PTAs and the mechanism of extended cumulation on value chains can be illustrated 
through an econometric exercise that looks not only at the benefits of sharing an agreement, but also 
of having a similar network of agreements as the other member countries in this agreement. In plain 
English, it considers not only the impact of, say, MERCOSUR on production sharing between Brazil and 
Argentina, but also the gains from Brazil and Argentina sharing a similar network of PTAs with the rest 
of the world. Such networks can open the door for accumulating inputs from third parties, without 
foregoing MERCOSUR preferences in their bilateral trade.
The exercise uses the following gravity equation:
FVAijst = β1PTAijt + β2Sijst + Dij + Dit + Djt + Ds + εijst (1)
where FVAijst is the (log of) foreign value-added from country j embodied in the exports of country i 
in sector s at time t (which consists of three years, 2001, 2004, and 2007); PTAijt is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if countries i and j share a trade agreement at time t and zero otherwise; Sijst is the 
number of agreements that country i has signed at time t with third partners but which country j is 
not party to; Dij is a dummy variable that captures all the time-invariant variables that are normally 
included in gravity equations, like the distance between countries, whether they share a common 
border, common language, common colonizer, or a common currency, among others. The variables 
Dit and Djt capture time-variant characteristics of countries i and j respectively, like economic size or 
population; Ds is a sector fixed effect that captures sector characteristics; and εijst is the error term. The 
standard errors of the regressions are clustered at the ijt level.
FVAijst are built upon information from versions 6, 7, and 8 of the GTAP databases, which correspond to 
the years 2001, 2004, and 2007, respectively. The calculation closely follows the methodology in Koopman 
et al. (2014). The source data for Sijst is UN Comtrade, and PTA information came from IDB INTrade.
Note that the use of the number of agreements which country j is not party to might not completely 
capture the disincentives faced by country i to source from j because even though this number might 
be small, country i might still sell a large share of its exports to those destinations. We could have 
used the share of exports of country i in sector s that go to members of trade agreements which 
country i is party to but country j is not, but this variable is highly correlated with PTAijt creating a 
(continued on next page)
Costa Rican exporters targeting the Mexican market, comparing the situation 
before and after the agreement. The findings reveal that the agreement almost 
doubled the percentage of inputs that these exporters sourced from Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, or El Salvador. 
While these sorts of cumulation gains are informative, they are not general 
enough to be used as proxy of what would happen if a cumulation system were 
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BOX 5.3  GRAviTY MODEL WiTH TRADE iN vALUE-ADDED (continued)
multicollinearity problem. An alternative to Sijt is the total market potential that country i has access 
to through the agreements that it has signed with third countries and in which country j is not a 
member of. As such, this proxy intends to incorporate more information about the importance of the 
agreements that country i has signed. The total market potential is calculated as
MPijt =∑k
GDPkt
Dik
,
where MPijt is the total market potential of country i for all the agreements that it has signed and 
which country j is not party to; GDPkt is the GDP of country k that belongs to any of those agreements, 
and Dik is the bilateral distance between country i and k.
Table B.5.3-1 shows the results of the estimations. The first column includes the trade agreements 
dummy, the number of agreements signed by country i which country j is not a member of and all 
the fixed effects in equation (1). The results support the idea that the flow of intermediate inputs 
between two countries is positively related with the existence of trade agreements between them 
and negatively associated with the number of trade agreements signed by the importing country 
which the sourcing country is not party to. The first coefficient in column (1) implies that the value-
added from country j embodied in the exports of country i would increase by 7.3% (e^(0.0708)–1) 
if countries i and j share a trade agreement. The second coefficient implies that the value-added 
from country j embodied in the exports of country i would decrease by 1.6% for any additional trade 
agreement signed by country i which country j is not party to. Column 2 presents the results when 
market potential is used instead of the number of agreements. The result shows again that trade in 
value-added between countries i and j is spurred on if the countries share a trade agreement and it is 
negatively affected by the market potential associated with the trade agreements signed by country 
i which country j is not a member of. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the exercise, but with lagged values for 
the covariates to address potential reverse causality issues. The results (not shown) indicate that the 
point estimates decline slightly but the coefficients remain significant at conventional levels.
TABLE B.5.3-1
(1) (2)
Trêëì êgreement between country i and country j 0.0708***
(0.0153)
0.0506***
(0.0172)
Number of trade agreements signed by country i 
    in which country j does not participate
–0.0164***
(0.0012)
Market potential associated with the trade agreements
    signed by i in which j does not participate
–0.0116***
(0.0013)
Number of Obs. 1,071,588 1,071,588
R2 0.752 0.752
Source: IDB estimates.
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All standard errors clustered at the i,j,t level.
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established for the whole region. For that, a more general exercise is needed us-
ing the same type of gravity model used in section 3, but with data on bilateral 
flows of value-added rather than the full value of traded goods. More precise-
ly, the variable of interest in the model (which is explained in more detail in 
box 5.3) is the value-added from, say, Colombia, that is embodied in exports 
from Chile. This variable is particularly useful for analyzing the effects of trade 
agreements on the formation of supply chains for two reasons. First, it captures 
the flows of value-added from one country that are used in the production 
of goods in another. It therefore provides a realistic measure of supply chains 
between two nations. Second, the input imported from abroad is used in the 
production of a good that is subsequently exported. Accordingly, this variable 
is likely to be influenced by any PTAs that the importing country may have 
with its sourcing partner (an effect arising on the import side). It may also be 
affected by PTAs that the importing country may have with countries to which 
the good embodying this foreign input will be exported (an effect arising on 
the export side). This, in fact, underlines the essence of the estimation: the de-
velopment of supply chains between two countries is likely to be influenced not 
only by their integration, but also by the extent to which the country using the 
partner’s inputs is preferentially integrated with third markets.
To illustrate the idea further, consider the following example: Costa Rica and 
Peru have shared a PTA since 2013. This implies that, other things being equal, 
when Costa Rica imports inputs to be used in goods for domestic final con-
sumption, it has more incentives to import from Peru than from, say, Argentina, 
a country with which it does not have a trade agreement. This is the typical PTA 
effect that is analyzed in the empirical literature on trade agreements.
Now, when it comes to importing goods that will be subsequently used as in-
puts in Costa Rica’s exports to Mexico (which it has a PTA with), the use of 
many inputs from Peru (which is not party to this PTA) will be constrained by 
the agreement’s RoOs. Accordingly, Costa Rica does not have more incentives 
to import those inputs from Peru rather than from Argentina, even though it 
has an agreement with Peru.83 This is because the agreement with Mexico does 
not allow cumulation from Peru (or, for that matter, from Argentina). In more 
general terms, Costa Rica’s exports to other members of its PTA network will 
need to pay MFN tariffs if it uses inputs from countries which do not have an 
83 Strictly speaking, not all inputs from Peru are constrained by the RoOs of the Costa Rica-Mexico PTA. 
Moreover, some inputs that are constrained could be used as long as they undergo the necessary transformation. 
The general point here is that most inputs from Peru are bound by the agreement’s RoOs; therefore, they 
cannot be used freely unless certain conditions are met.
TO DEVELOP REGIONAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS, COUNTRIES 
NOT ONLY NEED ACCESS TO 
EACH OTHER’S MARKET, BUT 
ALSO SHARED ACCESS TO 
THIRD MARKETS
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agreement with the importing partner (so-called nonoriginating inputs), even if 
Costa Rica has a PTA with the country where the input comes from.
The story, though, can only be fully understood with the introduction of another 
country, say Nicaragua. As mentioned above, Nicaragua has an agreement with 
Costa Rica that allows for extended cumulation with Mexico. This situation im-
plies the following: other things being equal, when Costa Rica imports inputs to 
be used in goods for domestic final consumption, it has more incentives to trade 
with Nicaragua than with Argentina because it has a trade agreement with the 
former but not with the latter. This is similar to the situation between Peru and 
Argentina. Again, this is the bilateral trade impact that is typically captured in 
the literature. But the second effect now implies that when it comes to importing 
inputs that will subsequently be used in exports to a country like Mexico, Costa 
Rica has an additional incentive to import from Nicaragua at the expense of 
Peru (or Argentina) because it can cumulate materials from Nicaragua into ex-
ports to Mexico without losing its preferences there. The extended cumulation 
with Mexico gives an additional value chain incentive for sourcing inputs from 
Nicaragua.
The gravity model is used to estimate these two effects arising from sharing 
(a) a trade agreement and (b) RoOs that allow for extended cumulation. In the 
context of the road map discussed earlier, this can be seen as an initial, par-
tial equilibrium, approximation of the RVC gains of a more ambitious move 
toward a regionwide FTA. More specifically, the estimated impact from the 
gravity model will be the sum of two impacts. First, an increase in value-add-
ed from country j to country i that takes place if they sign a trade agreement. 
Second, an increase in the value-added from j to i that arises if i is allowed to 
accumulate origin from j because it is now part of its trade network and thus 
they all share the same set of rules of origin, making cumulation across them 
possible.
Before presenting the results, it is important to note that the rules of origin in the 
gravity equation were modeled based on a very simplified assumption, which is 
explained below. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the dataset on val-
ue-added is available at a very aggregate level, which makes it difficult to match 
the data on rules of origin, which are normally written at very disaggregated 
product levels. Second, to obtain robust estimates, the model was run using data 
not only for LAC but for the whole world, across three different time periods 
(see box 5.3). Obtaining detailed data on RoOs for all world PTAs at different 
time periods would be a monumental task, one that goes beyond the scope of 
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this study. Therefore, a very simple proxy was used to capture the potential dis-
incentives for country i to import from j because the rules of origin in PTAs 
with third partners prevent i from doing so: the number of agreements that i 
has signed with third countries and which j is not party to.84 This simplification 
comes at some cost. Because this is a crude proxy of the extent and the level 
of RoO restrictiveness, the results from the estimations should be viewed with 
some caution. The attention should focus more on the direction of the effects 
and the relative magnitudes rather than on the absolute size of the impacts.85
Figure 5.4 shows the results for this exercise. In all the cases, the variable of in-
terest is the change in the value-added from country j (the exporting country) 
that is eventually used by country i (the importing country) in its own exports. 
The first column shows the average across all source countries and destinations 
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Source: IDB estimates.
84 An alternative proxy was also used: the total market potential that country i has access to through the 
agreements that it has signed with third countries and in which country j does not participate. See box 5.3.
85 In this type of analysis there are always two econometric challenges: i) the explanatory variable does not 
pick up the effects of other factors or policies (say, export processing zones) and ii) the causality goes from 
the explanatory variable to the dependent variable and not the other way around. The estimation presented in 
Box 5.3 addresses the first challenge by including a full set of fixed effects that control, among other things, for 
time-variant importer and exporter factors. The estimation of the model using lagged values of the explanatory 
variable seeks to address the second challenge.
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FIGURE 5.5   CHANGE iN ExPORTS OF vALUE-ADDED FROM 
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in LAC. PTA measures the increase of value-added that arises from sharing 
a trade agreement, and RoO measures the increase of value-added that arises 
from sharing the same set of RoOs. The results, shown in the first column, point 
to an average increase in value-added of around 9%. That is, for the average LAC 
country, exports of intermediate goods that are subsequently used as inputs in 
other LAC countries’ exports increase by 9%, with equal contributions from the 
PTA and RoO effects.
The rest of the columns show the results when the sources of value-added (that 
is, the exporting countries) are grouped by subregion. The second column pres-
ents the average for Central America and Mexico when they export interme-
diate goods that are used as inputs in the exports of other LAC countries. The 
third and fourth columns do the same for the Andean and the Southern Cone 
countries, respectively.86 The results indicate the existence of some heterogene-
ity across subregions, with the countries in the Central America/Mexico region 
exhibiting slightly larger average effects.
86 Central America/Mexico includes: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
Panama. The Andean countries includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The Southern Cone 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
CONVERGENCE OF RoOs IN 
THE CONTEXT OF A  LAC-FTA 
IS LIKELY TO INCREASE THE 
USE OF REGIONAL INPUTS IN 
LAC EXPORTS BY 9%
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FIGURE 5.6   CHANGE iN ExPORTS OF vALUE-ADDED FROM 
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FIGURE 5.7   CHANGE iN ExPORTS OF vALUE-ADDED FROM 
SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRiES THAT ARE 
SUBSEQUENTLY USED AS iNPUTS iN SELECTED 
REGiONS’ ExPORTS
0
2
10
8
6
4
12
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Central America & Mexico Andean Southern Cone
PTA RoOs
Source: IDB estimates.
CONNECTING THE DOTS108
Figures 5.5 to 5.7 present more disaggregated results by exporting and import-
ing regions, and thus provide more insight on what is going on behind the av-
erages. For instance, figure 5.5 shows the results when the countries of Central 
America and Mexico export intermediate goods that are used as inputs in each 
of the other subregions’ exports. Note, for example, that the potential increase 
in exports of value-added to countries in the same region is very modest. This 
is because most of these countries already have trade agreements and rules of 
origin that allow cumulation among them; therefore, a regionwide FTA does 
not add much to what they already have. Note, however, that this is not the case 
with exports of value-added to the Andean or Southern Cone countries. Since 
there are currently relatively fewer trade agreements between Central America/
Mexico and countries in these other regions, the proposed LAC-FTA has a 
much larger impact on the potential formation of supply chains across these re-
gions. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show a similar situation for the Andean and Southern 
Cone countries.
Overall, the results suggest the move toward convergence and, eventually, a re-
gionwide FTA might have significative and positive impacts on the formation 
of regional supply chains. The largest impacts appear to be in the formation of 
supply chains across subregions, a result that arises from the fact that there is 
more room for integration across subregions than within them.
The Big Picture: The Partial and General 
Equilibrium Trade Effects of a LAC-FTA
The results presented so far reveal the immediate, partial equilibrium gains for 
a particular type of trade: trade in intermediate inputs, which is key for the de-
velopment of value chains. They do not, however, shed any light on the impact 
of a LAC-FTA on overall trade, including the part that arises from the general 
equilibrium effects throughout the economy.
To remedy this, two different methodological strategies were used, both of 
which have pros and cons. The first—a modified version of the sectoral gravity 
model used in section 3—still focuses on immediate, partial equilibrium gains, 
but considers trade in both intermediate and final goods. The bigger, gener-
al equilibrium picture is still missing, but this is a methodological option that 
is less data-intensive (and therefore requires fewer imputations and heroic as-
sumptions) and is very transparent as to the source of the gains. The second 
A LAC-FTA MIGHT HAVE 
SIGNIFICATIVE AND 
POSITIVE IMPACTS ON THE 
FORMATION OF REGIONAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS
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strategy resorts to a more structural model—a general computable equilibrium 
(CGE) model—which is a standard tool for trying to capture economy-wide 
general equilibrium gains. It has advantages when it comes to providing a bigger 
picture, but these come at the expense of the robustness of the assumptions and 
data used and clarity as to the source of the gains. Neither of these approaches 
consider services or the dynamic impacts of the FTA, that is, the gains arising 
from higher investment and productivity, nor do they capture the gains arising 
from the removal of NTBs properly. All the same, together they offer a good 
initial approximation of what is at stake in a more ambitious regional agenda.
The Gains of Gravity. As discussed in section 3 and technical appendix 3.2, one 
convenient feature of sectoral gravity is that it goes beyond the standard “dum-
my” variable to capture the effect of PTAs. It includes information about applied 
tariffs and the PTAs’ margins of preferences (MOPs) at a fairly disaggregated 
sectoral level (4-digit Harmonized System), which provides a good platform for 
simulating the trade impacts of a regionwide FTA across subregions and sectors. 
Since the focus of this study is on a LAC-FTA, the model was run to estimate 
what the average effects of LAC’s intraregional PTAs have been, rather than es-
timating the effect of each individual PTA, and the results were used to simulate 
a scenario where all intraregional tariffs are eliminated. The technical details are 
discussed in technical appendix 5.1.
FIGURE 5.8   iNTRAREGiONAL TRADE GAiNS OF A LAC-FTA BY 
SECTOR. A SECTORAL GRAviTY APPROACH
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Note: Simulation of a zero-tariff scenario based on the estimated coefficients presented in table A.5.1, columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8 of technical appendix 5.1. The tariff, indirect, and residual effects come from tariff reductions, MOPs, 
and a catch-all PTA residual, respectively.
THE MOVE TOWARDS A 
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FIGURE 5.9   iNTRAREGiONAL ExPORT GAiNS OF A LAC-FTA BY 
SUBREGiON. A SECTORAL GRAviTY APPROACH
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Note: These are gains in exports to other subregions and are the result of a simulation of a zero-tariff scenario 
based on the estimated coefficients shown in table A.5.1, columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of technical appendix 5.1. The 
tariff, indirect, and residual effects come from tariff reduction, MOPs, and a catch-all PTA residual, respectively.
Figure 5.8 presents the results for the region as a whole. The move toward a LAC-
FTA would increase overall intraregional trade by 3.5%, mostly driven by tariff 
elimination. One-third of this gain is explained by the so-called indirect effects 
captured by MOPs and the general PTA dummy (such as less policy uncertain-
ty, improvements in trade facilitation, removal of NTBs, and greater incentives 
for trade-inducing foreign direct investment). Trade in manufactures stands to 
gain the most (4%), followed, as expected, by agriculture (the sector where the 
indirect gains are the most relevant given the prevalence of NTBs), and mining.
Figure 5.9 breaks down export gains by subregion, and figure 5.10 does so by 
subregion and sector. As can be seen, Central America would expand its ex-
ports more than the other subregions (12%), driven by gains in agriculture, 
35% of which are explained by factors other than tariff elimination. These gains 
are rooted in better access to MERCOSUR, some of the Andean countries, and 
the Caribbean (see table 2.2, section 2). The Caribbean comes second with an 
estimated 8.8% gain driven by agriculture and by better access to most of the 
region, particularly to MERCOSUR and Mexico.87 Mexico follows closely be-
87 Due to data restrictions, the Caribbean group is restricted to Belize, Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
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FIGURE 5.10   ExPORT GAiNS OF A LAC-FTA BY SECTOR AND 
SUBREGiON. A SECTORAL GRAviTY APPROACH
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Note: These are gains in exports to other subregions, the result of a simulation of a zero-tariff scenario based on 
the estimated coefficients shown in table A.5.1, columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of technical appendix 5.1. The tariff, indirect, 
and residual effects come from the tariff reduction, MOPs, and a catch-all PTA residual, respectively.
hind, with gains of 8%, driven by manufacturing, with tariff elimination ac-
counting for most of the results. MERCOSUR is in the middle of the pack, with 
4% gains on the back of tariff elimination in manufacturing and agriculture, 
mostly in Mexico and Central America. The Andean countries and Chile come 
last with similar gains, a result consistent with their larger networks of intra-
regional agreements. Their gains break down differently, however. Whereas the 
main explanatory factor in the Andean countries is manufacturing, in Chile it is 
agriculture. The Andean gains are mostly concentrated in Central America and 
the Caribbean while Chile’s are mostly in the Caribbean.
What can be said of these gains? They are certainly open to a glass half-empty, 
glass half-full interpretation. They seem small in comparison to past results for 
subregional agreements, which ranged from 8% to 41% (see section 3 for more 
information). But does that mean governments should not invest political capi-
tal in addressing fragmentation? Not necessarily. As suggested earlier, this type 
of exercise is more likely to arrive at the lower bounds of potential gains, as it 
focuses only on the immediate, direct effects. Moreover, it is not surprising that 
these gains tend to be smaller than those of the initial PTAs, which started with 
much higher levels of protection. But, even if the average 3.5% gain—worth 
US$11.3 billion in 2017—is taken at face value (which, as shown, hides signifi-
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cant variations across subregions and sectors), this is not something to be left on 
the table. For instance, intraregional LAC trade fell 26% between 2012 and 2017. 
In this scenario, even a 3.5%, “once-and-for-all” shift gain in trade flows is not a 
gain the region can afford to ignore.
A Glimpse of Economy-Wide Impacts. The general equilibrium approach adds 
to the analysis by providing a better look at the effects of LAC PTAs throughout 
the economy. As mentioned earlier, the picture remains far from perfect because 
the model still has major limitations when it comes to capturing all the sources 
of trade gains, particularly those arising from trade in services and from great-
er competition, knowledge diffusion, and innovation.88 None of these gains are 
captured in the simulations, which mainly reflect changes in relative prices and 
improvements in resource allocation. These results, therefore, should be also be 
considered the lower bounds of potential gains and are more illustrative of the 
variation in gains across different scenarios than of their absolute value.
The simulations detail how exports of goods would change with the full imple-
mentation of a LAC-FTA (including RoO cumulation) in three stylized scenar-
ios. The first scenario—the status quo—assumes that the world will resume its 
march toward mega-agreements with the full implementation of the TPP and 
TTIP. The second assumes that China concludes a PTA with partners in the 
Pacific region—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).89 
The third and final scenario, labeled “global trade frictions,” mimics an envi-
ronment of higher trade barriers and simulates the impacts of a 20-percent-
age-point increase in global bilateral tariffs.
The results for the change in overall (intra- and extraregional) exports are shown 
in table 5.1 and exclude the Caribbean because of data restrictions. What is im-
mediately evident is that the LAC-FTA “strategy” is dominant in all three sce-
narios, but its impact is particularly relevant in an environment of heightened 
trade frictions. A LAC-FTA would not prevent the region’s exports from falling 
in the event of a trade war but would decrease the drop in exports by nearly 
40%. This “cushion” effect is of the same order of magnitude for all countries and 
subregions, except for Mexico, due to its much higher dependency on the US 
market. In the case of the two mega-PTA scenarios, a LAC-FTA is also unequiv-
ocally the best option. However, the absolute gains are small, mainly because 
neither of the two scenarios seems consequential for the region, either because 
88 For details, see technical appendix 5.2.
89 The RCEP is being negotiated between the 10 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries 
plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
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TABLE 5.1   GENERAL EQUiLiBRiUM iMPACT OF A LAC-FTA* ON REGiONAL ExPORTS iN 
DiFFERENT TRADE SCENARiOS (%)
Country/
Subregion Trade Scenario LAC’s Response
Country Status quo China-led
Trade 
frictions
Status quo + 
LAC-FTA
China-led + 
LAC-FTA
Trade frictions 
+ LAC-FTA
Latin America 0.00 –0.03 –13.37 0.65 0.62 –8.12
Mexico 0.16 0.05 –15.25 0.25 0.15 –14.05
C. America & DR –0.36 0.03 –13.65 1.60 1.96 –4.91
Andean 0.00 –0.05 –10.98 1.70 1.67 –2.86
Chile 0.04 0.04 –6.69 0.23 0.22 –2.80
MERCOSUR –0.07 –0.13 –14.53 0.32 0.25 –7.67
Source: IDB estimates.
* The Caribbean was not Included. See technical appendix 5.2 for details. 
the countries involved already have bilateral PTAs or because the markets and 
preferences in question are not especially relevant to LAC.90
Overall, as in the partial equilibrium exercise, this is not a story about path-break-
ing gains, even allowing for the likely underestimation bias of the methodology. 
But it is again a story about providing a stronger economic backbone for more 
than half a century of regional integration aspirations, in which politics have 
often trumped economics. The estimates suggest that it would be a particularly 
opportune injection of economic rationality at a moment where the region faces 
strong protectionist headwinds in the global economy. 
90 Other computable general equilibrium exercises on the TPP, such as chapter 4 of World Bank (2016), also 
point to very small impacts on LAC exports.
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Technical Appendix 5.1
The results presented in figures 5.8 to 5.10 are based on an exercise using the same 
sectoral gravity model as described in technical appendix 3.2. The objective is to 
estimate how trade flows are impacted by a scenario in which a full LAC-FTA is 
implemented, meaning that all intraregional tariffs are brought to zero.
The first step adjusts the gravity model to estimate the average impact of intra-
regional LAC PTAs. It uses the following specifications:
ln(Mijt
s )=βintraLACln(1+TFijts )∗(Di ∗D j )+βotherln(1+TFijts )∗(1−Di ∗D j )+ρ ∗ ∗ ρ ∗ − ∗ ω ∗ ∗ ω ∗ − ∗ γ δ λ ∈
β ∗ ∗ β ∗ − ∗D j )+ρintraLACln(1+MOPijts )∗(Di ∗D j )+ρotherln(1+MOPijts )∗(1−Di ∗D j )+ω ∗ ∗ ω ∗ − ∗ γ δ λ ∈
β ∗ ∗ β ∗ − ∗ ρ ∗ ∗ ρ ∗ − ∗D j )+ωintraLACPTAijt ∗(Di ∗D j )+ωotherPTAijt ∗(1−Di ∗D j )+γ δ λ ∈
β ∗ ∗ β ∗ − ∗ ρ ∗ ∗ ρ ∗ − ∗ ω ∗ ∗ ω ∗ − ∗D j )+γijs +δits +λjts+∈ ijts
where, D
i
 and D
j
 are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the importing coun-
try i or the exporting country j are from LAC.
The model was estimated separately for four sectors: meat, vegetables and grains, 
manufacturing, and minerals. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of table A.5.1 present the 
regression results. For each sector, the model was re-estimated to include only 
the variables that have significant coefficients. The results are reported in col-
umns 2, 4, 6, and 8.
The second step simulates the trade effect of a LAC-FTA (zero tariffs among 
LAC countries) using the coefficients in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 and equation 
A.5.1 to predict bilateral trade when tariffs are cut to zero. The base year used 
was 2013, except for Chile, whose preferential data for that year was not avail-
able and was replaced by those of 2015 . As explained in technical appendix 3.2, 
the total effect was decomposed into the direct effect (tariffs), the indirect effect 
(MOPs), and the PTA residual dummy effect.
In this exercise LAC is made up of 26 countries: Argentina, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. These are aggregated into five subregions or countries: 
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay); Central America 
(Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
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Nicaragua, and Panama); Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Venezuela); Chile; and Mexico.
The PTAs that were included are the same ones that were used in technical 
appendix 3.2. The intra-LAC PTAs are: the Andean Community (AC), AC–
MERCOSUR, CACM, CACM–Mexico, CAFTA–DR, CARICOM, CARICOM–
Colombia, CARICOM–Costa Rica, CARICOM–Cuba, CARICOM–Dominican 
Republic, CARICOM–Venezuela, MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR–Bolivia, 
MERCOSUR–Chile, and all LAIA ECAs.
TABLE A.5.1  SECTORAL GRAviTY. ESTiMATiON RESULTS
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Meat Meat VegGrain VegGrain Mnf Mnf Min Min
(S2) (S2) (S2) (S2) (S2) (S2) (S2) (S2)
÷øùúariff_in-
tra-LAC pair
–0.823
(0.652)
–1.220**
(0.491)
–1.189
(0.383)
–2.137***
(0.113)
–2.143***
(0.113)
–1.860*
(0.969)
–1.792*
(0.965)
ln_tariff_other 
pairs
–0.692***
(0.072)
–0.745*** –0.545*** –0.545*** –0.601*** –0.601*** –0.786*** –0.831***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.057) (0.020) (0.020) (0.152) (0.142)
ln_MOP_in-
tra-LAC pair
1.751***
(0.494)
2.120***
(0.457)
0.138
(0.487)
0.654***
(0.118)
0.659***
(0.118)
3.902***
(1.114)
3.886***
(1.110)
Ln_MOP_other 
pairs
0.128
(0.092)
0.152**
(0.073)
0.149**
(0.073)
0.298***
(0.029)
0.298***
(0.029)
0.128
(0.253)
Intra_LAC PTA 0.421**
(0.174)
0.457***
(0.174)
–0.138
(0.096)
0.010
(0.018)
–0.048
(0.163)
Other PTAs –0.034
(0.023)
–0.014
(0.013)
0.032***
(0.003)
0.032***
(0.003)
0.031
(0.020)
Observations 805,214 805,214 2,124,774 2,124,774 37,281,238 37,281,238 1,089,801 1,089,801
R-squared 0.831 0.831 0.826 0.826 0.820 0.820 0.822 0.822
imp#exp#hs4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
exp#hs4#year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
imp#year No No No No No No No No
imp#hs2#year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors cluster by imp#exp#hs4 in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Technical Appendix 5.2
The general equilibrium results presented in table 5.1 are based on comput-
able general equilibrium (CGE) model developed by Giordano, Watanuki, and 
Gavagnin (2013). This version of the model has been developed to specifically 
evaluate the payoff of a policy response that would allow the region to widen 
and deepen regional integration to offset the negative impact of an external en-
vironment that becomes progressively more protectionist.
The model belongs to the class of global (multicountry and multisector) CGE 
models, which feature the following characteristics: static, constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition, fixed employment levels, and no link between 
trade and total factor productivity. For this particular application, the following 
extensions were introduced: i) the separation of imports and domestic inputs 
(i.e., the Armington composite) in the production function for each demander; 
ii) the explicit modeling of RoOs; and iii) the inclusion of trade costs.
The model is calibrated to the GTAP 9a database. Specifically, it singles out 
twenty-nine countries, eleven sectors, two labor categories, one physical capi-
tal stock, and the natural resources (i.e., land) used in agriculture and mining. 
The model assumes perfect mobility across sectors for both labor categories and 
physical capital, and sector specificity for natural resources used in agriculture 
and mining. At the macro level, the following macroeconomic closure rules were 
applied: (a) balance of payments: to ensure that the simulations are neutral in 
terms of changes in countries’ net foreign assets, changes in real exchange rates 
maintain a current account balance that is fixed in foreign currency; (b) govern-
ment consumption: to ensure that the simulations are budget-neutral, changes 
in income tax rates on households clear the government budget (i.e., no domes-
tic and/or foreign financing additional to baseline values); and (c) intertemporal 
investment: to ensure neutrality across the simulations in terms of investing in 
future activities, real investment is fixed. As a result of the last two closure rules, 
changes in real private consumption may be interpreted as being equivalent to 
changes in aggregate welfare.
The simulations build on a baseline that replicates the world economy in the 
base year, upon which the following groups of scenarios were designed:
1. Status quo: This set of scenarios assumes that the global trade environ-
ment follows the course set in the last decade. The United States (US) is 
at the center of negotiation initiatives (US–global), and megaregional 
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agreements—which were modeled as a complete phase-out of residual tar-
iffs among the members of the TPP and TTIP—are the main drivers of trade 
liberalization.
2. China-led: An alternative scenario assumes that China takes the lead by 
concluding a free trade agreement with partners in the Pacific region, which 
was modeled as complete trade liberalization among the members of the 
RCEP initiative.
3. Global trade frictions: This set of scenarios assumes that global trade fric-
tions increase. It was modeled as the imposition of a hypothetical tariff of 
20 percentage points on top of the tariffs that are currently applied to all 
existing bilateral trade flows.
4. Latin American and Caribbean response (with integration): The final set 
of scenarios was designed as a variant of those discussed above. It compares 
the option of pursuing a deep free trade area whereby not only are residual 
tariffs phased out among all economies in the region, RoOs are also harmo-
nized into a single set of provisions (LAC-FTA). Technically, this scenario 
eliminates the implicit subsidy granted to FTA intermediates and the im-
plicit tax on non-FTA intermediates originating in countries in the region 
that prevailed prior to deeper integration.
Given the specification of the model and the underlying assumptions, the results 
should not be interpreted as a prediction of the magnitude of the economy-wide 
effects of the otherwise hypothetical policy reform experiments but should rath-
er serve as an indication of their ranking to establish policy priorities. Table 
A.5.2 details the impact of select scenarios on exports and imports by subregion.
ESTIMATING THE GAINS 119
TABLE A.5.2   TRADE iMPACT OF SELECTED SiMULATiON SCENARiOS 
(US$ and percentage change from base)
   
 
Base (*)
External Environment Latin American Response
 
Country
USA–
Global
China–
Global
Tar20–
Global
USA–
Global + 
LAC-FTA
China–
Global + 
LAC-FTA
Tar20-
Global + 
LAC-FTA
Exports Mexico 352,233 0.157 0.049 –15.245 0.246 0.154 –14.051
C. America 
& DR
87,968 –0.360 0.033 –13.654 1.596 1.963 –4.907
Andean 213,466 –0.003 –0.045 –10.981 1.701 1.669 –2.857
Chile 94,021 0.044 0.039 –6.691 0.230 0.224 –2.799
MERCOSUR 390,387 –0.065 –0.132 –14.529 0.320 0.251 –7.665
Latin 
America
1,138,075 0.001 –0.033 –13.370 0.647 0.617 –8.124
imports Mexico 322,089 –0.149 0.025 –17.936 0.669 0.860 –14.482
C. America 
& DR
117,052 –0.387 –0.128 –10.443 1.367 1.609 –3.276
Andean 180,673 –0.149 –0.142 –14.406 1.582 1.608 –4.840
Chile 80,891 0.106 –0.241 –12.817 0.548 0.219 –6.763
MERCOSUR 373,076 –0.194 –0.372 –17.074 0.312 0.128 –8.404
Latin 
America
1,073,782 –0.171 –0.178 –15.840 0.765 0.765 –8.945
Source: IDB estimates. 
Note: (*) in millions of US$.

WRAPPING UP
This report set out to answer a few key questions about the results of LAC’s 
quarter-of-a-century experiment with the “new regionalism” and their impli-
cations for the region’s trade policy agenda. Five sections of analysis later, what 
are the main findings? The picture in the rearview mirror is a nuanced one. 
The open regionalism of the early 1990s clearly overcame the paralysis of the 
postwar period, which was rooted in the conflict between LAC countries’ pro-
tectionism and their aspirations toward integration. This regionalism thrived 
as these countries’ development strategies shifted to promarket and protrade 
policies, which not only facilitated the liberalization of intraregional trade but 
also minimized the costs of trade diversion that are implicit in preferential 
liberalizations.
The new regionalism was also marked by a move from more ambitious, region-
wide goals to more pragmatic, subregional set-ups. This approach was a mixed 
blessing, however. On the one hand, it simplified and expedited negotiations, 
while opening the door to more ambitious, Europe-like agreements. On the 
other, however, it set strict limits to the benefits of regional PTAs by promot-
ing fragmentation. The quantitative exercises in this study show unequivocally 
that subregional PTAs were powerful tools for promoting regional integration: 
they boosted intraregional trade by 64%, on average, despite a mixed record of 
implementation. However, the results also show that PTAs were very ineffective 
in fulfilling their main economic motivation: boosting competitiveness abroad. 
The blame for this outcome can be largely laid at the door of fragmentation. 
LAC’s small, subregional PTAs, whose members shared similar comparative ad-
vantages, were poorly equipped to generate large enough scale and specializa-
tion gains to move the global competitiveness needle. This was especially true 
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at a time when the emergence of mega-economies and mega-agreements were 
transforming the world economy.
When the focus of the report shifts toward the future policy agenda, the recom-
mendations may sound disconcerting, as they point to a solution that has al-
ready been tried and proved to be elusive: the convergence toward a regionwide 
FTA. Why would things be different this time around? The recommendations in 
section 4 build on the lessons learned and the challenges and opportunities of 
new global and regional policy environments.
In a global economy that is increasingly dominated by mega-economies and 
mega-agreements but is also facing the challenge of a protectionist backlash, 
LAC’s mosaic of small intraregional PTAs leave the region with little choice: 
either these PTAs acquire a critical economic mass or they face a slow death or, 
worse yet, irrelevancy. If LAC governments want to hold on to their regional 
integration objectives, convergence is the answer. Unlike during previous initia-
tives, the region has now a favorable policy environment and a strong head-start: 
nearly 90% of intraregional trade is already duty-free. The burning question, 
though, is how best to go about creating a regionwide FTA. This is where the 
ability to learn from past mistakes matters the most.
This report does not underestimate the political constraints of this challenge. 
It discusses different routes to convergence, giving governments the option 
of picking the itinerary that is best suited to their circumstances. They could 
take a more cautious, step-by-step approach, beginning by extending the cu-
mulation of RoOs among existing agreements and then filling in gaps in these 
relationships. Alternatively, they could plot a nonstop course to a LAC-FTA. 
Given the region’s experiences with customs unions, supranational institu-
tions, and complex disciplines, the recommendations point to a “plain vanilla” 
free trade zone, based on intergovernmental architecture and with a focus on 
goods and services as a first step. In the spirit of a “living agreement,” other 
issues such as intellectual property, labor, or the environment may be consid-
ered once the foundations for a regional free trade area for goods and services 
is firmly in place.
The agreement should also include a broad chapter on trade facilitation, covering 
not just customs-related measures but also mechanisms capable of minimizing 
transportation and transaction costs, such as technical standards, phytosanitary 
measures, and logistics. While efforts to rationalize and promote the harmo-
nization of these measures do not necessarily depend on a formal trade agree
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ment, this platform represents a major opportunity to facilitate coordination 
and enforce the commitments already contained in a series of subregional ini-
tiatives relating to both infrastructure and trade facilitation.
Another critical recommendation is to get negotiations started as soon as a crit-
ical mass of countries with enough gravitational pull indicate their commitment 
to reaching a LAC-FTA—there is no need for all the region’s governments to be 
involved at the early stages. Taking a page from the Pacific Alliance’s playbook, 
all aspiring members should be required to already be party to bilateral or sub-
regional PTAs as a way of facilitating negotiations and signaling their commit-
ment, which is indispensable for the region’s credibility. During this process, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are in a unique position to play a critical role 
and eventually bring together the region’s largest subregional blocs—the Pacific 
Alliance and MERCOSUR—whose combined US$4.3-trillion market accounts 
for 81% of LAC’s GDP.
The report concludes with a few estimates of the potential trade gains that 
convergence could bring. The message is clear: the gains of convergence are 
not likely to be a panacea or even a major boost for LAC trade but they are a 
low-hanging fruit, and the region can hardly afford to ignore them. There is a 
clear opportunity for LAC to build more economic backbone into a commit-
ment that has survived the ebb and flow of politics for at least half a century. In 
the process, the region stands to collect gains that are far from negligible, which 
is a rarity in the current global trade environment.
Estimates of the immediate, localized impact of a LAC-FTA point to average 
gains of 9% for intraregional trade in the intermediate goods used in the region’s 
exports, which would be an important boost for LAC’s underdeveloped regional 
value chains. Likewise, an average 3.5% increase is expected for intraregional 
trade as a whole (an additional US$11.3 billion, based on 2017 flows), with a sig-
nificant variance across subregions and sectors (ranging from 1% in mining in 
the Andean countries to 8% in manufacturing in Mexico and 21% in agriculture 
in Central America). Even if these gains are taken at face value—and they are 
admittedly partial, lower-bound estimates—they cannot be dismissed as irrel-
evant, particularly in a context where intraregional trade has fallen by 26% be-
tween 2012 and 2017. The estimates that seek to capture economy-wide effects 
tell a similar story of modest yet palpable gains that are particularly useful for 
illustrating the insurance policy dimension of potential convergence. If frictions 
in global trade increase, a regionwide FTA would mitigate negative impacts on 
LAC exports by as much as 40%.
These estimates also send an important message in terms of the advantages of 
taking an aggressive approach to convergence rather than a cautious one. If the 
gains of moving all the way toward a regionwide FTA are palpable but limited, 
a slow, step-by-step approach could render these gains irrelevant despite the 
eventual political advantages of such strategy, particularly given the pace of the 
transformations sweeping the world economy. If governments in the region are 
really committed to strengthening both the political and the economic cases for 
integration, time, unfortunately, is not on their side.

